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Critical infrastructure provides essential services of economic and social value. However, the 
pressures of demand growth, congestion, capacity constraints and hazards such as extreme 
weather increase the need for infrastructure resilience. The increasingly interdependent 
nature of infrastructure also heightens the risk of cascading failure between connected 
systems. Infrastructure companies must meet the twin-challenge of day-to-day operations 
and long-term planning with increasingly constrained budgets and resources. With a need for 
an effective process of resource allocation, this thesis presents a network criticality 
assessment methodology for prioritising locations across interdependent infrastructure 
systems, using metrics of the expected consequence of an asset failure for operational service 
performance.  
Existing literature is focused mainly upon simulating the vulnerability of national-scale 
infrastructure, with assumptions of both system dynamics and dependencies for simplicity. 
This thesis takes a data-driven and evidence-based approach, using historical performance 
databases to inherently capture system behaviour, whilst network diagrams are used to 
directly identify asset dependencies. Network criticality assessments are produced for three 
applications of increasing complexity from (i) electricity distribution, to (ii) railway transport, 
to (iii) electrified railway dependencies on external power supplies, using case studies of 
contrasting infrastructure management regions.  
This thesis demonstrates how network criticality assessments can add value to subjective tacit 
knowledge and high-level priorities both within and between infrastructure systems. The 
spatial distribution of criticality is highlighted, whilst the key contribution of the research is 
the identification of high-resolution single points of failure and their spatial correlation across 
systems, particularly within urban areas. Service-level metrics also have a broad applicability 
for a range of functions, including incident response, maintenance and long-term investment. 
The role of network criticality within a holistic and systemic decision-making process is 
explored, for risk assessment and resilience interventions. The limitations of the research, 
regarding sample-size caveats and the definition of system boundaries within performance 
databases, lead to recommendations on cross-system fault reporting and the improvement of 
information systems. 
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 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1  Critical Infrastructure 
1.1.1 Value of Infrastructure 
Critical infrastructure is essential to support modern life, providing services crucial for the 
prosperity of a nation in terms of maintaining both economic growth (Solomon, 2013; NIC, 2017; 
Li et al, 2018) and social wellbeing (Haughwout, 2001; MHCLG, 2018; Sapkota, 2018). For 
example, the rail industry and its supply chain generate upwards of £10 billion in GVA for the UK 
each year (Oxera, 2015), whilst key business and leisure functions rely upon on a continuous 
electricity supply, with supplies to services and utilities, such as hospitals and sanitation, vital for 
the health and safety of a population.  
For the United Kingdom, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure defines Critical 
National Infrastructure (CNI) as “facilities, systems, sites, information, people, networks and 
processes, necessary for a country to function and upon which daily life depends” covering 
thirteen national infrastructure sectors (CPNI, 2018). However, the majority of infrastructure 
planning and investment converges around a more focused group of sectors, typically involving 
energy, transport, digital communications/IT, water supply, waste water, flood protection and 
solid waste (Tran et al, 2014; Hall et al, 2017). The Infrastructure Transitions Research Consortium 
(ITRC) advocates a strategic and systematic approach to investment and decision making for 
national infrastructure, both in the UK and globally, involving analysis of the performance of 




planning horizons (Hall et al, 2017). Such a systematic approach is being adopted in the UK, 
following the establishment of the National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) in 2015 to develop 
a framework for planning major infrastructure investment.  
To inform the work of the NIC, a National Needs Assessment was developed which provides an 
independent and long-term vision for UK infrastructure where “‘the UK will invest efficiently, 
affordably and sustainably in infrastructure assets and services that will drive the economic 
growth necessary to enhance the UK’s position in the global economy, support a high quality of 
life and realise a low carbon future” (Armitt et al, 2016). This assessment involved a detailed 
analysis of future infrastructure service needs and provided the foundation for a National 
Infrastructure Assessment (NIA). The recently published NIA outlines a long-term and cross-
sectoral infrastructure strategy and vision for the period 2020-2050, involving a significant 
programme of upgrades centred around fibre broadband, renewable energy and urban transport 
(NIC, 2018). In terms of capital investment, the National Infrastructure and Construction Pipeline 
includes projected public and private investment plans of over £600 billion in UK economic and 
social infrastructure between 2017-2027 which can be sustained long-term with the NIC having 
been given a fiscal remit of 1 to 1.2% of GDP (IPA, 2017). 
1.1.2 Risk and Resilience 
Infrastructure provides services and utilities which are distributed through spatial networks of 
connected assets from source to sink. For example, electricity is transported from generation sites 




and freight between terminals. Infrastructure owners and operators face a variety of challenges 
and in the management and maintenance of a portfolio of assets, in order to sustain their 
functionality and continuity of service. At a high-level, Hall et al (2017) state that the two major 
challenges for national infrastructure management are complexity and uncertainty. 
Infrastructure networks can vary significantly in their design and operation, whereas the number 
of ‘moving parts’ increases, the complexity of understanding and managing infrastructure 
increases. Uncertainty relates to the number of unknown factors that determine infrastructure 
supply and demand, with a vulnerability to potentially unexpected future changes, such as 
population, economic growth and technology. The ability to break down the complexity of 
infrastructure networks is therefore crucial to effective planning and management, as are efforts 
to obtain information on network dynamics and projections of future trends. 
The continued operation of infrastructure networks is of paramount concern, with significant 
capital investment required in the face of challenges from the ‘three Cs’ of congestion, lack of 
capacity and carbon (NIC, 2017) for infrastructure to keep pace with population growth and 
modern life. With capacity constraints, infrastructure demand is a major global challenge, 
particularly with increasing and ageing populations in cities putting urban infrastructure under 
stress (Tran et al, 2014; Heathcote, 2017). For example, all infrastructure relies upon a continuous 
supply of electricity, and with an increasing demand for and dependence on electrical power 
driven in part by communication technologies, whilst on the railway there is an increasing 
demand for both passenger and freight services (ORR, 2016; 2017). However, such an intensive 




with inherent capacity and design limitations presented by ageing networks with limited 
redundancy. Ageing infrastructure assets are a particular issue across multiple sectors, which 
incur repair costs for public and private sectors whilst increasing the threat of business and supply 
chain interruptions (Zurich, 2017) leading to insecurity of supply. In addition, infrastructure 
management is influenced by a broad range of factors including the financial climate, regulation, 
network effects, multi-stakeholder perspectives, siloed thinking (Parlikad & Jafari, 2016) and a 
general desire to maintain and improve environmental standards, including cross-sector 
decarbonisation (Tran et al, 2014). 
Alongside the capacity and design pressures on infrastructure, owners and operators that are 
already under stress must also manage specific risks to their asset portfolios. The concept of risk 
is a broad one and can be thought of as the probability of events or situations occurring that pose 
a threat to the normal functionality of infrastructure and the subsequent provision of services. 
According to the Engineering Council (2011), risk can be considered as the potential for an adverse 
outcome, and is a multifaceted idea including elements relating to the expected consequence and 
likelihood of harmful events. The determinants of risk have interchangeable terms, with different 
envelopes of meaning dependent on the discipline in which they are applied. A review of risk 
terminology by Thywissen (2006) identifies risk as the probability of damage, comprising the key 
concepts of hazards (events with the potential to cause adverse effects), vulnerability (the 
potential for damage) and exposure (the number of elements at risk). Cardona et al (2012) define 
the determinants of weather and climate risk as vulnerability and exposure, alongside the major 




highly dynamic and spatiotemporally variable. In the context of this thesis, risks to infrastructure 
can be defined as the combination of: a hazard, such as extreme weather; the vulnerability or 
susceptibility of assets to this hazard; and, the consequence of these assets failing for 
infrastructure service operations and performance. 
As part of the UK’s National Security Strategy (HM Government, 2015b) one of Government’s key 
priorities is to the need to improve the security of Critical National Infrastructure against attack, 
damage or destruction. Risks can be in the form of internal and external shocks, ranging from 
mechanical breakdown of equipment to more serious threats such as climate change, terrorism 
and systemic failure (ICE, 2009) alongside the emergent threat of cyber-attacks (DfT, 2016; POST, 
2017). Unplanned events present a significant threat to network management, as well as having 
major socioeconomic impacts. For example, despite the rail network being considered a robust 
mode of transport (Eddowes, 2003) the intense storms of 28th June 2012 resulted in 10,000 delay 
minutes to train services across GB and severed key rail links between England and Scotland 
(Jaroszweski et al, 2015). Furthermore, any significant electricity supply interruption could 
potentially have significant economic consequences for the UK (Royal Academy of Engineering, 
2011; 2014). In April 2018 a city-wide power cut in Birmingham, UK resulted in the loss of supply 
to 9600 customers causing shops to close and disruption to departure boards and lighting at 
Birmingham New Street railway station (ITV, 2018).  
Of particular concern, and most readily observed, are the risks posed by climate change and 
extreme weather. Baker et al (2010) outline how infrastructure has a two-way relationship with 




effects, along with the impact of extreme weather on infrastructure assets and the need to adapt 
to changing conditions. It is the latter that is of most interest for maintaining network 
functionality. It is the ‘extreme’ weather events, such as flooding, heatwaves and storms that 
present the greatest risks to infrastructure (Thornes et al, 2012). Climate change is increasing the 
likelihood of experiencing more frequent extreme weather events (IPCC, 2012) which in turn 
increases the risk of infrastructure failure. Thornes & Davis (2002) estimate that up to 20% of 
unplanned delays to railway services may be as a result of adverse weather conditions, whilst 
Dawson et al (2016) highlighted how projections of increasing sea levels are likely to increase days 
with line restrictions by up to 1170% and lead to repair costs in the £10s of millions. For energy, 
McColl et al (2012) reported that weather-related faults on the UK electricity distribution network 
in 2008/2009 caused approximately 1.9 million customer interruptions. Focusing on urban 
infrastructure, Chapman et al (2013) outlined how urban heat can place great stress on critical 
infrastructure networks in cities, through a greater demand for services and increasing 
vulnerabilities. For example, the Urban Heat Island (UHI) effect can cause heat to be retained by 
buildings and infrastructure in cities, elevating urban temperatures and increasing energy 
consumption for cooling (Azevedo et al, 2016). Public health issues are also of interest, with 
Thornes et al (2017) and Hickman et al (2018) exploring air quality in enclosed facilities, such as 
Birmingham New Street railway station. Health and social care systems can be impacted by 
extreme weather, through increased demand for services alongside the direct impact on 




Given the variety of risks, the provision of resilient and effective infrastructure is a global policy 
priority, with the African Development Bank and Asian Development Bank both making the case 
in recent reports for increased infrastructure investment to promote national development (ADB, 
2017; AfDB, 2018). The building of resilient infrastructure also forms part of the United Nation’s 
Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015). Resilience is another broad concept, with no 
commonly accepted definition. Different actors, organisations, regulators and stakeholders will 
have a different viewpoint on resilience dependent on their functions and interests, so it is 
important that the complete spectrum of resilience be accounted for when considering 
interventions. The definition of resilience from the UN (2016, p22) describes the “ability of a 
system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, 
transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including 
through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through 
risk management”. 
Resilience is multi-faceted and involves multiple timescales, with the World Economic Forum 
(2013) defining five core components of resilience as robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, 
response and recovery. According to Howell (2013), robustness relates to protection elements 
such as fail-safes and firewalls, redundancy is the creation of excess capacity and alternative 
options for service provision, resourcefulness is building networks of resources and organisations 
to react efficiently to events, response involves feedback mechanisms for early recognition and 
response to issues, whilst recovery is the capacity to adapt and rebound from disruption. Wang 




term view of infrastructure by using failure as an opportunity for improvements and building back 
better. Thywissen (2006) explains how the concept of resilience also incorporates the idea of 
coping capacity, relating to the level of damage a infrastructure can cope with whilst still providing 
a service. In the context of this thesis, resilience can be considered as the ability of infrastructure 
to provide a service before, during and after a hazardous event, with elements of improving 
robustness; the ability to resist disruption, redundancy; the ability to use backup assets and 
pathways to provide a service during disruption, and recovery; the ability to rapidly return to 
normal service following disruption. 
1.1.3 Infrastructure Interdependencies 
The vulnerabilities of infrastructure networks extend beyond the directly managed asset 
portfolio, with disruption to key supporting elements such as electricity and ICT (Information and 
Communication Technology) resulting in a loss of service. The management of critical 
infrastructure, and the resilience to major challenges and hazards, is complicated by the 
increasingly interconnected and interdependent nature of infrastructure. Interconnected and 
tightly coupled infrastructure can lead to social and service disruption that is greatly out of 
proportion to physical damage caused, as a result of cascading failure from localised damage 
(Vespignani, 2010). In the context of this thesis, infrastructure interdependency relates to the 
reciprocity between physical assets, in that interdependent assets influence each other’s 
functionality due to physical proximity of operational interaction (O’Rourke, 2007). There is also 
an element of directionality, in that interdependent assets place demands upon each other, whilst 





CASE STUDY – SUMMER 2007 FLOODING IN THE UK 
Source: Pitt Review of flooding in the UK during the Summer of 2007 (Pitt, 2008). 
 
The experience of extreme weather events highlights the potential for national-scale impacts 
across a number of infrastructure sectors. Extensive flooding in the UK during the Summer of 
2007, extensive floods presented a major civil emergency, with 55,000 properties being 
inundated with water, tens of thousands of people made homeless, 7000 people rescued from 
by the emergency services and 13 fatalities. Many essential infrastructure services were lost, 
with almost half a million people without mains water or electricity, transport networks failed, 
a dam breach was narrowly averted, and emergency facilities were inaccessible. Specifically, 
Gloucestershire was severely affected with the loss of a water treatment works leaving 
350,000 people without mains water supply for up to 17 days, the shutdown of a major 
electricity substation leaving 42,000 people without power in Gloucester for up to 24 hours, 
10,000 people left trapped on the M5 motorway and commuters left stranded on the rail 
network. Overall, insurance costs were estimated at over £3 billion, with further substantial 
costs faced by central government, local public bodies, businesses and private individuals.  
 




 CASE STUDY – EXTREME WEATHER DURING WINTER 2013/14 IN THE UK 
Source: Brown review of extreme weather in the UK during the winter of 2013/14 (DfT, 2014a) 
 
The experience of extreme weather in the UK during the winter of 2013/14 paints a similar 
picture for transportation, where a combination of storm activity, extreme rainfall, flooding, 
wind and coastal damage, and storm surges resulted in prolonged disruption to road and rail. 
Most evident was the impact on rail, with coastal storm damage severing the only rail line to 
South West England at Dawlish, leading to rail services west of Exeter being suspended for 
two months. Elsewhere, trees blown over in the storms caused severe disruption and damage 
to number of lines on multiple occasions, particularly after the St Jude's storm on 28th 
October, whilst intense rainfall caused flooding and triggered embankment slips resulting in 
several lines being closed or disrupted for many days. Key roads in the region were on high 
alert, whilst others were closed for varying periods due to flooding as well as trees or power 
lines temporarily blocking the carriageway. Gatwick Airport also suffered severe disruption 
on 23rd and 24th December, with the partial closure of the North Terminal because of 
basement flooding disrupting key power and IT systems. The Port of Immingham was also 
closed for a number of days in December 2013 with the east coast tidal surge overtopping the 
main dock gates, causing extensive flooding of the port area and also disrupting key power 
and IT systems. 
 




The conceptual basis of infrastructure interdependencies is explored by Rinaldi et al (2001), who 
outline how infrastructure networks are mutually dependent because the continued functionality 
of one network may depend upon the functionality of another external network. Two key types 
of interdependency defined by Rinaldi et al (2001) are geographic – where assets are co-located 
in the same geographic area and therefore exposed to the same hazards, and physical – where 
one asset depends upon a flow of resources from another external asset. Zimmerman (2001; 
2004) defines similar concepts as spatial and functional interdependencies. There is widespread 
evidence that the interdependence of infrastructure can be the source of emergent opportunities 
and risks, and therefore there is value in the identification and management of interdependencies 
(Frontier Economics, 2012). Operational efficiency through the use of ICT management systems, 
and economic efficiency through increased return on investment from cross-sector projects 
present benefits from interdependence, whilst an increasing reliance on technology and external 
resource supplies mean that the implications of asset failure may be widespread. As defined by 
Rinaldi et al (2001) interdependencies present the potential for common cause failure (Zuo et al, 
2018), where multiple infrastructure assets are exposed to the same hazard and fail at the same 
time either because assets are located in the same physical corridor or the hazard is widespread, 
and cascading failure (Lu et al, 2018), where disruption can propagate through infrastructure due 
to a loss in functionality of an asset in one network to which an asset in another network is directly 
connected and directly dependent for its functionality. 
UK infrastructure comprises a highly complex and interdependent collection of networks and 




widespread evidence that interdependencies are important for the planning, design and 
operation of critical infrastructure and this only set to increase with greater reliance on 
technology, digital connectivity and power supply (The Resilience Shift, 2018). The difficulty in 
integrating interdependencies into the planning, design and operation of infrastructure is that, 
historically, policy and decision making has been made in isolation for individual infrastructure 
sectors and projects, with little regard for other interconnected infrastructure (Tran et al, 2014). 
It is crucial that long-term infrastructure planning involves strategic thinking, overcoming the 
challenges of a complex governance landscape, the existence of regulation at multiple 
geographical scales, and the need to implement policies to facilitate low-carbon transitions and 
innovation.  
Exploring key cross-sector interdependencies, Tran et al (2014) identifies water-energy and 
energy-transport interactions as key interdependencies that may influence the future 
performance of these sectors. Looking at interactions between the water and energy, energy 
supply has interdependencies with water availability as thermal power plants use water for 
cooling, in addition to the existing hydro and pumped storage capacity, therefore hydrological 
variability poses a risk to water-dependent electricity generation. Murrant et al (2017a; 2017b) 
explored the resilience of the water-energy nexus, finding that a lack of available freshwater 
resource may compromise the UK government’s policy of increasing thermal generation capacity, 
but seawater resources may reduce generation costs during low freshwater flows. For 
interactions between energy and transport, electricity demand is likely to increase through an 




which would increase both electricity consumption and peak loads. This would require large 
investment in additional generating capacity, national transmission networks and local 
distribution networks (Baruah et al, 2014). 
The electrification of transport networks increases the dependency of transport on energy, 
meaning that a significant failure on the electricity network has the potential to cascade onto the 
transport network with far reaching consequences (Chapman et al, 2013). In 2003, the failure of 
three electricity transmission substations in South London resulted in the loss of supply to London 
Underground for over 30 minutes, and almost 40 minutes to Network Rail causing significant 
disruption to services (NG, 2003). In 2015, Euro Tunnel rail services between England and France 
were disrupted for over six days due to power supply issues with just a single line operating, 
resulting in delays of up to an hour (Kitching, 2015). There were also further knock-on impacts for 
the transport sector, with congestion on the coastbound M20 motorway in Kent due to Operation 
Stack (which involves parking HGVs on the carriageway to ease congestion to the Port of Dover) 
causing 20 miles of tailbacks. 
Exploring the concept of interdependencies between infrastructure assets involves an 
understanding of the infrastructure systems in which they reside. A broad definition of a system 
from INCOSE (2018) is a collection of different elements that together produce results not 
obtainable by the elements alone, with whole system-level value added by the relationships and 
interconnections among the parts. Therefore, a system is more than the sum of its parts, 




Dawson et al (2018) considered a systems view of infrastructure, with a system comprising of 
physical components; the resources moved by, or used in the construction of the infrastructure; 
the service provided; the users that depend on them, including supply and demand dynamics; 
and the governing processes, including various actors and protocols. Within these various 
components, infrastructure can depend upon other infrastructure to function, by means of 
technical, social and economic interdependencies. The distribution of different risks throughout 
a system is also highlighted by Dawson et al (2018) with specific risks to physical assets, network 
scale risks, interdependent risks produced by the relationships between assets of different types, 
and systemic risks at the level of the whole infrastructure system, such as supply chain disruption. 
For example, the railway system has a physical infrastructure sub-system which both relies upon 
and influences other sub-systems such as the supply chain, funding and socio-political factors 
(RSSB, 2016b). A systems-of-systems approach to analysing infrastructure is advocated by Hall et 
al (2013), moving beyond traditional siloed-thinking around isolated systems and viewing national 
infrastructure as a series of interconnected systems, such as transport and energy, which place 
demands on each other. 
In the context of this thesis, the principal focus is on risks presented by connected physical assets 
either at the network scale, or the level of interdependent assets that present a connection 
between different systems. Therefore, the scope of direct interest in an infrastructure system is 
thus limited to technical interdependencies between the physical sub-systems and networks 
contained within them, and their interactions, whilst recognising that assets have social and 




Thacker et al (2017b) presents a multi-scale system-of-systems characterisation of physical 
infrastructure to facilitate such an approach, shown in Figure 1.1, with infrastructure represented 
as a collection of nodes and edges operating at different systemic levels. Interdependencies exist 
both internally (within individual sectors) and externally (between connected sectors). The lowest 
layer of this structure is customers, who consume, and place demands upon infrastructure 
services. Infrastructure consists of assets, which are physical components that provide a function, 
which collectively form a network of interconnected elements. Networked assets that fulfil a 
similar function, such as railway signalling, can be grouped into sub-systems and subsequently 
those sub-systems form part of a system for that sector. 
A system-of-systems is thus a collection of systems from different infrastructure sectors, each 
with their own moving parts, that comprise a national infrastructure system. These systemic 
interactions mean that if one part of the systems fails, whole system failure can occur (Beckford, 
2014). 
 
Figure 1.1 System-of-Systems Representation of Multi-Scale Critical National Infrastructure. Adapted 





CASE STUDY - DECEMBER 2015 FLOODING IN LANCASTER, UK 
Source: Ferranti et al (2017). 
 
 
Intense rainfall during 4-5 December 2015 had a major impact on Lancaster’s critical 
infrastructure. A two-day rainfall total of 82mm through persistent heavy rainfall, resulted in 
common-cause failure through localised flooding. Business and residential properties were 
flooded whilst road transport was severely disrupted, leading to the closure of the key route 
around the city centre along with key bridges and part of the M6 motorway. A significant 
power outage caused by flooding of a major electricity substation led to approximately 61,000 
homes in Lancaster and the surrounding areas being without power for over two days until 
emergency generators were brought in. A major issue here was the flood water in excess of 
one metre in height at the substation site presenting difficulties for maintenance access. 
Another power outage cut off supplies to 45,000 homes overnight before the power supply 
was maintained via generators until reconnection to the mains supply later in the week. There 
was a clear case of cascading infrastructure failure, with widespread disruption across 
Lancaster and the surrounding area due to the unavailability of a power supply. With no 
residential or public broadband connection, and mobile base stations out of operation 
providing no mobile phone signal, there was a reliance on radio for information. There was 
no power for street or traffic lights on the roads, and no fuel available from electric pumps, 
whilst trains could only stop at Lancaster station during daylight as there was no lighting. 
Hospitals cancelled routine appointments and non-critical surgery, whilst care services, 
schools and the University were also suspended. Overall, every critical infrastructure network, 
across road, railway, electricity, digital communications, emergency services, and water were 
impacted either directly by flooding, demonstrating common-cause failure, or indirectly by 





1.2 Context of Thesis 
From the above, it is clear that (i) infrastructure is important socially and economically (ii) 
infrastructure has a variety of challenges to face and risks to manage (iii) infrastructure networks 
are interdependent which increases efficiency but also amplifies single sector risks. There is 
therefore a need to improve the resilience of infrastructure to both sectorial and interdependent 
risks, in order to maintain the value of an infrastructure system.  
Resilience of critical infrastructure is a key priority for the UK government. As part of the National 
Security Strategy (HM Government, 2015b) annual Sector Security and Resilience Plans are 
produced (Cabinet Office, 2017) which set out the current resilience of critical infrastructure to 
hazards, risks and other threats alongside proposed measures to improve resilience. These plans 
involve a range of potential resilience interventions. For example, for the energy sector, measures 
include ensuring an acceptable and affordable level of Black Start service, an assessment of cyber-
attack risk, fuel delivery contingencies and flood protection, whilst for the transport sector, 
measures focus on multi-agency planning, technological solutions, incident response, cyber-
attacks, flood protection, industrial action and space weather. Internal resilience plans exist 
within infrastructure owners and operators, who need to respond to dynamic risks such as climate 
change to maintain service provision and prevent escalating costs. Climate change adaptation 
reports have been produced by multiple infrastructure sectors including rail (NR, 2015a), 
electricity distribution (WPD, 2011) and water (Severn Trent, 2015). It is however crucial that 
interdependent network properties are considered in any resilience interventions to prevent 




Infrastructure resilience involves a range of types of intervention across multiple divisions and 
activities of multiple organisations. There are also multiple spatial scales to consider. The Pitt 
Review (Pitt, 2008) of the summer 2007 flooding in the UK presented a case of a national-scale 
civil emergency. However, Ferranti et al (2017) demonstrated very localised impacts of an 
extreme weather event for Lancaster, at the city-scale. For the railway network, Network Rail 
have produced specific route-based weather resilience and climate change (WRCC) adaptation 
plans, e.g. (NR, 2016c), highlighting targeted and local-level resilience interventions. Urban 
climate resilience is becoming increasingly important, with growing urban populations exposed 
to extremes such as urban heat (Tyler & Moench, 2012) requiring interdisciplinary action, high 
resolution monitoring and modelling of weather impacts on infrastructure systems (Chapman et 
al, 2013). The centralised nature, density and interdependencies of urban infrastructure lead to 
interconnectedness between services, meaning that disruption at one point in the system can 
have significant knock-on effects (Guthrie & Konaris, 2012). 
1.2.1 Problem Description: Resource Allocation 
Despite the heightened need for infrastructure resilience, owners and operators must manage a 
broad portfolio of activities, at multiple organisational and spatial levels, within the constraints of 
a limited management budget and finite resources. These activities can include day-to-day 
maintenance programmes, network operations, incident response, fault resolution as well as 
implementing long-term asset renewal and upgrade programmes (WPD, 2014; NAO, 2015). With 
such a range of undertakings and the high number of assets involved within an infrastructure 




management challenge is the allocation of resources for such undertakings, in order to make the 
most cost-effective use of the funding, personnel and equipment that are available (Durango-
Cohen and Madanat, 2008). There is therefore a need for prioritisation in resource allocation, 
where resilience interventions are targeted to assets or locations within a network where they 
will have the greatest potential benefit. The optimal allocation of resources and budgets for 
specific projects can be based upon cost-effectiveness and the valuation of an asset within an 
infrastructure system (Bier et al, 2008) and can be used to prioritise which projects to pursue and 
in what order (Carbno, 1999). A targeted prioritisation scheme can promote efficiency in decision 
making for operational and financial benefits. However, optimising investment and expenditure 
for infrastructure projects requires novel approaches to strategic and tactical asset management 
decisions (Parlikad & Jafari, 2016). They propose a quantitative and interdependent approach to 
decision making, moving from ad-hoc and qualitative prioritisations for single networks to value-
based priorities across systems. 
1.2.2 Proposed Solution: Network Criticality 
An effective quantitative approach to prioritising resilience interventions for infrastructure 
networks is through risk-based resource allocation, where projects are prioritised according to 
the perceived degree of system risk they are designed to mitigate. Farrell et al (2013) outline how 
risk-based processes can be used to allocate scarce resources across multiple systems, which have 
common traits in that they are all focused on protecting assets, have many potential locations for 
disruption and have many sources of risk to monitor and oversee. A key function of strategic asset 




principally based upon the potential location of application (IEC, 2015; Montesinos-Valera et al, 
2017).  
Verner et al (2017) suggest that the protection of critical infrastructure should focus on the 
identification and prioritisation of such locations based on the potential network consequence of 
asset failure, using objective measures to avoid reliance on expert or tacit knowledge which may 
have personal judgement bias and lack appreciation of system-level resilience. Such a 
prioritisation would assess risk from network effects, recognising that whilst assets only provide 
value when combined with other assets within networks and systems, individual assets can have 
a different influence on the overall value dependent on their criticality to service operations 
(Parlikad & Jafari, 2016). Therefore, if the response of the network to asset failure is dependent 
upon the locational characteristics of an asset, the spatial distribution of operational risk through 
a network is unlikely to be uniform and suggests that an assessment of network criticality would 
be of value for identifying more and less ‘critical’ locations. Network criticality assessment is 
common in both academic research (Jonsson et al, 2008; Dunn & Wilkinson, 2013; Faramondi et 
al, 2018) and internally within infrastructure owners and operators (NR, 2016d; Ofgem, 2017a) 
with a focus on identifying critical nodes, edges or components in infrastructure networks based 
upon various metrics and measures of performance-based risk.  
Central to a location-based prioritisation scheme for resource allocation is the identification of 
localised single points of failure which are strategically important locations that, should they be 
disrupted, have the potential to cause large scale consequences for service performance and 




locations are often referred to as Golden Assets which are defined as “equipment and facilities 
situated at locations where any failure of this equipment would have a severe detrimental impact 
on the operation of the railway” (Ellis, 2010, p177). The criticality of a location within an 
infrastructure network is a measure of its strategic importance for maintaining service 
performance, which can be defined by the potential consequence of failure. For the railway 
network, criticality would be mainly influenced by the number and frequency of trains passing or 
calling at that location (RSSB, 2016a). Therefore, as the topological characteristics and service 
patterns within a network have significant spatial variability, incidents or faults occurring at 
different locations on a network can have vastly different consequences for service performance, 
and thus a very different measure of network criticality. Jaroszweski et al (2015) demonstrated 
how weather-related incidents at key locations can cut off access to large parts of a transport 
network, not only through disruption to train services at the point of failure but also through 
knock-on disruption that propagates widely throughout the network resulting in costs and delays 
significantly greater than just the local impact. In an electricity distribution network, there is also 
a clear hierarchy of assets as one higher voltage substation can supply several lower voltage 
substations. Therefore, faults occurring at different substations on the network can have vastly 
different consequences for service performance and the continuity of electricity supply. 
Network criticality can help to understand the distribution of risk throughout a network and 
prioritise interventions at locations where the greatest service performance improvement would 
be yielded from the investment. Introducing externalities to a system adds greater complexity to 




holistic view of risks to a network and avoid siloed thinking, it is necessary to look beyond the 
traditional boundaries of that particular system at external assets that may influence the 
functionality of that system. 
1.2.3 Research Gap 
Based upon the above, there is clear need for an efficient and cost-effective prioritisation scheme 
for resource allocation, that targets activities towards critical network locations where the use of 
finite resources is likely to have the greatest benefit for service performance and resilience of the 
whole infrastructure system. This thesis aims to develop a network criticality assessment 
methodology for the identification of localised single points of failure, demonstrated for both 
individual infrastructure networks and between dependent infrastructure systems to produce a 
risk assessment that transcends system boundaries. 
The originality of the network criticality assessment methodology presented in this thesis, and 
thus the contribution to research, is primarily through the spatial scale and resolution of 
assessment, and the resultant benefits for reliability, certainty and application of the single points 
of failure identified. To quantify network criticality, the principal direction of existing literature is 
towards national-scale mathematical modelling and simulation of infrastructure vulnerability 
often across multiple interdependent systems (Thacker et al, 2014; Cats et al, 2016; Pant et al, 
2016; Thacker et al, 2017b). Whilst such simulations may have a broad scope, and the ability to 
explore a range of infrastructure and failure scenarios, the scale of the models requires a series 




computational expense which constrain the reliability of the results i.e. Thacker et al (2014). 
Vulnerability models are also limited by their uncertainty surrounding asset dependencies, often 
inferring dependencies from spatial proximity with assumptions that an asset in one network is 
dependent upon the geographically closest asset in the connected network i.e. Pant et al (2016). 
National-scale simulations have applications for informing the high-level direction of 
infrastructure investment and provision, but the application of the output for local-level decision 
making within infrastructure owners and operators, particularly at the level of prioritising specific 
assets, is not viable due to the reliability and uncertainty challenges as well as the definition of 
properties relative to national demand profiles (Pant et al, 2014; Thacker et al, 2014). 
There is therefore a research gap in developing a network criticality assessment methodology 
that better represents real-world infrastructure systems, with applications for localised resource 
allocation. In this thesis, the challenge of representing reliability in system behaviour is 
approached through a data-driven methodology. Historical fault databases can be used in the 
risk-based evaluation and prioritisation of options to identify fault trends for specific assets (IEC, 
2015). Metrics of service performance can be used to quantify the consequence of asset failures 
and thus identify critical locations that have the greatest propensity to generate a high magnitude 
of disruption should a fault occur. Historical disruption records facilitate a criticality assessment 
that incorporates real world network behaviour and allow a very focused prioritisation scheme 
for a broad range of network management activities. For the challenge of certainty in system 
dependencies, an evidence-based approach is used in this thesis. Utilising information sources 




cross-system assets increases the certainty in system connectivity. When identifying and 
integrating asset and system dependencies into a network criticality assessment, a high degree 
of certainty is required for local-scale applications. 
As well as better representing real-world system behaviour and dependencies, there is a need for 
a more localised focus and spatial resolution with assessments of network criticality based upon 
historical performance data. For example, the internal prioritisation scheme from Network Rail 
(2016d) applies a financial metric of network criticality to broad sections of railway track as long 
as 100km, in terms of the typical cost of disruption from an asset failure relative to the national 
average. However, whilst this metric is useful for allocating budgets for infrastructure projects at 
a high-level, a higher resolution of network criticality is required for localised management, for 
example, at the level of railway links, stations and junctions, and electricity substations, whilst a 
metric relative to the regional distribution would be more informative. The quantification of 
regional and high-resolution service performance priorities, within and between connected 
networks has applications for informing decision making and improving targeted resource 
allocation for a range of localised asset management and resilience interventions. Through more 
cost-effective use of the constrained management budget and resources available, robust asset 
management and network resilience can be promoted whilst identifying opportunities for cross-
sector mutual benefit in resilience solutions and enhancements, a priority of the National Needs 
Assessment for UK infrastructure (Armitt et al, 2016).  
The development and interpretation of the network criticality assessments also benefit from 




route levels within Network Rail, and discussions with a variety of management personnel at 
several WPD stakeholder workshops. 
1.2.4 Literature Scope 
The literature employed in the development of the research presented in this thesis, and that 
which has been excluded, is influenced by the nature of the resource allocation problem and the 
application of the proposed solution of network criticality assessment. The originality of the 
research principally lies in the formalised prioritisation of physical infrastructure for improving 
resource allocation at the local scale. To define and quantify the criticality of infrastructure at an 
appropriate level of spatial granularity for localised management (individual assets and their 
connections i.e. electrical substations and cables) it was necessary to consult literature which 
represented infrastructure as a network of connected assets. For this reason, the main body of 
literature employed in the research is that of infrastructure network modelling and simulation. 
Such work presents technical and quantitative methodologies for understanding the criticality of 
assets, determined by network topology and flows, such as Panteli et al (2017) who developed 
fragility curves for networked electricity assets and Pant et al (2014) who modelled passenger 
flows between networked railway assets. The limitations to the existing literature were then 
identified and the methodological approach of this thesis, in using industry performance data and 
metrics to represent real-world infrastructure network flows and behaviour, was developed. 
For a single infrastructure network, such as a railway or electricity grid, the identification of the 




considering an infrastructure network as part of a ‘system’ and the interdependencies between 
these systems, there is a wider spectrum of literature available. At a high level, systems thinking 
literature provides a long-established conceptual basis for considering any technical or social 
entity as a system comprised of multiple dynamic, interconnections and hierarchical components, 
where the behaviour of the entity can only be fully understood by analysing interactions at the 
level of the ‘whole system’ rather than static and individual elements (Senge, 1990: APM, 2018). 
There are multiple systems thinking philosophies and methodologies, such as Checkland’s Soft 
Systems Methodology (Checkland, 2000) and Ackoff’s Interactive Planning (Ackoff, 2001) which 
provide frameworks for understanding complex problems and the dynamic behaviour of 
processes or entities within a system. Evolving from this broader theoretical literature, the 
systems engineering discipline applies systems thinking to project management, such as the 
construction or renewal of infrastructure, through an interdisciplinary approach that ensures 
customer and stakeholder needs are satisfied throughout the lifecycle of the system (INCOSE, 
2018). Systems engineering combines multiple branches of engineering to understand the 
problem in its entirety, with Blockley & Godfrey (2017) outlining how rethinking the construction 
of infrastructure and collaborative learning can overcome deep and complex issues, echoed in 
the recommendations of iBuild (2018) in developing an integrated and holistic approach to 
infrastructure business models.  
Understanding infrastructure as a ‘whole system’, and the application of systems thinking and 
engineering methodologies, involves the consideration of elements beyond physical asset 




interdependent infrastructure research element of this thesis is dependent on the parts or sub-
systems of a system that are directly of interest. This thesis is concerned with defining the 
criticality of networked physical assets, that may depend on a flow of resources from other 
physical assets external to that system. The interdependencies directly assessed are thus between 
networked infrastructure assets from physical sub-systems (i.e. overhead rail electrification and 
electricity distribution) that are part of broader ‘whole systems’ (i.e. rail and energy) that are 
influenced by other interacting sub-systems (i.e. rail franchising and electricity generation). For 
this reason, the primary body of literature employed to inform the interdependent infrastructure 
network criticality assessment was that of network systems modelling and simulation. Such work 
models the interactions between networks of assets across system boundaries, via actual or 
derived pathways (physical connections or geographic proximity), such as Thacker et al (2017b) 
who developed a system-of-systems model for disruption propagation between electricity and 
flight networks, and Thacker et al (2017a) who modelled geographic risk hotspots based on the 
spatial density of dependent customers on cross-system assets. The limitations to this literature 
were then identified to inform the methodological approach, in using multiple system 
performance metrics and network diagrams to represent real-world infrastructure 
interdependencies.  
It is important to acknowledge that interdependent physical infrastructure networks are part of 
‘whole systems’ with multiple interacting elements, and the foundation that systems thinking and 
systems engineering disciplines have provided for recent network modelling methodologies. 




therefore there is the potential to scale-up the research with the application of systems 
methodologies or tools and thus the direct modelling of all system elements, but this is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. As a result, systems thinking and engineering literature was excluded in 
the development of the research. Nevertheless, some systemic concepts are helpful for the 
context of the application of network criticality, such as the work of Beckford (2016) on 
information management and organisational structure, and are included in the latter chapters of 
the thesis to aid the interpretation of the research. 
1.3 Scales of Complexity 
Network criticality is influenced by different scales of complexity in both infrastructure systems 
and geography. All infrastructure management involves complex tasks, yet different networks 
have different relative levels of complexity, and thus different degrees of management difficulty, 
dependent upon the topology, service patterns or flows, and operational processes involved. 
Therefore, the spatial distribution of risk and thus single points of failure is likely to differ between 
infrastructure networks, as are the requirements for resilience interventions. Within 
infrastructure networks, the management of both day-to-day tasks and long-term planning is 
typically devolved into a series of geographic management regions. Alongside differences in 
complexity between infrastructure networks, there are also differences in operational 
characteristics of areas within them. Therefore, this thesis aims to develop a scalable 
methodology for assessing infrastructure network criticality, demonstrated for three applications 
of increasing scales of complexity through a case-study approach. The level of complexity is scaled 




network in electricity distribution, then a comparatively more complex railway transport network, 
with both assessments applied to two different regional-scale management areas of varying 
operational characteristics within each network. The final stage involves scaling up complexity 
further by bringing the two network criticality assessments together in order to assess the 
dependencies of an electrified railway on external electricity distribution for traction power 
supplies at the local-scale.  
1.3.1 Less Complex Network - Electricity Distribution 
The UK’s electricity network delivers power to industrial, commercial and domestic consumers 
and is divided into two parts. National-scale circuits operating at high voltages (HV) up to 400kV 
comprise the transmission network, transporting power from generation sites to large 
substations, which is owned and maintained by a single infrastructure company in National Grid 
(NG). Regional-scale circuits operating at and below 132kV are the responsibility of Distribution 
Network Operators (DNOs). The distribution network transforms power from HV via a series of 
stages down to 11kV and below for residential supplies. DNOs undertake a variety of activities. 
Alongside design and development, and logistics, the core function within a DNO is network 
services, involving the management of safety, physical delivery and delivery costs, along with the 
day-to-day requirements of depots (WPD, 2014). Key tasks are local project planning and delivery 
such as asset replacement, inspection and maintenance such as tree cutting, customer services, 





The network is operated by different DNOs, which are separate infrastructure companies, 
covering different geographic areas of the UK. Within a DNO, network management is further 
divided into a series of regions known as licence areas, with responsibility for regional distribution 
services. There are currently fourteen licence areas in GB, managed by six DNOs (Figure 1.2). This 
thesis focuses on two licence areas of contrasting topology and operations, in the South West and 
West Midlands, both of which are managed by Western Power Distribution (WPD). 
 
Figure 1.2. Map of electricity distribution network DNOs and Licence Areas. Adapted from Ofgem (2018). 
 
Electricity networks have quite a simplistic and hierarchical topology, where power flows from 
source to sink (transmission/generation to consumer) and from a small number of HV substations 




unidirectional, with the exception of distributed generation and smart grid technologies, 
therefore the pathways between substations, and thus the footprint of assets is clearly defined. 
A substation failure will typically only impact the substations and customers to which it supplies 
electricity. There is potential for cascades of failure between substations, but this is likely to be 
within an operating voltage level and with limited spatial propagation. Electricity distribution 
networks are typically comprised of substation sites connected by underground cables or 
overhead lines. The distinction between the locational characteristics of substations comes from 
the operating voltage and the demand/load profiles. Infrastructure management and service 
operations are also combined, falling under the jurisdiction of the DNO. 
1.3.2 More Complex Network - Railway Transportation 
The UK’s railway network transports both passengers and freight between stations and terminals 
using rolling stock/trains moving on steel rails. The majority of rail infrastructure is owned and 
maintained by a single infrastructure company in Network Rail (NR). The operation of train 
services is the responsibility of separate and privately-owned Train Operating Companies (TOCs) 
and Freight Operating Companies (FOCs) for passenger and freight trains respectively. For NR, 
managing the railway network involves three main business activities (NAO, 2015). These are (i) 
Network Operations – including nearly 75% of the workforce but less than a third of spend, 
covering in-house maintenance and operations including signalling, day-to-day running and 
activities, along with small renewal projects (ii) Infrastructure Projects – including 12% of the 
workforce but two-thirds of spend, involves strategic planning and delivery of large projects, 




planning – includes elements such as plans for meeting future capacity and demand projections, 
group and corporate strategies, and the digital railway programme within the horizons of five-
year Control Periods.  
NR devolve the day-to-day responsibility for railway management into nine strategic geographical 
routes (Figure 1.3), including Freight and National Passenger Operations (FNPO). These routes are 
semi-autonomous business units and can make operational and financial decisions within the 
national-level framework and oversight from the National Operations Centre (NOC) in Milton 
Keynes. This thesis focuses on two routes of contrasting topology and operations, in Wessex and 
the southern half of London North Western (LNW).  
 




Railway networks have a quite complex topology, as locations are highly interconnected. In 
theory, it is possible to travel between any two points on the railway network, with any location 
having the potential to act as both a source and sink for train services. Therefore, service flows 
are multi-directional, with trains able to operate upstream and downstream along a section of 
track, dependent upon the number of up/down lines available. There are often multiple possible 
pathways between locations, and thus the footprint of assets is variable and dependent on train 
service patterns. There is high potential for spatial propagation of disruption, as an asset failure 
can have widespread consequences for network performance. It is demonstrated by Jaroszweski 
et al (2015) how an incident at a relatively minor location on the railway network, such as Barnt 
Green, has the potential to disrupt services in Scotland and South West England due to 
reactionary delays to long-distance services.  
There is a high variability in the characteristics of locations on the railway network, such as 
stations, junctions, depots and freight terminals, with demand/load profiles variable dependent 
on service patterns and different categories of line, such as main lines and branch lines. The 
management of infrastructure and the operation of services are also separated, although Route 
Control within NR maintains responsibility for the regulation of services but does not operate 
rolling stock. The railway network is highly complex, with many ‘moving parts’ and sub-systems 
such as signalling and communications, many different types of assets and the added 
complication of human-factors with regulating services, passenger behaviour and train drivers. 
Multiple competing T/FOCs and train services in the same railway corridor effective and efficient 




1.3.3 Dependent Networks – Railway Electric Traction 
An exemplar of the dependence of the transport system on the energy system, and the potential 
for cascading infrastructure failure, is the clear one-way dependency of rail transport systems 
upon external power distribution systems for a supply of electrical power for various rail sub-
systems including traction current, signalling, stations and control centres (RDG, 2017). The 
energy sector is critical to all other sectors, as all infrastructure relies upon a constant electricity 
supply, therefore, a significant electricity supply interruption could potentially have major 
economic consequences (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2011; 2014). Furthermore, the success 
of rail transport is highly reliant on physical infrastructure, including well maintained rail track, 
power supply and train fleet (Leviakangas & Saarikivi, 2012). The most direct dependency is the 
supply of traction power for electrified rail to move rolling stock. Approximately 40% of the British 
railway network is currently electrified, with UK railway traction electricity demand at 3.4 TW/h 
in 2015-16, making the rail network one of the largest single consumers of electricity in the UK 
(NR, 2017c).  
Combining network criticality for two networks of contrasting topologies, service operations and 
management structures presents a challenge, with complexity scaled up further when attempting 
to identify and understand the dependencies between the two systems overall. For this specific 
application, dependent network criticality is assessed for a local-scale example of an electrified 
railway dependent on external electricity distribution infrastructure supplying power for the 




the electricity demands of a railway will influence the design of both electricity distribution and 
transmission networks. 
The operation of a traction feeder system is influenced by the activities of two infrastructure 
companies from different infrastructure sectors, in this case NR and WPD. In order to assess cross-
sector risk, there must be a consideration of multiple factors which introduce complexity such as 
(i) different types of assets – from electricity distribution and traction feeder substations, to 
railway electrification infrastructure (ii) different types of service flows – unidirectional power 
flows and multi-directional train services (iii) different network topologies – hierarchical and 
interconnected (iv) different management regions – licence areas and routes (v) different 
approaches to service and infrastructure management – integrated for electricity, separated for 
the railway (vi) different organisational targets and priorities.  Assessing system externalities 
increases the envelope of risks and vulnerabilities to a system, and thus the scope of resilience 
interventions required. It also increases the opportunity for cross-sector collaboration and 
integration of infrastructure planning and operation, for mutual benefits.  
There is also a difference in geographic complexity, moving from single-sector and regional-scale 
network criticality assessment to cross-sector and local-scale risks. For specific dependencies 
between assets, a greater detail of information is required to determine individual dependent 
pathways and resource flows. A case-study of the electrified suburban Cross City railway line, in 
the West Midlands, UK, was chosen to allow a focus on locally specific risks and dependencies 





Figure 1.4. Map of Cross City railway line. Adapted from WMR (2018a). 
 
The Brown review of transport resilience to extreme weather, based on the experience of winter 
2013/14 (DfT, 2014a) highlighted the resilience of the electricity supply as a specific threat to the 
continued operation of the rail system. In particular, the failure of key substations can be an 
unforeseen source of vulnerability during a disruptive event and it is recommended that rail and 
electricity network managers liaise to trace critical substations and cables through which traction 
power is supplied and identify single points of failure where resilience improvements can be 
targeted. To contribute towards this recommendation, this thesis undertakes a network criticality 




1.4 Aim and Objectives 
The overall aim of this thesis is to develop and demonstrate a local-scale and high-resolution 
network criticality assessment methodology for the evidence-based identification of single 
points of failure within infrastructure systems of different scales of complexity and dependency. 
A series of specific objectives are designed to facilitate the achievement of this aim. 
 
Objective One: To evaluate network criticality for a relatively less complex infrastructure system 
– electricity distribution. 
Objective Two: To evaluate network criticality for a relatively more complex infrastructure 
system – railway transportation. 
Objective Three: To evaluate network criticality for two dependent infrastructure systems – 
traction feeder supplies to an electrified railway. 
Objective Four: To explore the practical implications of the presented network criticality 
assessments for infrastructure system management.  
Objective Five: To evaluate the contribution of the developed network criticality assessment 






1.5 Thesis Structure 
This chapter has provided a background the thesis, including the importance of infrastructure, 
the challenges and risks faced, and the interdependencies between systems, along with an 
overview of the context of the thesis and the research gap, including an outline of the problem, 
the proposed solution and the approach of the thesis to network criticality assessment. Each of 
the specific objectives detailed above is covered by a dedicated chapter in this thesis.  
As a result of the range of data and information sources used in the thesis, and the differences in 
application, there is no overall literature review or methodology chapter, to aid interpretation of 
the material Chapters 2-4 contain a review of the relevant research background and the 
development of the specific network criticality assessment methodology used. Chapter 5 explores 
how the results of the criticality assessments can be applied for infrastructure management, with 
Chapter 6 providing a critique of the methodology and suggestions for future improvements. 
Finally, the overall conclusions of the thesis are presented in Chapter 7 alongside considerations 
of potential future changes that may influence network criticality and opportunities for future 
research. Figure 1.5 provides an overview of the thesis structure. 
It should be stated that the material in Chapter 3 is based upon a paper from Hodgkinson et al. 
submitted to the international journal ‘Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice’, the 
manuscript of which is included in Appendix A. To outline the various author contributions, Simon 




Quinn and Lee Chapman contributed with suggestions and comments prior to the manuscript 
submission. 
 




 ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION NETWORK CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an assessment of electricity distribution network criticality, a relatively less 
complex system compared to railway transport, with a clearly defined hierarchical topology and 
unidirectional power flows. The UK’s electricity network is divided into two parts. Circuits 
operating at HV up to 400kV comprise the transmission network, transporting power from 
generation sites to large substations, which is owned and maintained by a single infrastructure 
company in NG. Circuits operating at and below 132kV are the responsibility of DNOs. The 
distribution network transforms power from HV via a series of stages down to 11kV and below 
for residential supplies. The network is divided into a series of geographic regions known as 
licence areas, which are operated by different DNOs. There are currently fourteen licence areas 
in GB, managed by six DNOs. This chapter is concerned with the management of electricity 
distribution network substations at the local-level, which operate at a lower voltage than the 
transmission system but are greater in number. The security and generation of electricity are 
beyond the scope of this chapter.  
DNOs must manage a broad portfolio of activities within the constraints of a limited management 
budget and finite resources, including day-to-day maintenance programmes and operational 
incident response as well as implementing long-term asset renewal and upgrade programmes. A 
major network management challenge is the cost-effective allocation of resources for such 




equipment that are available (Durango-Cohen and Madanat, 2008). A key function of strategic 
asset management for electricity networks is the risk-based evaluation and prioritisation of 
options, which can be based upon historical fault databases to identify fault trends for specific 
assets (IEC, 2015). Decision making can be informed by a targeted prioritisation scheme where 
resources are allocated to elements of the distribution network where they will have the greatest 
benefit for service performance.  
A location-based prioritisation scheme for electricity distribution undertakings can be achieved 
through an assessment of network criticality, which aims to identify localised critical locations 
through single points of failure which are strategically important substations that, should they 
fail, have the potential to cause large scale consequences for service performance. The criticality 
of a substation within an electricity distribution network is a measure of its strategic importance 
for maintaining service performance, which can be defined by the potential consequence of 
failure and is influenced by a range of factors including network topology and power flows. 
Therefore, as the topological characteristics and power flows within an electricity distribution 
network have significant spatial variability, faults occurring at different locations in the network 
can have vastly different consequences for service performance, and thus a very different 
measure of network criticality. As power flows from source to sink (transmission/generation to 
consumer, except for distributed generation and smart grid technologies, flows are 
unidirectional. There is also a clear hierarchy of assets as one higher voltage substation can supply 
several lower voltage substations. Therefore, faults occurring at different substations on the 




Metrics of service performance can be used to quantify network criticality by measuring the 
consequence of asset failures at a high level of granularity across the electricity distribution 
network and thus identifying single points of failure that have the greatest propensity to generate 
a high magnitude of disruption to the electricity supply should a fault occur. Historical disruption 
records for electricity distribution network faults facilitate a criticality assessment that 
incorporates real world network behaviour with benefits for the reliability of single points of 
failure identified, whilst the spatial and temporal resolution also facilitates a localised and focused 
prioritisation scheme for a broad range of network management activities. 
This chapter presents and demonstrates a local-scale and high-resolution network criticality 
assessment methodology for electricity distribution infrastructure, using an evidence-base of 
operational data on service performance between 2009 and 2014. The study area encompasses 
the South West and West Midlands licence areas of the GB electricity distribution network, 
assessing localised criticality within two contrasting areas managed a single DNO in WPD. 
Applying the output from such an assessment informs decision making and can improve targeted 
resource allocation. Through more cost-effective use of the constrained management budget and 
resources available, robust asset management and network resilience can be promoted. 
2.2 Research Background 
Essentially, there are two broad approaches to defining criticality within electricity infrastructure 
management. At a high level, economic benchmarking is part of the price review process for 




identifying areas where efficiency improvements can be targeted through the cost reduction of 
interventions (Pollitt, 2005). However, for the purpose of this chapter in defining location-based 
criticality within the GB electricity distribution network through identifying single points of failure, 
network-based approaches are the most pertinent as they focus on prioritising interventions at 
specific locations rather than departments or business units, allowing an assessment of network 
criticality. Pagani and Aiello (2013) undertook a review of Complex Network Analysis (CNA) 
approaches to analysing the reliability of electricity distribution systems, where infrastructure is 
modelled as a connected graph of nodes and edges, which in this case would typically consist of 
substations, overhead lines and underground cables. Pagani and Aiello (2013) found that most 
studies focus on purely topological properties, with reliability parameters relating to the structure 
of the network and the position of nodes within a graph, i.e. node degree distribution and in some 
cases betweenness distribution for centrality. Such approaches are rooted in graph theory and 
apply an attack strategy to an indirected graph, assessing the connectivity between elements 
should nodes and edges be removed. Examples include the work of Rosato et al (2007) who used 
spectral analysis to estimate damage to three European transmission networks; Dey et al (2016) 
who examined how changes in topology influence cascading failure propagation in electrical grids 
using a branching process metric applied to IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 
test networks; and Koc et al (2016) who assessed structural vulnerability and robustness in 
electricity distribution networks using a metric of Upstream Robustness with applications for 




Topological studies are useful for understanding how nodes and edges may be critical to 
maintaining network connectivity but are abstract mathematical approaches with limited 
information on the physical properties and functions of a system. Pagani and Aiello (2013) suggest 
that purely topological measures of network reliability may be inappropriate and produce 
inaccurate results due to the omission of physical laws and power flows, highlighting a recent 
move towards weighted networks considering physical and electrical parameters including 
electrical engineering detail such as AC/DC power flow models and impedance of lines. Such 
approaches involve more reliable simplifications due to the physical and electrical dynamics 
involved, making enhanced CNA models more akin to real networks (Pagani and Aiello, 2013). 
Hines et al (2010) also conclude that evaluating vulnerability in electricity networks using purely 
topological metrics can be misleading, which could result in erroneous allocation of resources for 
risk reduction, instead advocating the use of metrics that account for network behaviour which 
provide more realistic risk assessments. 
More of the real-world system operations and behaviour can be captured through the use of 
supply and demand modelling, using information on network flows. At a broad level, Augutis et 
al (2016) assessed component criticality within a simulated mixed energy system, involving input-
output models of district heating and electricity generation. Supply and demand of energy 
branches (electricity, heat and fuel) were derived using an optimisation model. More specifically, 
Bollinger and Dijkema (2016) assessed the resilience of the transmission network in the 
Netherlands to extreme weather, evaluating a series of adaptation options. The unified electricity 




a power flow model based on known peak and mean consumption values, alongside generator 
capacities. Panteli et al (2017) examined the resilience of a test version of the GB power system 
to extreme weather, developing analytical fragility curves for individual towers and lines which 
were included in a network level model. Failure probabilities were combined with modelled 
optimal power flows in a sequential Monte Carlo simulation, with the aim of prioritising critical 
sections using both infrastructure and operational metrics. However, perhaps the most 
comprehensive model is that of Thacker et al (2014) who assessed the vulnerability of present 
and future configurations of the GB electricity network to climate hazards using a spatial 
hierarchical model of national-scale integrated transmission and distribution. Capacity and 
demand values were assigned to nodes and edges using a capacity constrained shortest-path 
resource allocation model to map pathways of flows between sources (generators) and sinks 
(customers), based on demographic data for demand estimates and known capacity values. 
Information on power system characteristics, such as generation capacities, end user demand 
and flow pathways provide a greater appreciation of the likely consequence of link or node 
removal for system operations. When combined with predicted or observed hazards, such as 
extreme weather, more comprehensive models can have additional applications for electricity 
distribution network management problems, such as evaluating resilience interventions. 
However, any model by its nature is a simplification of reality, therefore there remains the 
limitation of the necessity for assumptions on network behaviour. For example, Thacker et al 
(2014) assume that electricity follows the shortest path between two points, but the actual 




justifiable given the spatial scale of the simulations and the number of failure modes or disruption 
scenarios involved but are still sources of uncertainty. Risk assessment can involve elements of 
hazard occurrence and likelihood, asset vulnerability and susceptibility, and the consequence of 
asset failure for system performance. Assumptions on any or all of these elements introduces 
uncertainty in simulations. 
There remains a gap in understanding electricity network behaviour and response to asset failure 
using historical evidence of interruptions. The benefit of using historical evidence is that it can 
provide a more complete picture of historical risk, inherently capturing the complex operational 
and behavioural mechanisms that may be omitted or simplified in more theoretical network 
modelling and simulation approaches. In order for a consequence to have been observed and 
recorded in the data, an asset must have been vulnerable to a hazard resulting in asset failure 
and performance degradation. Therefore, a data-driven risk assessment is more likely to 
represent the complexity of real world network management challenges. Using historical data 
overcomes the need for assumptions and simplifications of system behaviour, increasing the 
reliability of critical locations identified, whilst also providing the spatial and temporal granularity 
to facilitate a more localised and focused assessment of network criticality with direct 
applications for a range of electricity distribution infrastructure management activities, such as 
maintenance and electrical switching. The utility of the national-scale approaches is limited for 
local asset management, for example, Thacker et al (2014) defines priorities relative to the entire 
GB electricity distribution network which will highlight national priorities, but those demand or 




unlikely to be explored. Local priorities can be determined using historical data to a high spatial 
resolution. 
To obtain a complete picture of risk, an observed measure of consequence is required. Pagani 
and Aiello (2013) highlight the need for network risk assessments that cross-check their results 
with the experience of DNOs, improving the applicability of results for real power systems, and 
the difficulties of such analysis given the confidentiality of information on network topology and 
properties. There is currently an absence of published academic literature that uses a metric of 
historical electricity distribution network service performance to produce a network criticality 
assessment for GB electricity distribution infrastructure. There are studies that describe statistical 
relationships between hazards and electricity asset failure using historical data, such as McColl et 
al (2012) who assessed the potential impact of climate change on UK electricity networks using 
data on weather-related faults and climate change projections. The relationships identified can 
provide great insight into the vulnerability of types of asset, but do not normally account for the 
structure or function of assets within a network either due to the absence of information or the 
need to anonymise individual assets.  
However, Ofgem, the regulator of gas and electricity networks in GB, in conjunction with DNOs, 
have developed a Common Network Asset Indices Methodology (CNAIM) for assessing the health 
and criticality of network assets internally within DNOs (Ofgem, 2017a) with a similar process for 
transmission networks (Wright et al, 2016). The purpose of CNAIM is to facilitate regulatory 
reporting and benchmarking of condition-based asset risk deliverables under the RIIO-ED1 price 




and renewals, towards high risk assets. Under CNAIM, monetised indices are calculated for each 
individual asset on health and failure probability, relating to asset condition and remaining 
lifetime, along with indices on consequence of failure and criticality. These indices are then 
combined to calculate an overall risk index per asset. The methodology for criticality indices is of 
most interest in this case. A Consequence of Failure (CoF) metric is calculated per asset, for four 
categories of consequence: financial, safety, environmental, and network performance. CoF is a 
monetised value in GBP of the likely cost incurred from a loss of supply to that asset, relative to 
the average cost for the consequence category and asset type. Each asset is allocated a criticality 
band based on the calculated CoF, ranging from C1 (‘low’ <75% of average cost) to C4 (‘very high’ 
criticality ≥ 200% of average cost).  
CNAIM (Ofgem, 2017a) is an evidence-based assessment as reference costs are ‘typical’ failures 
from DNO experience, established from historical reported number of customers interrupted and 
duration of interruption values as part of the Interruptions Incentive Scheme (IIS). To ensure that 
the topological and operational situation for each asset is considered, the derived reference cost 
is modified using specific local factors, such as number of customer connections and volume of 
load carried for network performance indices. Basing a risk assessment on historical performance 
inherently incorporates elements of network behaviour, as supply and demand for electricity, 
along with operational and control mechanisms will influence the consequence of an asset failure, 
captured in the metrics or indices used.  
The utility of a criticality assessment depends upon its intended application, including the 




level, defining the consequence of a supply loss to specific pieces of equipment. However, the 
potential financial cost of asset failures is calculated relative to the average for all DNOs in GB. To 
facilitate a cost-benefit analysis in the development of a long-term investment plan, a criticality 
assessment based on national-scale financial metrics is suitable. CNAIM has been used by 
Northern Ireland Electricity Networks to rank assets by monetised risk and provide an objective 
cost benefit assessment of interventions (Hutchen et al, 2016). However, there remains the need 
to translate national-scale financial allocations into projects of importance for local service levels. 
Furthermore, managing and responding to supply interruptions locally requires a more spatial 
prioritisation scheme, that moves beyond pure economic assessment of assets to understand 
direct risks to service level performance. An improved understanding of operational service risk 
at the local-level will allow more informed decisions to be made regarding the allocation of 
resources to critical locations for regular maintenance, interruption management and long-term 
asset renewals whilst also formalising and challenging priorities that may currently exist as tacit 
knowledge within a DNO. As such, this chapter presents and applies a high-resolution and data-
driven methodology for defining critical locations within regions of the GB electricity distribution 
system. 
2.3 Methodology 
Historical asset fault data from WPD is used to classify critical substations across the electricity 
distribution network in terms of the expected magnitude of performance degradation should an 




the infrastructure management perspective promotes a criticality assessment that can be applied 
to both operational and strategic decision making. The approach of this chapter adds to the 
existing literature by assessing electricity distribution network criticality using a pure service 
performance metric to define and map licence area level single points of failure. In doing so, it 
provides the means to prioritise resource allocation to a high spatial resolution, for a variety of 
local applications including operations and maintenance. The details of the data and method used 
to conduct the network criticality assessment are outlined below. 
2.3.1 Study Area 
This chapter focuses on two licence areas, both managed by WPD but varying in terms of topology 
and supply patterns: namely the South West and West Midlands (Figure 2.1). Applying the 
proposed methodology to two contrasting licence areas demonstrates the transferability and 
robustness of a network criticality assessment, responding to different types of supply patterns 
and thus interruption dynamics. 
The South West licence area covers the southwestern peninsula of England, an area of 
approximately 14,400 km2 (WPD, 2016) delivering electricity to around 1.4 million customers. 
Stretching from Bristol and Bath in the north east to Land’s End in the south west, the licence area 
is quite isolated having limited interaction with other DNO networks. Electricity distribution is 
supported by a 400kV transmission ring around the peninsula, connected at eight GSPs, between 
which the 132kV network operates in parallel along the coast. 33kV lines branch out along the 




particularly the central areas including the National Parks of Dartmoor and Exmoor and is 
dominated by resorts along the coastline. The centre of the region is more rural and thus 
electricity distribution is sparser. The principal demand centres around the cities of Bristol, 
Plymouth, Exeter and Bath where there is a higher density of circuits.  
 
Figure 2.1. The main map shows the extent of the South West and West Midlands licence areas used. 





The West Midlands licence area is located centrally within England, covering an area of 
approximately 13,300 km2 delivering electricity to around 2.4 million customers (WPD, 2018). 
Stretching from the Welsh border eastwards to Banbury (Oxfordshire), and from Congleton 
(Cheshire) in the north towards the outskirts of Bristol in the south, the licence area is quite open 
and potentially influenced by other DNOs at the boundaries. The interconnected 275/400kV 
transmission network supplies seventeen GSPs in the West Midlands. The main 132kV lines from 
these GSPs run north to south through the region, branching out to the major conurbations. 66kV 
lines branch out to cover the centre of the region, whilst 33kV lines cover the north and south. 
Key demand centres are concentrated in the north and east of the licence area, including the city 
of Birmingham, the Black Country region including Wolverhampton, and the Potteries region 
including Stoke-on-Trent. The south and west are more rural, including Gloucestershire and 
Herefordshire. There is also significant manufacturing and industrial activity, as well as logistics 
and agriculture which present more singular high demand centres (WPD, 2018). 
2.3.2 Data and Metrics 
Electricity distribution network performance metrics can be used to assess and quantify the 
degree of disruption to a substation during a specific time period. Electricity network operators 
globally use similar performance metrics, such as the System Average Interruption Duration Index 
(SAIDI) which is a measure of the average outage duration per customer served (IEC, 2015). 
Alongside operational metrics, there are economic based measures such as Value of Lost Load 




To ensure that DNOs meet minimum levels of performance, the regulator Ofgem has set out a 
price control framework known as RIIO-ED1 where the revenues that companies can earn relate 
to the level of performance output across six primary categories: safety, environment, customer 
satisfaction, connections, social obligations, and reliability and availability (Ofgem, 2017b). The 
latter category includes assessment of network performance, where the IIS exists as an incentive 
for DNOs to reduce the frequency and duration of interruptions through a scheme of rewards and 
penalties for performance above or below set targets. For unplanned interruptions, DNOs must 
report metrics of Customer Interruptions (CI), defined as the number of customers interrupted 
per 100 customers per year where an interruption is three minutes or longer, and Customer 
Minutes Lost (CML), defined as the average duration of interruptions to supply per customer per 
year, where an interruption is three minutes or longer (Ofgem, 2017b). Therefore, operational 
service performance is monitored for electricity distribution networks at the licence area level, 
through measures of temporal disruption and the scale of the asset footprint. The scheme applies 
only to incidents within the control of DNOs, excluding exceptional events, cut-out failures and 
short interruptions, ensuring that performance is assessed from the infrastructure management 
viewpoint.  
To complement the primary outputs for RIIO-ED1, secondary deliverables are used as indicators 
of long-term delivery and value for money, in the form of health, criticality and load indices 
(Ofgem, 2017b). These deliverables are based on the CNAIM methodology (Ofgem, 2017a) which 
assesses asset criticality in terms of the potential economic cost of a supply loss to pieces of 




CI metrics, adjusted for individual assets, to produce a monetised Consequence of Failure (CoF) 
metric in GBP of the consequence of a supply loss relative to the to the average cost for the asset 
type. Therefore, financial service performance is monitored for electricity distribution networks 
at the asset level, through measures of the economic cost of disruption. 
When selecting a metric for analysis of electricity distribution network criticality, it is important 
to consider whether the basis of the metric and the geographic scale are appropriate for the 
application involved. An operational metric in CML is beneficial as it provides a neutral 
performance measure, where one minute of supply lost has an equivalent weight at each 
substation. Financial metrics, such as CoF used under CNAIM, may not be representative of the 
degree of operational or management difficulty associated with an interruption, involving 
network reconfiguration and switching, which would be accounted for in CML. Furthermore, if 
the financial cost of disruption differs between locations, this can introduce a level of bias and 
pre-defined priorities into a criticality assessment. For the geographic scale, licence area reporting 
is too broad, asset level risk is of significantly greater utility for application to prioritisation local-
scale asset management interventions. 
Decision making using a measure of pure electricity distribution service performance will provide 
a different prioritisation of interventions than financial costs. In order to focus the criticality 
assessment in this chapter on operational service performance priorities of local-level 
significance, an adaptation of the CML metric was used at the substation level. Network criticality 
is derived from WPD’s fault reporting database which records causation, consequence and 




record such data, most DNOs use the National Fault and Interruption Reporting Scheme (NaFIRS) 
or an equivalent system (Ofgem, 2015). NaFIRS is administered by the Energy Networks 
Association (ENA) and is an electronic system for reporting, checking and correction of data on 
supply performance including the cause and effects of component failure (ENA, 2012). Therefore, 
similar metrics and information should be reported across all DNOs in GB and the reliability of the 
data is likely to be improved through the verification and checking process.   
To provide a representative sample and distribution of interruptions, fault records were extracted 
from WPD’s database for the South West and West Midlands licence areas between April 2009 
to March 2014. Historical records of electricity supply disruption are not widely used in network 
vulnerability and resilience studies, mainly due to access and confidentiality issues, but can 
provide a valuable platform for detailed analysis, with a high degree of spatial and temporal 
disaggregation. For every individual asset failure that results in an interruption of supply, WPD 
report information regarding the time/date, the location and attributes of the substation from 
which supply was lost, the cause of the interruption and two disruption metrics: Customers 
Affected (CA) and CML. Whilst the metrics reported to Ofgem under the IIS are averages for the 
licence area, in this case the values reported describe the actual impact of individual 
interruptions. CA is defined as the total number of customers interrupted due to the reported 
asset failure, whilst CML is the aggregate number of electricity supply minutes lost across all 
connected customers (actual interruption duration * number of connected customers). Using the 
reported values of CML as a measure of criticality would produce single points of failure weighted 




forced towards a small number of substations with the highest loads or demands, a metric of 
Supply Minutes Lost (SML) was calculated for each interruption, as CML/CA, defined as the actual 
supply outage duration. This metric allows for a comparison of the criticality of substations as 
single points of failure in a network, controlling for the different voltage levels and thus 
differences in the number of connected customers and substations, known as the asset footprint. 
The influence of supply and demand dynamics for substations is also inherently accounted for in 
the CML metric, as network reconfiguration and switching procedures would influence the outage 
duration and impact on customers from a substation. The railway network criticality assessment 
in Chapter 3 is also unweighted, with the influence of passenger loadings inherent within the 
metrics used but not applied to force the assessment towards major train service paths. 
Asset faults can occur either at substation sites (i.e. transformers) or within the circuits they 
supply (i.e. cables). Each record in WPD’s fault reporting database specifies both the substation 
site and outgoing circuit to which supply was lost, along with the voltage level of the assets. In 
this chapter, a criticality metric is applied at the level of substation sites (a site can have multiple 
substations at different voltages i.e. 11kV/33kV) both in order to identify single points of failure 
and aid interpretation of the output, as each substation can have multiple outgoing circuits. The 
database contains records for all voltage levels within the electricity distribution network: 132kV, 
33/66kV, 11kV and LV(230V). However, only faults at 11kV or above were taken forward for 
analysis, meaning that LV (Low Voltage) faults were omitted. This filter was applied as there are 
LV faults attributed to over 43,000 different distribution substations, transforming incoming 11kV 




only 761 primary substations, Bulk Supply Points (BSPs) and Grid Supply Points (GSPs) which 
collectively transform power from incoming 275/400kV to 132kV to 66/33kV down to 11kV 
outgoing, with reported faults. Calculating criticality at the LV level would present significant 
challenges in both the visualisation and interpretation of output. Furthermore, LV circuits are 
supplied from smaller distribution substations, typically at the street scale, and are the final 
connections to residential and business premises. Therefore, it is recognised that an LV failure 
would have a relatively minor impact and be unlikely to affect surrounding substations. Further 
filters are applied to the database prior to the calculation of the criticality metric, to enhance the 
reliability of the resultant prioritisation. Faults classified as “cause unknown” were removed, as 
were any records with null values for metrics of CML and CA. The criticality assessment in this 
chapter is interested only with verified asset failures that result in a consequence for service 
performance.  
2.3.3 Criticality Assessment 
To undertake a criticality assessment, it was first necessary to extract fault counts along with CML 
and CA metrics from WPD’s fault reporting database for each primary substation, BSP or GSP site 
in the South West or West Midlands licence area with at least one recorded interruption. The 
aggregated values were initially used to calculate a SML metric for each substation site (CML/CA 
giving the actual supply outage duration) before criticality bands were applied using the process 
described in Figure 2.2. Essentially, a measure of SML per incident for each location is compared 




definitions similar to the CNAIM methodology (Ofgem, 2017a) were employed, but here bands 
are based on electricity distribution service performance relative to the mean for substations in 
the licence area, rather than financial costs across all DNOs. Allocating criticality bands as opposed 
to using the calculated values of SML per incident facilitates the classification of locations into 
different categories or priorities for action, aiding the interpretation and application of network 
criticality. 
The final stage of the criticality assessment involved the visualisation of the calculated criticality 
bands in a GIS (Geographic Information System). A shapefile of electricity distribution assets in 
the South West and West Midlands licence areas was obtained from WPD’s online Planning Data 
Portal. Such spatial data allows a representation of network topology and geographic substation 
locations, information which is typically difficult to obtain due to availability and confidentiality 
reasons. In this case, in order to maintain confidentiality of network locations, substations are 
anonymised as far as is reasonably practicable. In order to map criticality, the calculated criticality 
bands were imported into a GIS and manually allocated to each substation site based on the 
substation name, in the absence of an exact common identifier between the fault database and 











In excess of 20,000 supply interruptions due to ≥11kV asset faults in the South West and West 
Midlands licence areas between 2009 and 2014 were included in the criticality assessment, with 
a combined impact of over 640 hours of outages to customers. Overall, the South West was found 
to have a mean SML per fault value of 11.77 minutes which is almost 50% greater than the value 
of 7.86 minutes for the West Midlands. Therefore, it should be noted that the average magnitude 
of disruption originating from a Band 1 critical substation site in the South West is likely to be 
significantly greater than from a Band 1 critical substation site in the West Midlands. However, 
this chapter focuses on the relative criticality of substation sites within a licence area and the 
overall spatial distribution, rather than drawing numerical comparisons of locations between 
licence areas. Owing to the confidentiality and security implications of locational information for 
electricity distribution networks, substation sites are mapped and described by their attributes, 









2.4.1 South West 
Figure 2.3 shows mapped criticality bands for substation sites within the South West licence area. 
Key centres of criticality are distributed through the region, with several clusters of highly critical 
substations. The most critical substations are concentrated around major urban areas, such as 
larger towns and cities. The geography of South West England dictates that the larger population 
centres are located in coastal areas, particularly on the South Coast and to the north east of the 
region, around the Bristol Channel. Therefore, coastal regions have both more substations overall 
and more highly critical substations. The centre of the South West licence area is more rural, with 
fewer and smaller conurbations resulting in a reduced density of electricity distribution 
infrastructure, where substations are almost exclusively low criticality. It is evident that the 
greatest concentrations of critical substations are present in the two cities with the highest 
populations in the licence area; Bristol and Plymouth. There are also key clusters of criticality 
located around the south west of Cornwall, north Devon, and the Exeter/Exmouth area. Alongside 
these clusters, more isolated critical substations are present in the regions of Bath, Newton 
Abbott, Yeovil and south west Dorset. There is also a series of medium criticality substations to 
the east of the region between Weston-Super-Mare on the north coast, Taunton and Torquay on 
the south coast. 
Table 2.1 details the most critical (Band 1) substation sites within the South West licence area. 
There are a high number of substations allocated to the highest criticality band, with 36 Band 1 
sites. The Bristol district contains one third of all Band 1 substations in the licence area, 




However, the top three ranked critical substations in the South West are actually located in 
Cornwall, specifically in the Bodmin and Redruth districts. The high resolution of the criticality 
assessment allows the identification of more localised single points of failure alongside traditional 
criticality centres. Regarding the voltage levels of these substations, 26 of the 36 sites allocated 
to the highest criticality band are primary substations with a downstream voltage of 11kV, 
however, the top three ranked substations are BSPs with a downstream voltage of 33kV. Most 
Band 1 critical substations are located in significant residential areas or town/city centres. 
However, many of the substations are located in close proximity to either an industrial site, a key 
facility such as a dock or water treatment plant, or various renewable energy generation sites 
including a wind farm and multiple solar farms for photovoltaic (PV) energy. A complete list of the 















Table 2.1. Substations allocated Criticality Band 1 (highest) for the South West licence area, ranked in 
descending order of disruption magnitude. 
Rank District Asset Type Voltage (Up/Down) Faults SML SML per fault 
1 Bodmin BSP 132/33 1 620.0 620.0 
2 Redruth BSP 132/33 2 674.0 337.0 
3 Redruth BSP 132/33 3 777.7 259.2 
4 Exeter Primary 33/11 2 324.1 162.1 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 1 117.8 117.8 
6 Barnstaple BSP 132/33 2 220.5 110.3 
7 Barnstaple BSP 132/33 2 186.0 93.0 
8 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 69.2 69.2 
9 132 kV GSP 400-275/132 1 65.0 65.0 
10 Projects BSP 132/33 1 63.0 63.0 
11 Bristol Primary 33/11 5 308.4 61.7 
12 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 60.0 60.0 
13 132 kV BSP 132/33 1 55.7 55.7 
14 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 55.2 55.2 
15 Redruth BSP 132/33 1 52.0 52.0 
16 Plymouth Primary 33/11 1 51.7 51.7 
17 Plymouth Primary 33/11 1 51.0 51.0 
18 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 48.0 48.0 
19 Redruth Primary 33/11 2 94.1 47.1 
20 Redruth Primary 33/11 1 46.8 46.8 
21 Exeter Primary 33/11 1 45.3 45.3 
22 Plymouth Primary 33/11 1 45.1 45.1 
23 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 44.0 44.0 
24 Weston Primary 33/11 1 40.0 40.0 
25 Bristol Primary 33/11 3 119.6 39.9 
26 Bath Primary 33/11 2 72.8 36.4 
27 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 34.7 34.7 
28 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 32.5 32.5 
29 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 32.1 32.1 
30 Projects BSP 132/33 1 31.5 31.5 
31 Taunton Primary 33/11 8 244.6 30.6 
32 Plymouth Primary 33/11 1 30.5 30.5 
33 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 28.5 28.5 
34 Plymouth Primary 33/11 3 80.7 26.9 
35 Plymouth Primary 33/11 1 25.4 25.4 





2.4.2 West Midlands 
Figure 2.4 shows mapped criticality bands for substation sites within the West Midlands licence 
area. There is a limited distribution of key centres of criticality through the region, with the only 
clustering of highly critical substations being in the West Midlands conurbation to the east. More 
critical substations are concentrated in this urban area, including the cities of Wolverhampton 
and Birmingham. These larger population centres have a greater density of electricity distribution 
infrastructure and more highly critical substations. The rest of the licence area has comparatively 
smaller conurbations, however, there are the cities of Stoke-on-Trent, Lichfield, Worcester, 
Hereford and Gloucester which have surprisingly low criticality substations. Southern parts of the 
region are more rural, including Herefordshire and Gloucestershire, resulting in a reduced density 
of electricity distribution infrastructure, where substations are almost exclusively low criticality. 
The limited distribution of clusters of critical substations serves to highlight the criticality of the 
West Midlands conurbation within the licence area. However, whilst there may only be one 
cluster of highly critical substations, there are also more isolated highly critical substations that 
present single points of failure near to the north and south boundaries of the licence area. Several 
of the most critical locations are actually outside the West Midlands conurbation. Alongside these 
substations, there are medium criticality substations located in the regions of Shrewsbury, 
Ironbridge and Worcester. 
Table 2.2 details the most critical (Band 1) substation sites within the West Midlands licence area. 
Compared to the South West, there are a low number of substations allocated to the highest 




substations in the licence area, highlighting the criticality of electricity distribution infrastructure 
for major urban areas in the West Midlands. However, the second and third ranked critical 
substations are actually located outside the West Midlands conurbation, in the Stoke and 
Gloucester districts respectively. The identification of such localised single points of failure is 
achieved through the high resolution of the criticality assessment, alongside traditional criticality 
centres. Regarding the voltage levels of these substations, 6 of the 11 sites allocated to the highest 
criticality band are BSPs with a downstream voltage of 33kV, however, the top ranked substation 
is a GSP with a downstream voltage of 132kV. Most Band 1 critical substations are located in close 
proximity to heavy industrial sites, such as cement works, manufacturing plants or agriculture 
sites. All of the Band 1 substations outside of the West Midlands conurbation come into this 
category. The remaining substations are located in significant residential areas or town/city 
centres. A complete list of the criticality bands allocated to all substation sites in the West 












Table 2.2. Substations allocated Criticality Band 1 (highest) for the West Midlands licence area, ranked in 
descending order of disruption magnitude. 
Rank District Asset Type Voltage (Up/Down) Faults SML SML per 
fault 
1 Birmingham GSP 400-275/132 1 421.0 421.0 
2 Stoke BSP 132/33 1 263.0 263.0 
3 Gloucester Primary 33/11 1 197.0 197.0 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 1 118.0 118.0 
5 Birmingham BSP 132/33 1 97.0 97.0 
6 Stoke BSP 132/33 1 71.0 71.0 
7 Birmingham Primary 33/11 3 188.5 62.8 
8 Stoke Primary 33/11 1 54.0 54.0 
9 Gloucester BSP 132/33 5 210.0 42.0 
10 Birmingham BSP 132/33 1 25.0 25.0 
















The results of the criticality assessment have highlighted the overall pattern of network criticality 
within the South West and West Midlands licence areas, alongside the presence of specific and 
localised single points of failure, both of which can be used to inform a prioritisation scheme for 
interventions. Comparing the two licence areas, the South West and West Midlands have 
contrasting criticality distributions. The distributions are predominantly a result of the 
geographies of the regions; the South West of England covers an area of approximately 14,400 
km2 in which load centres are quite spatially distributed, particularly for Bristol and along the 
south coast, whereas the West Midlands covers an area of approximately 13,300 km2 in which 
load centres are concentrated more centrally within the West Midlands conurbation including 
Wolverhampton and Birmingham. It is therefore expected that as the South West licence area is 
slightly larger, containing more substations and more dispersed loads, there will be a greater 
number of critical substations identified. However, even though the West Midlands is slightly 
smaller it serves around one million more customers than the South West, therefore loads are 
expected to be more concentrated in key areas, making the smaller number of Band 1 critical 
substations identified even more critical due to their higher loadings. This also highlights the 
benefits of defining network criticality bands relative to the individual licence areas, as in this case 
combining the regions would likely highlight the West Midlands substations and dampen the 
influence of the South West. Despite the contrasts, there is clear commonality in the attributes 
of substations that are classified as highly critical, outlined in Table 2.3, demonstrating the 




Table 2.3. Critical substation attributes and characteristics. 




The majority of critical substations are located within or nearby major load 
centres, such as larger towns and cities. Substations may fail more often if the 
demand cannot be met, whilst the duration of a power outage can be extended 
by the increased management complexity. Load switching and network 
reconfiguration in the event of a failure is more difficult with greater loads and a 
high number of customers clustered in one area. There is also an increased risk 
of cascading failure, where a substation fails, and the alternative/nearby supplies 






Within cities, an electricity distribution network branches out over multiple 
circuits in order to supply power to different areas of a city. Whereas a major 
load centre as a whole may be identified as critical, on dense and highly 
connected network any substation has the potential to generate a high 
magnitude of disruption. The relative criticality of substations within the 







Many critical substations can be attributed to large single consumers of 
electricity. Heavy industry, such as cement works, and key facilities, such as ports 
and water treatment plants have greater electricity demands than residential 
and business customers, and are often supplied at higher voltages, either 33kV 
or 11kV, from dedicated substations. Should these substations fail, there is again 
the issue of switching and network reconfiguration to restore such high loads. If 
these sites are located on the periphery of urban areas, or in rural areas, the 
density of the network may be reduced leaving fewer potential alterative 
supplies to switch to. Furthermore, as in most cases only a single 
customer/operation would be directly affected, as opposed to a large number of 
homes/businesses, the priority of response may be reduced with the exception 








Applicable specifically to the South West licence area, some critical substations 
can be attributed to distributed generation sites. These area private enterprises 
for generating renewable energy, either from wind turbines or solar panels (PV). 
Here, electricity is either consumed on site, stored, or sold back to the electricity 
grid. However, feeding electricity upstream into the DNO network presents a 
number of challenges. The system must be designed to accept reverse power 
flows and have the necessary capacity to accept the generated load. Electricity 
networks are usually designed for transporting energy from source to sink and 








The voltage level of critical substations is also a consideration. Considering Band 1 critical 
substations, there is only one GSP (132kV out) in each licence area, whilst there are half as many 
BSPs (33kV out) as primary substations (11kV out). This reflects the number of substations at each 
voltage level, where as the voltage increases the number of substations decreases. Failures at 
132kV are comparatively rare, with greater protection and redundancy, but when such 
substations do fail the impact can be of a high magnitude. Failures at lower voltages are more 
common, and present locally important single points of failure. Assessing criticality across three 
voltage levels in this chapter allows a comparison of relative criticality, independent of the 
established hierarchy of electricity distribution infrastructure. 
It is clear that traditional critical locations that are well understood, including cities and industrial 
sites, are worthy of prioritisation for interventions. There are no critical substations in remote 
locations where the reasoning for the high criticality band is unclear. This criticality assessment 
therefore acts as an objective evidence base to support the subjective priorities that may exist 
only as tacit knowledge within licence areas, formalising critical locations. However, local 
variations in supply and demand dynamics along with network topology also present very 
localised single points of failure, the identification of which adds further value to existing 
prioritisation schemes. Major cities such as Birmingham and Bristol have a consistently high 
criticality, whilst still encompassing more and less critical locations where a more localised layer 
of prioritisation would be of benefit. At the city or regional scale, a detailed and granular 
assessment of criticality facilitates the identification of hotspots where local asset management 




Such single points of failure are influenced by the regional scale assessment and selected 
performance metric. Defining criticality bands within single licence areas, rather than for all GB 
DNOs, allows the identification of locations that may not feature as prominently in a national 
assessment but are very important for regional level management. Also, using a performance 
metric relating to the service level output rather than pure financial costs treats all power outages 
of the same magnitude equally with no pre-weighted prioritisation scheme. Under a financial 
compensation metric, applying costs to outages based on CA, key load centres would likely be 
identified as critical but the distribution of criticality within those areas would be different. 
However, the influence of industry and distributed generation would likely be reduced as most of 
these sites involve a single customer where the fault reporting database is concerned.   
The more localised single points of failure within urban areas require careful interpretation due 
to the nuances of using a historical data set. Analysing historical asset failures has the advantage 
of incorporating real world system dynamics and thus captures all inherent behavioural 
mechanisms. However, the main limitation is that the criticality bands of the majority of 
substations are based upon a small sample of incidents. This is a particular issue with power 
networks due to the number of substations involved presenting many potential failure points, 
and the general rarity of power cuts overall. A trade-off exists between sample size and 
granularity, whereby combining substations at the district or county level would increase the 
sample size and thus the reliability of the calculated criticality band but also reduce the localised 
focus of the methodology and reduce the applicability for city or regional scale asset 




The criticality of a substation should therefore be taken as an indication that a fault occurring at 
such a location does indeed have the potential to cause a significant level of disruption, but the 
degree to which such a failure represents a typical disruption scenario is difficult to determine in 
such cases. However, for all Band 1 substations across both licence areas with more than one 
fault, only one observation at one substation had a Z-score ≥2. This would suggest that the 
calculated criticality bands are not unduly influenced by extreme values. 
It is important to understand the caveats to the analysis, and the factors that contribute to a 
location being rated as highly critical for maintaining service performance, in order to ensure that 
the criticality assessment is interpreted and applied in the most useful manner to achieve the aim 
of improving the efficiency of resource allocation and promoting cost-effective decision making 
for interventions. The added value of the criticality assessment methodology is in the 
identification of localised and granular single points of failure within urban areas, enhancing the 
understanding of licence area level electricity distribution service performance priorities as well 
as confirming the importance of expected critical locations in key load centres and industrial sites. 
The presented analysis demonstrates a criticality assessment of the South West and West 
Midlands licence areas of the GB electricity distribution network which can aid the identification 
of priority locations for maintaining service levels within a licence area. The insights gained can 
inform decision making for a broad range of interventions, such as long-term asset renewals and 




The criticality assessment provides a quantification of the relative importance of locations to 
maintaining service performance within a licence area. Understanding how much more or less 
critical a location is compared to the rest of the region is essential information for decision making 
on resource allocation.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a network criticality assessment methodology for electricity 
distribution infrastructure, which facilitates a prioritisation scheme for a range of interventions 
for GB DNOs. It is demonstrated that the assessment can add value through integration with 
existing prioritisation schemes by objectively identifying localised single points of failure that are 
strategically important for maintaining service performance.   
Using historical data on service performance to define network criticality to a high level of spatial 
granularity leads to the identification of single points of failure within well understood key load 
centres, such as the cities of Birmingham and Bristol. These locations can be used to refine high 
level financial allocations, translating funding into specific projects, whilst also objectively 
defining and challenging priorities that currently exist only as subjective tacit knowledge. The 
enhanced granularity provides a new layer of information for decision making and, whilst the 
specific application of criticality depends on the scale and timeframe of the decisions involved, all 
interventions are ultimately local therefore no matter what type of project is in focus, there is a 




The operational and behavioural mechanisms of the GB electricity distribution network are 
inherently captured in the criticality assessment, yet there is a clear trade-off between the spatial 
scale of analysis and the sample size available. A district or county level analysis would provide a 
higher frequency of faults and thus a more reliable indication of criticality, but for licence area 
level management using such broad areas is not adequate for localised decision making. However, 
criticality bands for substations with more than one fault do not appear to be influenced by 
extreme events. 
Although demonstrated for two specific licence areas of the GB electricity distribution network, 
the presented criticality assessment methodology is transferable and can be applied to the 
entirety all DNO licence areas to inform decisions across GB, as well as other international 
networks, dependent on the availability and quality of spatial and operational data. Overall, the 
key contribution of the chapter is the formalisation of localised critical locations at the licence 
area level, to inform decision making and promote cost-effective resource allocation. Chapter 3 
scales up the complexity of analysis to provide a criticality assessment for the railway network, 








 RAILWAY NETWORK CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a network criticality assessment was produced for a comparatively less 
complex system in electricity distribution. This chapter scales up the complexity of analysis to 
assess railway network criticality, involving more complex elements of topology and system 
behaviour. The majority of rail infrastructure in GB is owned and maintained by a single 
infrastructure company (NR) with responsibility for managing the railway network devolved to a 
series of nine geographic regions known as routes. Within the constraints of a limited 
management budget and finite resources, these routes must manage a broad portfolio of rail 
undertakings, including day-to-day maintenance programmes and operational incident response 
as well as implementing long-term asset renewal and upgrade programmes. A major network 
management challenge is the cost-effective allocation of resources for such undertakings, in 
order to make the most cost-effective use of the funding, personnel and equipment that are 
available (Durango-Cohen & Madanat, 2008). Decision making can be informed by a targeted 
prioritisation scheme where resources are allocated to elements of the rail network where they 
will have the greatest benefit for train service performance.  
Montesinos-Valera et al (2017) found that the principal factor in prioritising rail projects was the 
location of application, rather than the project characteristics or technical criteria. A location-
based prioritisation scheme for rail undertakings can be achieved through an assessment of 




failure which are strategically important locations that, should they be disrupted, have the 
potential to cause large scale impacts for train service performance and potentially sever key 
social and economic links (DfT, 2014a). The criticality of a location within a railway network is a 
measure of its strategic importance for maintaining service performance, which can be defined 
by the potential consequence of failure and is mainly influenced by the number and frequency of 
trains passing or calling at that location (RSSB, 2016a). Therefore, as the topological 
characteristics and train service paths within a rail network have significant spatial variability, 
incidents occurring at different locations in the network can have vastly different consequences 
for train service performance and mobility, and thus a very different measure of network 
criticality. Jaroszweski et al (2015) demonstrated how weather-related incidents at key locations 
can cut off access to large parts of a transport network, not only through cancellations or 
disruption to train services at the point of failure but also through knock-on disruption that 
propagates widely throughout the network resulting in costs and delays significantly greater than 
just the local impact. 
Metrics of train service performance can be used to quantify network criticality by measuring the 
consequence of asset failures at a high level of granularity across the rail network and thus 
identifying single points of failure that have the greatest propensity to generate a high magnitude 
of disruption to train services should an incident occur. Historical disruption records for railway 
network incidents facilitate a criticality assessment that incorporates real world network 




and temporal resolution also facilitates a localised and focused prioritisation scheme for a broad 
range of railway undertakings.  
This chapter presents and demonstrates a local-scale and high-resolution network criticality 
assessment methodology for rail infrastructure, using an evidence-base of operational data on 
train service performance between 2011 and 2016. The study area encompasses the Wessex and 
LNW (South) routes of the GB rail network, assessing localised criticality within two contrasting 
routes. Applying the output from such an assessment informs decision making and can improve 
targeted resource allocation. Through more cost-effective use of the constrained management 
budget and resources available, robust asset management and network resilience can be 
promoted.  
The material in this chapter is based upon a paper from Hodgkinson et al. submitted to the 
international journal ‘Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice’, the manuscript of 
which is included in Appendix A. To outline the various author contributions, Simon Hodgkinson 
analysed the data and prepared the manuscript, whilst David Jaroszweski, Andrew Quinn and Lee 
Chapman contributed with suggestions and comments prior to the manuscript submission. 
3.2 Research Background 
Essentially, there are two broad approaches to defining criticality within railway infrastructure 
management. At a high level, economic benchmarking can be used to identify railway 
undertakings where financial efficiency gains can be made through improving the cost efficiency 




based criticality within the GB railway network through identifying single points of failure, 
network-based approaches to are most pertinent as they focus on prioritising interventions at 
specific locations rather than departments or business units, allowing an assessment of network 
criticality. Mattsson and Jenelius (2015) outline two principal modes for network-based analysis 
of the vulnerability and resilience of transport systems. The first category is topological 
vulnerability studies, which are rooted in graph theory and network science, representing a 
transport network as an abstract graph with a series of connected nodes and links, which may 
have directions and weightings applied. Examples include the work of Ukkusuri & Yushimito 
(2009) who assess the criticality of highway transport nodes with a heuristic procedure using a 
performance measure of travel time; Khaled et al (2015) who modelled train design and route 
optimisation for freight railways using an iterative heuristic algorithm designed to minimise delay 
during disruptive events; and von Ferber et al (2012) who analysed the vulnerabilities of the 
London and Paris transit networks to random failure or attack examining how the removal of 
stations or links impacts upon connectivity properties based on complex network theory. 
Topological studies are useful for understanding how stations or links may be critical to 
maintaining network connectivity, and the structural robustness of a transport network, but they 
are abstract mathematical approaches with limited information on the physical properties and 
functions of a transport system. Mattsson and Jenelius (2015) highlight a second category of 
transport vulnerability models, which involve system-based approaches, representing more of 
the real-world system operations by using supply and demand models with node or link weights 




work of Voltes-Dorta et al (2017) who classified the criticality of European airports, simulating full 
day closures under a series of disruption scenarios using information from flight schedules and 
passenger itineraries to model aggregate passenger delay; Wei et al (2016) who performed an 
empirical analysis of airport network criticality in China, using a spectral clustering algorithm with 
data on flight schedules; and Rodriguez-Nunez & Garcia-Palomares (2014) who examined the 
criticality of the Madrid metro system using a full-scan approach in GIS with data on trip 
distributions. However, perhaps the most pertinent approach is that of Pant et al (2014) who 
assessed the criticality of the GB rail network using a national-scale model of passenger traffic. 
Passenger flows were estimated for stations, junctions and track sections using an origin-
destination trip assignment model, based upon data for passenger entries and exits at stations 
and railway timetables. Daily passenger trips are mapped, providing an indication of criticality 
based on the relative travel pattern importance across links and nodes. 
Information on railway system characteristics, such as link capacities, passenger demand and 
train pathways from timetables provides a greater appreciation of the likely consequence of link 
or node removal for system operations. When combined with predicted or observed hazards, 
such as extreme weather, more comprehensive models can have additional applications for 
railway network management problems, such as evaluating resilience interventions. However, 
any model by its nature is a simplification of reality, therefore there remains the limitation of the 
necessity for simplifications of network behaviour. For example, Pant et al (2014) use a railway 
trip assignment model that provides only estimations of passenger flows, given the absence of 




obtain a daily number of passenger trips allocated to a daily number of trains between pairs of 
stations based upon a representative weekly timetable. Such assumptions are quite justifiable 
given the spatial scale of the models, and the number of failure modes or disruption scenarios 
involved but are still sources of uncertainty. Risk assessment can involve elements of hazard 
occurrence and likelihood, asset vulnerability and susceptibility, and the consequence of asset 
failure for system performance. Assumptions on any or all of these elements introduces 
uncertainty in simulations. 
There remains a gap in understanding railway network behaviour and response to asset failure 
using historical evidence of disruption. The benefit of using historical datasets is that they can 
provide a more complete picture of historical risk, inherently capturing the complex operational 
and behavioural mechanisms that may be omitted or simplified in more theoretical network 
modelling and simulation approaches. In order for a consequence to have been observed and 
recorded in the data, an asset must have been vulnerable to a hazard resulting in asset failure 
and performance degradation. Therefore, a data-driven risk assessment is more likely to 
represent the complexity of real world railway network management challenges. Using historical 
data overcomes the need for assumptions and simplifications of system behaviour, increasing the 
reliability of critical locations identified, whilst also providing the spatial and temporal granularity 
to facilitate a more localised and focused assessment of network criticality with direct 
applications for a range of railway infrastructure management activities, such as maintenance 
and event response. The utility of the national-scale approaches is limited for local asset 




network which will highlight national priorities, but those passenger flows which are important 
within a local area but less prominent at the national-level are unlikely to be explored. Local 
priorities can be determined using historical data to a high spatial resolution.  
To obtain a complete and localised assessment of railway network criticality, an observed 
measure of consequence is required. There is currently an absence of published academic 
literature that uses a metric of historical train service performance to produce a network 
criticality assessment for GB rail infrastructure. There are studies that describe statistical 
relationships between hazards and railway asset failure using historical data, such as Dobney et 
al (2010) who assessed the potential impact of higher summer temperatures due to climate 
change on track buckles for the UK rail network using data on heat-related train delay incidents 
and a weather-generator. The relationships identified can provide great insight into the 
vulnerability of types of asset, but do not normally account for the structure or function of assets 
within a network either due to the scope of the study or the absence of information. 
However, NR have an internal network criticality assessment (NR, 2016d) used to inform their 
asset management plans including maintenance programmes and track renewals or upgrades. 
The national rail network is disaggregated into a series of 305 Strategic Route Sections (SRS) and 
compensation costs based on train service delay records from NR’s TRUST system were used to 
define critical track sections. Each section was allocated a criticality band relative to the mean 
historic financial cost of train delays per asset failure, ranging from one (highest – cost per incident 




mean). By analysing historical train service performance, elements of rail network behaviour and 
delay propagation based on train service patterns and network topology will be inherently 
incorporated into the criticality assessment. 
The utility of such a criticality assessment depends upon its intended application. NR (2016d) use 
broad sections of track, some of which exceed 100 track kilometres. The potential financial cost 
of asset failures on a track section are also calculated relative to the national average. To facilitate 
a cost-benefit analysis in the development of a long-term investment plan, a criticality assessment 
at a coarse granularity and national-scale is suitable. However, there remains the need to 
translate national-scale financial allocations into local-level projects and interventions. 
Furthermore, managing and responding to disruptive events locally requires a more granular and 
location specific prioritisation scheme, that moves beyond pure economic assessment to 
understand direct risks to train service performance. An improved understanding of operational 
service risk at the local-level will allow more informed decisions to be made regarding the 
allocation of resources to critical locations for regular maintenance, disruption management and 
long-term asset renewals whilst also formalising and challenging priorities that may currently 
exist as tacit knowledge within NR. As such, this chapter presents and applies a high-resolution 








Building upon the methodology of NR (2016d) historical train delay data from NR’s TRUST system 
is used to classify critical locations across the railway network in terms of the expected magnitude 
of performance degradation should a disruptive incident occur at that location. Understanding 
the distribution and drivers of criticality from the infrastructure management perspective 
promotes a criticality assessment that can be applied to both operational and strategic decision 
making. The approach of this chapter adds to the existing literature by assessing railway network 
criticality using pure train service performance to define and map route level single points of 
failure. The details of the data and method used to conduct the network criticality assessment 
are outlined below.  
3.3.1 Study Area 
This chapter focuses on two contrasting routes, both in terms of topology and operations: namely 
Wessex and the southern section of LNW (Figure 3.1). Applying the proposed methodology to 
two contrasting routes demonstrates the transferability and robustness of a network criticality 







Figure 3.1. The main map shows the extent of the Wessex and LNW (South) routes. The inset map shows 
the location of the two routes within the GB rail network. 
 
The Wessex route is located in the south of England, including the Isle of Wight, and is one of the 
busiest and most congested routes on the GB rail network (NR, 2016b). Wessex has a mainly 
longitudinal boundary containing the South West mainline and is largely a contained, single TOC 
route with most traffic being operated by South Western Railway. Traffic consists of suburban 
and commuter services to and from London, local and long-distance services to the south coast 
as well as significant freight traffic. London Waterloo is the major hub, with regional centres at 




LNW (South) is part of the biggest single mixed-use route on the GB rail network and covers a 
substantial breadth of England from the South East to the West Midlands. The route contains 
large sections of the West Coast and Chiltern mainlines (Figure 3.2), with the West Coast mainline 
(WCML) recognised as a strategic transport corridor linking GB to mainland Europe (NR, 2016c). 
LNW (South) is a very open multi TOC route with a large volume of mixed traffic including long-
distance, regional urban, commuter, branch and freight. London Euston and Birmingham New 
Street are the major hubs, with regional centres at Wolverhampton, Coventry, Rugby, 
Northampton and Milton Keynes Central.  
3.3.2 Data and Metrics 
Train service performance metrics can be used to assess and quantify the degree of disruption to 
a route or line during a specific time period. In this chapter, passenger and freight rail 
performance are derived from NR’s TRUST (Train Running System on TOPs) system which records 
detailed train timing information regarding asset failures or incidents occurring on the GB rail 
network that have an operational impact on train service performance. To monitor regulatory 
targets, passenger performance is predominantly assessed using the Public Performance Measure 
(PPM), whilst freight performance is assessed using the Freight Delivery Metric (FDM) (ORR, 
2018). Such measures of punctuality and reliability relate to the percentage of scheduled trains 
arriving at their planned destination “on time” or “significantly delayed”. Punctuality and 
cancellations are common factors of performance metrics globally, with several international rail 





Figure 3.2. Map showing the WCML and Chiltern Mainline paths through the GB rail network. 
 
Regulatory metrics are underpinned by a fundamental measure of punctuality known as Delay 
Minutes (DM) (ORR, 2018) which are recorded should a passenger or freight train arrive at a 




delayed train services, for which a detailed attribution process is undertaken in order to 
determine the causative incident and thus the party responsible for the delay (DAB, 2018). 
Therefore, in order to assess train service performance from the infrastructure management 
viewpoint, only NR attributable delays count towards regulatory targets. Delay minutes or 
passenger weighted DM are common factors of railway performance metrics globally (RSSB, 
2016a) and are also a commonly accepted form of assessment for the road network (DfT, 2014b; 
Pregnolato et al, 2016). 
DM and the TRUST system underpinning them are seen as a useful tool for network management 
and supporting decision making (RSSB, 2016a). However, the principal commercial focus of DM 
and attribution is to facilitate the financial compensation regime agreed between NR and 
operators. This regime has elements which compensate operators for unplanned train service 
disruption caused by NR and other operators (ORR, 2015) whilst also covering planned 
unavailability of rail infrastructure (RSSB, 2016a). DM are a neutral measure of punctuality 
whereby a delay minute on a main line is equivalent to a delay minute on a branch line. However, 
for regulatory metrics, different operators or lines may have different targets to meet and thus 
manage towards, distorting the comparability between lines or routes. Compensation costs have 
pre-determined priorities with respect to operators and lines, for example, long-distance services 
on mainlines would likely have a greater cost of delay per minute than local services operating on 
branch lines. Therefore, using such costs as a measure of performance introduces a significant 
bias, where the impact of each delay minute is treated differently dependent on where it 




Decision making using DM as a measure of pure train service performance will provide a different 
prioritisation of undertakings than financial costs or regulatory metrics. In order to focus the 
criticality assessment in this chapter on pure train service performance priorities of local-level 
significance, a metric of DM was used. Using DM therefore defines network criticality priorities 
based upon the service dynamics, train paths and topological design of the rail network, covering 
network effects and behaviour as opposed to simply mapping TOC or FOC priorities. The use of 
DM is an improvement upon existing research as they capture the real-world dynamics of the 
railway system, with the complexity of train operations, timetables, disruption mechanisms and 
the influence of human decisions, such as signalling and service amendments, captured in the 
metric of consequence recorded for an incident. 
To provide a representative sample and distribution of disruptive incidents, delay records were 
extracted from NR’s TRUST system for January 2011 to May 2016. Historical records of transport 
disruption are significantly underutilised sources of information for vulnerability and resilience 
studies (Jaroszweski et al, 2015) but can provide a valuable platform for detailed analysis, with a 
high degree of spatial and temporal disaggregation. Several previous studies have used NR’s 
TRUST system to assess priorities for resilience and performance enhancement (Dobney et al, 
2009; Dobney et al, 2010; Jaroszweski et al, 2015; Ferranti et al, 2016). 
The complete TRUST database contains records for all NR attributable delays, where the cause of 
the initial incident was deemed to come under the remit of NR. However, only delays caused by 




analysis to ensure that the resulting criticality assessment is within the asset management 
domain. By restricting the assessment to asset failures, the criticality of a location will also include 
a more reliable indication of the exposure of that location to hazards as assets have a fixed 
location and can only fail in situ whereas other hazards, such as trespass and bovine incursions, 
can have a more random spatial distribution and do not necessarily involve the failure of or 
damage to an asset. Furthermore, as only train service affecting failures are of interest, any 
records with less than one delay minute were removed. In order to limit the influence of extreme 
values or outliers having a disproportionate influence on the criticality of a location, Z-scores of 
skewness were calculated for incidents at each individual location, with any incident having a Z-
score greater than 2 removed from the analysis. Locations with only one incident were also 
omitted as Z-scores could not be calculated. 
Incident locations in TRUST are recorded at timing points throughout the network which are used 
to monitor train movements, defined by NR as the STANOX (Station Number) level. The location 
of an incident can either be reported as an individual timing point location, such as stations, 
junctions and sidings, or the location can be a track section between two timing points. The 
reported location depends upon where the initial train to be directly delayed by an incident was 
located at the time of delay, either travelling between two points or idle at a station or junction. 
These track sections are on average a third of the length of a SRS used in the internal NR (2016d) 
criticality assessment. Whilst the initial incident is reported as occurring at a specific location, the 
reported metric of DM includes all delays to services attributed to that incident across the entire 




reactionary delays due to network effects. Therefore, TRUST data allows the identification of 
localised single points of failure that can have consequences for the wider network.  
To ensure that only incidents within the Wessex and LNW (South) routes were included in the 
criticality assessment, the TRUST data were spatially filtered in a GIS using a complete list of timing 
locations within the route boundaries to create a subset of the national database. Only incidents 
at timing locations wholly within the route boundary were retained in order to ensure that the 
criticality assessment was as route specific as possible. Up and down lines were collated into 
single sections where necessary, to aid visualisation and interpretation of the network criticality 
assessment. 
3.3.3 Criticality Assessment 
To undertake a criticality assessment, it was first necessary to extract incident counts and delay 
magnitudes from TRUST for each incident location in Wessex or LNW (South) with at least one 
recorded incident. Therefore, any locations without a reported incident in the database were not 
included in the criticality assessment and are therefore will not appear on the mapped output, 
explaining any omissions or ‘gaps’ in the rail network. The aggregated incident and delay values 
were used to calculate criticality bands for each incident location within Wessex or LNW (South) 
by employing the process described in Figure 3.3. Essentially, a measure of DM per incident for 
each location is compared to the relative distribution for the route in question and allocated a 
criticality band. Band definitions similar to the methodology of NR (2016d) based on train service 




criticality assessments. Allocating criticality bands as opposed to using the calculated values of 
DM per incident facilitates the classification of locations into different categories or priorities for 
action, aiding the interpretation and application of network criticality.  
The final stage of the criticality assessment involved the visualisation of the calculated criticality 
bands in a GIS. Jaroszweski et al (2015) demonstrated the benefits of using novel visualisations of 
transport disruption metrics to understand network response to disruptive events. In order to 
map criticality for Wessex and LNW (South) the individual track sections were manually digitised. 
Mapping was supported by open train timetable data from Real Time Trains 
http://www.realtimetrains.co.uk and base maps from Open Street Map 
https://www.openstreetmap.org. Finally, the calculated criticality bands were imported into GIS 
and mapped for each route. In some cases, there was a degree of overlap between track sections 
due to the manner in which incident locations are recorded. Where sections overlap, the highest 






























In excess of 22,000 asset failure incidents originating in Wessex and LNW (South) between 2011 
and 2016 were included in the criticality assessment, with a combined impact of over 2.5 million 
DM to train services. Overall, LNW (South) was found to have a mean delay minute per incident 
value of 124.28 which is 54% greater than the value of 80.69 for Wessex. Therefore, it should be 
noted that the average magnitude of disruption originating from a Band 1 critical location in LNW 
(South) is likely to be significantly greater than from a Band 1 critical location in Wessex. However, 
this chapter focuses on the relative criticality of locations within a route and the overall spatial 
distribution, rather than drawing numerical comparisons of locations between routes.  
3.4.1 Wessex 
Figure 3.4 shows mapped criticality bands for locations within the Wessex route, with Figure 3.5 
focusing specifically on the London area. It is evident that a key centre of criticality is the London 
area, including the heavily utilised commuter line between the major hub London Waterloo and 
Woking. There is another area of high criticality towards the centre of the route, including the 
lines towards the regional hubs of Portsmouth & Southsea, Bournemouth and Southampton 
Central which serve as termini for several long-distance services including significant freight 
traffic. The western section of the route is mostly medium to low criticality, with the exception of 
the area around Yeovil Junction, with a relatively isolated and sparse rail network. Across the 
route, key locations of criticality are junctions; such as Clapham Junction, depots; such as 




Wessex is a predominantly single TOC route, dominated by local South Western Railway services 
from London Waterloo to the west of the city, and thus there is a more lateral pattern of criticality 
emanating from the capital. In general, the route is rather isolated with the main inter-route 
services to London and the south coast, which contribute to these areas being classified as the 
most critical. 
Table 3.1 details the most critical (Band 1) locations within the Wessex route. The locations of 
highest criticality are mostly concentrated within the eastern half of the route, with 11 of the 23 
Band 1 locations situated within the London area, including the top four ranked locations. When 
examining the criticality of the London area in detail, the value of high resolution critical locations 
is apparent. There are several highly critical locations between London Waterloo and Woking, 
highlighting the importance of this line. However, the top two ranked critical locations are actually 
on branches off this line, and act as localised single points of failure. A similar situation is evident 
for the South Coast, with a cluster of highly critical locations around Southampton Central and 
Portsmouth & Southsea, combined with the two lines towards the South Coast being 
predominantly Band 1 criticality. In terms of granularity, 13 Band 1 locations are track sections 
whilst 10 are individual elements such as stations and junctions. The most critical Band 1 track 
section has the second shortest length at 1.54km. Whilst the longest section is 50.66km, most 
sections are less than 7km which highlights the increased spatial resolution of the network 
criticality assessment. A complete list of the criticality bands allocated to all locations within the 





























Table 3.1. Locations allocated Criticality Band 1 (highest) for the Wessex route, ranked in descending 











Rank Location Length 
(Km) 
Incidents DM DM per 
Incident 
1 Strawberry Hill C.S.D. to Teddington 1.54 2 1504.6 752.3 
2 Motspur Park to Tolworth SDGS 3.86 2 945.8 472.9 
3 Nine Elms Jn to Vauxhall 1.07 5 1607.5 321.5 
4 Clapham Junction to Vauxhall 3.99 36 10512.6 292.0 
5 Fratton to Portcreek Jn 4.55 63 17983.9 285.5 
6 Clapham Junction to Wimbledon 5.21 88 23787.4 270.3 
7 New Malden NA 31 8103.8 261.4 
8 Andover to Romsey 50.66 4 1042.0 260.5 
9 Northam C.S.D. NA 6 1482.5 247.1 
10 Earlsfield to Wimbledon 2.65 29 7128.2 245.8 
11 Clapham Junction to London Waterloo 6.15 202 46136.7 228.4 
12 Winchester NA 44 9175.6 208.5 
13 Andover NA 2 416.0 208.0 
14 Eastleigh to St Denys 6.00 127 26286.3 207.0 
15 Earlsfield NA 23 4753.1 206.7 
16 Fawley Esso NA 3 567.0 189.0 
17 Winchester to Worting Jn 26.20 346 61683.8 178.3 
18 London Waterloo to Nine Elms Jn 2.95 15 2646.2 176.4 
19 Fratton NA 47 8250.0 175.5 
20 Basingstoke to Worting Jn 4.07 11 1861.9 169.3 
21 Southampton Eastern Docks NA 3 505.4 168.5 
22 Kingston NA 8 1341.4 167.7 




3.4.2 LNW (South) 
Figure 3.6 shows mapped criticality bands for locations within the LNW (South) route, with Figure 
3.7 focusing specifically on the London area and Figure 3.8 on the Birmingham area. LNW (South) 
is a very open route, where significant long-distance and through traffic involving multiple TOCs 
provide potential for train service disruption to be both imported and exported. Therefore, the 
pattern of criticality is rather dispersed through the route. A clear area of high criticality is the line 
towards the major hub London Euston from Watford Junction, with a high frequency of local and 
long-distance services, as well as significant freight traffic. In the West Midlands there is another 
major centre of criticality, particularly for train services passing through the major hub 
Birmingham New Street, such as the line to Wolverhampton. Both the West Midlands and London 
areas have a high frequency of local services, as the WCML runs from north to south through the 
route it has a major influence on the criticality distribution. Delays to train services on the line 
itself can have a major impact, but long-distance services also have potential to spread 
reactionary delay through the route and beyond, as is the case with the Chiltern mainline to a 
lesser extent. Across the route, key locations of criticality are junctions; such as Aynho Junction, 
depots; such as Tyseley L.M.D, freight terminals; such as Willesden Euroterminal, and major hubs; 
such as London Euston. In general, there is a lateral pattern of criticality along the two mainlines 
and near London Euston, with a more radial pattern around the West Midlands region. The route 




Table 3.2 details the most critical (Band 1) locations within the LNW (South) route. The locations 
of highest criticality are not confined to particular parts of the route, due to the degree of long-
distance traffic along the two mainlines. The WCML is the dominant feature, with 10 out of 18 
Band 1 critical locations. The Chiltern mainline has 2 locations of maximum criticality. At either 
end of the mainlines, there are two major metropolitan networks in the West Midlands and 
London which have more localised critical locations. The granularity of criticality is most apparent 
around the city of Birmingham where there are several highly critical locations on heavily utilised 
local lines, which act as single points of failure. The top two ranked critical locations are actually 
away from the WCML, located to the west of Birmingham and on the Chiltern mainline 
respectively. In terms of granularity, 10 Band 1 locations are track sections whilst 8 are individual 
elements such as stations and junctions. The most critical Band 1 track section has the shortest 
length at 3km. Whilst the longest section is 21.25km, most sections are less than 10km which 
highlights the increased spatial resolution of the network criticality assessment. A complete list 





































Table 3.2. Locations allocated Criticality Band 1 (highest) for the LNW (South) route, ranked in 






















Rank Location Length (Km) Incidents DM DM per 
Incident 
1 Rowley Regis NA 4 4157 1039.3 
2 Princes R'Boro Ace NA 3 2446.3 815.4 
3 Weedon NA 5 3778 755.6 
4 Kingsbury Jn to Kingsbury SDGS 3.00 2 1285 642.5 
5 Bescot Up Engineers SDGS to Perry Barr 
North Jn 
6.25 2 1218.5 609.3 
6 Ledburn Jn NA 64 27871.5 435.5 
7 Harrow & Wealdstone NA 24 10203.5 425.1 
8 Longbridge NA 28 11645.5 415.9 
9 Hanslope Jn to Weedon 21.25 133 55278.1 415.6 
10 Hanslope Jn NA 59 22727.8 385.2 
11 Kingsbury Jn to Park Lane Jn 8.54 6 2302 383.7 
12 Galton Jn to Wolverhampton Steel Term 13.64 9 3251.5 361.3 
13 Bescot Holding Sidings to Walsall 5.13 2 645 322.5 
14 Harrow & Wealdstone to Watford 
Junction 
9.75 224 63578.3 283.8 
15 Ledburn Jn to Tring 10.58 76 21474.5 282.6 
16 Harrow & Wealdstone D.C. to Willesden 
Jn Low Level 
9.33 199 55682.3 279.8 
17 Aynho Jn NA 10 2701.6 270.2 






The results of the criticality assessment have highlighted the overall pattern of network 
criticality within the Wessex and LNW (South) routes, alongside the presence of specific and 
localised single points of failure, both of which can be used to inform a prioritisation scheme 
for rail undertakings. Comparing the two routes, Wessex and LNW (South) have contrasting 
criticality distributions. Wessex has quite distinct criticality centres whereas LNW (South) has 
more dispersed criticality, dominated by the WCML. The two routes are on a very similar scale 
geographically but have markedly different network topologies and train service patterns. 
LNW (South) has a much denser and connected network than Wessex, presenting more single 
points of failure, along with more long-distance services that can propagate train service 
disruption. However, there is clear commonality in the types of locations that are classified as 
highly critical, outlined in Table 3.3, demonstrating the transferability of the methodology.  
Table 3.3. Critical location types and characteristics. 
Location Type Characteristics Examples 
City-Scale 
Networks 
Present in both routes, criticality is influenced by a 
combination of frequent local services and longer distance 
services through major hubs. There are clear priority lines, 
but on dense and highly connected networks any location 
has the potential to generate a high magnitude of 
disruption. 




The majority of long-distance lines are attributed to the 
top criticality bands. Multiple service groups travelling long 
distances, through multiple major hubs and across multiple 
routes have the potential to import and export disruption, 
propagating delays across the network. The number of up 
and down lines can influence the ability to regulate 
services. Disruption may also be exported to diversionary 
routes, should they be available.  
WCML and the 
lines to the south 
coast of England. 
Freight Lines Freight paths cover significant distances, increasing the 
volume of traffic as well as the potential for reactionary 
delays to passenger services should they become blocked 
by a freight train. Limited looping places and loop lengths 
Lines around 







restrict the ability to manage freight traffic. Consignments 
are usually time critical in a supply chain, thus they are 
difficult to divert and cannot be terminated early or 
amended. Incidents at or near freight terminals can also 
generate a high magnitude of disruption. 
Southampton 
Docks.  
Key Junctions With a high volume and frequency of traffic, multiple train 
service paths can be disrupted which can then result in 
congestion and spread reactionary delays further across 
the network. Many of the key junctions in both routes 
create pinch points on the network and are thus allocated 
to the highest criticality bands. Regulating late running 
traffic at junctions is a key management problem, placing 
great emphasis on the decision making of the local 
Signalling Controller. 
Clapham Junction 
and Barnt Green. 
Major Hubs Any incident at or near a major hub, such as point or signal 
failures, can block traffic in or out. This can cause major 
disruption through direct and reactionary delays. 
Congestion can occur should platforms be occupied for 
longer than scheduled. Train crew may also become 
displaced or delayed, disrupting subsequent services. Short 
turnaround times for services mean delays on inbound 
trains can cause delay on the outbound service as there is 





Depots Incidents at or near depots can restrict access, affecting 
the ability to bring rolling stock onto the network to 
operate train services, or causing congestion with units 
backed up on the network and unable to return to depot. 
The train services comprised of the units involved may be 






It is clear that traditional critical locations that are well understood, including main lines, key 
hubs and junctions are worthy of prioritisation for rail undertakings. This criticality assessment 
therefore acts as an objective evidence base to support the subjective priorities that may exist 
only as tacit knowledge within routes, formalising critical locations. However, local variations 
in train service patterns and network topology also present very localised single points of 
failure, the identification of which adds further value to existing prioritisation schemes. 
Mainlines have a consistently high criticality, whilst still encompassing more and less critical 





regional scale, a detailed and granular assessment of criticality facilitates the identification of 
hotspots where local asset management and incident response can be prioritised. In fact, 
some of the top ranked locations in both routes are on branch lines, such as Rowley Regis in 
LNW (South) and Strawberry Hill C.S.D. to Teddington in Wessex. The increased granularity is 
highlighted by the fact that of the 41 Band 1 critical locations across both routes, 23 are track 
sections, with 18 sections less than 10km in length. Using shorter track sections allows 
prioritisation of resource allocation to have a much more localised focus, targeting more 
specific locations and saving time and money. 
In some cases, branch line incidents may generate a high number of DM as it can be easier to 
isolate the line and contain disruption, therefore maintaining a train service is less of a priority 
as the impact on the wider network should be minor. Such single points of failure are also a 
product of the regional scale assessment and selected performance metric. Defining criticality 
bands within a single route, rather than for the GB rail network, allows the identification of 
locations that may not feature prominently in a national assessment but are very important 
for route level management. Also, using a train service performance metric of DM treats all 
delays of the same magnitude equally with no pre-weighted prioritisation scheme, therefore 
some of the more remote branch line locations may have a high criticality band as incidents 
at that location have a significant impact on train service levels, but under a financial 
compensation metric such delays would have a low weighting and be regarded as a lower 
priority.  
However, the more localised single points of failure require careful interpretation due to the 





advantage of incorporating real world system dynamics and thus captures all inherent 
behavioural mechanisms. However, the main limitation is that the criticality bands of some 
locations are based upon a small sample of incidents and may therefore be influenced by high 
severity but low frequency incidents. This should therefore be taken as an indication that an 
incident occurring at such a location does indeed have the potential to cause a significant level 
of disruption, but the degree to which such an incident represents a typical disruption scenario 
is difficult to determine in such cases. A trade-off exists between sample size and granularity, 
whereby combining locations into longer track sections would increase the sample size and 
thus the reliability of the calculated criticality band but also reduce the localised focus of the 
methodology and reduce the applicability for city or regional scale rail management.  
Identifying outliers, using z-scores of skewness, removes the more extreme incidents but 
there will always be an influence of rare but high magnitude events. Extending the time series 
would negate such issues by increasing the sample available for analysis, and as more data is 
recorded over time future iterations of the criticality assessment methodology would have a 
greater reliability for single points of failure. For the existing assessment, the interpretation of 
such locations should be on a case-by-case basis, requiring a forensic analysis of the nature of 
the incidents occurring at these locations and/or an examination of track and location 
characteristics. Single points of failure within major lines are generally more reliable, with a 
higher frequency of failure presenting a more representative sample. For more remote 
locations on branch lines, a high criticality band indicates a potential problem, but the low 
sample size means there is no certainty on whether this is a systematic issue or the result of 





It is important to understand the caveats to the analysis, and the factors that contribute to a 
location being rated as highly critical for maintaining train service performance, in order to 
ensure that the criticality assessment is interpreted and applied in the most useful manner to 
achieve the aim of improving the efficiency of resource allocation and promoting cost-
effective decision making for railway undertakings. The added value of the criticality 
assessment methodology is in the identification of localised and granular single points of 
failure, enhancing the understanding of route level train service performance priorities as well 
as confirming the importance of expected critical locations on mainlines and around major 
hubs and junctions.  
The presented analysis demonstrates a criticality assessment of the Wessex and LNW (South) 
routes of the GB rail network which can aid the identification of priority locations for 
maintaining train service levels within a route. The insights gained can inform decision making 
for a broad range of rail undertakings, with the goal of promoting cost-effective resource 
allocation. The criticality assessment provides a quantification of the relative importance of 
locations to maintaining train service performance within a route. Understanding how much 
more or less critical a location is compared to the rest of the route is essential information for 
decision making on resource allocation.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a network criticality assessment methodology for rail 
infrastructure, which facilitates a prioritisation scheme for a range of undertakings on the GB 
rail network. It is demonstrated that the assessment can add value through integration with 





are strategically important for maintaining train service performance. Using historical data on 
train service performance to define network criticality to a high level of spatial granularity 
leads to the identification of single points of failure within well understood critical lines, such 
as the WCML, whilst also highlighting more remote critical locations on branch lines. These 
locations can be used to refine high level financial allocations, translating funding into specific 
projects, whilst also objectively defining and challenging priorities that currently exist only as 
subjective tacit knowledge. The enhanced granularity provides a new layer of information for 
decision making and, whilst the specific application of criticality depends on the scale and 
timeframe of the decisions involved, all interventions are ultimately local therefore no matter 
what rail undertaking is in focus, there is a role for localised single points of failure in risk 
assessments.  
The highly complex operational and behavioural mechanisms of the GB rail network are 
inherently captured in the criticality assessment, yet there is a clear trade-off between the 
spatial scale of analysis and the sample size available. Coarse track sections would provide a 
higher frequency of incidents and thus a more reliable indication of criticality, but for route 
level management using such broad sections that can transcend route boundaries is not 
adequate for localised decision making. Although demonstrated for two specific routes of the 
GB rail network, the presented criticality assessment methodology is transferable and can be 
applied to the entirety of NR's network and could inform decisions made on the 20,000 miles 
of track and 2,500 stations that NR owns and operates, as well as other international rail 





Overall, the key contribution of this chapter is the formalisation of localised critical locations 
at the route level of the GB rail network, to inform decision making and promote cost-effective 
resource allocation.  Chapter 4 scales up the complexity of network criticality assessment 
further to examine the dependencies of an electrified railway on an external electricity 
distribution system for a traction power supply, and the spatial correlations in criticality 

















 DEPENDENT NETWORK CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT -   
RAILWAY ELECTRIC TRACTION FEEDER SYSTEM 
4.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, a railway network criticality assessment was produced, scaling up the 
complexity of topology and system behaviour. This chapter scales up the complexity of 
network criticality assessment further to examine the dependencies of an electrified railway 
on an external electricity distribution system for a traction power supply, and the spatial 
correlations in criticality between the two networks at the local-scale. 
Infrastructure owners and operators have a limited budget and finite resources with which to 
manage a broad range of activities, including regular maintenance programmes and incident 
response as well as long-term asset renewals and upgrades. The cost-effective allocation of 
resources for such activities is a therefore a major network management challenge (Durango-
Cohen & Madanat, 2008). Verner et al (2017) suggest that the protection of critical 
infrastructure should focus on the identification and prioritisation of network failure points 
based on potential consequence. To this end, a location-based network criticality assessment, 
identifying such single points of failure (DfT, 2014a), can help to understand the distribution 
of risk throughout infrastructure networks and prioritise interventions at locations where the 
greatest service performance improvement would be yielded from the investment.   
The criticality of a location within an infrastructure network is a measure of its strategic 
importance for maintaining service performance, which can be defined by the potential 





infrastructure networks have significant spatial variability, faults or incidents occurring at 
different locations in networks can have vastly different consequences for service 
performance, and thus very different measures of network criticality. The prioritisation of 
critical locations is further complicated by the increasingly interconnected and 
interdependent nature of infrastructure. There is widespread evidence that 
interdependencies are important for the planning, design and operation of critical 
infrastructure and this only set to increase with greater reliance on technology, digital 
connectivity and power supply (The Resilience Shift, 2018). A systems-of-systems approach to 
analysing infrastructure is advocated by Hall et al (2013), viewing national infrastructure as a 
series of interconnected systems, such as transport and energy, which place demands on each 
other. The concept of infrastructure interdependencies is introduced by Rinaldi et al (2001), 
where infrastructure systems are mutually dependent as the continued functionality of one 
infrastructure system depends on the functionality of another infrastructure system and vice 
versa. This allows the potential for cascading failure to occur, where infrastructure failure and 
disruption can propagate between systems.  
Introducing externalities to a system adds greater complexity to network management 
activities and thus resource allocation.  In order to appreciate a more holistic view of risks to 
a network and avoid siloed thinking, it is necessary to look beyond the traditional boundaries 
of that particular system at external assets that may influence the functionality of that system. 
In this chapter, the focus is on physical dependencies between two connected systems, where 
one asset depends upon a flow of resources from another external asset (Rinaldi et al, 2001). 
There is a clear one-way dependency of rail transport systems upon external power 





traction current, signalling, stations and control centres (RDG, 2017). Within a rail corridor, 
the most direct application is the supply of traction power for electrified rail to move rolling 
stock. The electrification of transport networks increases the dependency of transport 
systems on the energy system, meaning that a significant failure on the electricity network 
has the potential to cascade onto the transport network with far reaching consequences 
(Chapman et al, 2013). A recent review of transport resilience to extreme weather (DfT, 
2014a) highlighted the resilience of the electricity supply as a specific threat to the continued 
operation of the rail system. In particular, the failure of key substations can be an unforeseen 
source of vulnerability during a disruptive event and it is recommended that rail and electricity 
network managers liaise to trace critical substations and cables through which traction power 
is supplied and identify single points of failure where resilience improvements can be 
targeted.  
To contribute towards this recommendation, this chapter undertakes a local-scale and high-
resolution network criticality assessment of dependent power distribution and electrified 
railway systems, applied to a case study for the Cross-City railway line (West Midlands, UK) 
and electricity distribution substation dependencies for traction power. Verner et al (2017) 
advocate the use of objective criticality measures to avoid reliance on expert or tacit 
knowledge which may have personal judgement bias and lack appreciation of system-level 
resilience. Through an evidence-based assessment applying previously underutilised spatial 
and topological network information in conjunction with historical service performance 
metrics, real-world system dependencies and network behaviour are captured. A robust 
prioritisation of locations can aid decision making for localised asset management 





single points of failure identified. The output from such an assessment can promote cost-
effective resource allocation whilst identifying opportunities for cross-sector mutual benefit 
in resilience solutions and enhancements, a priority of the National Needs Assessment for UK 
infrastructure (Armitt et al, 2016). 
4.2 Research Background 
Network criticality assessments applied to a single system, such as rail (Pant et al, 2014; NR, 
2016d) or electricity (Rosato et al, 2007; Ofgem, 2017a), can provide a detailed picture of 
spatially distributed risks within that system. However, such assessments often fail to consider 
external sources of risk beyond the system boundary. Decision making, and resilience 
enhancements based on single network risk assessments may leave infrastructure managers 
open to unexpected vulnerabilities during disruptive events, that can have major and far 
reaching consequences. There is a scarcity of research assessing the vulnerabilities posed by 
dependencies between railway sub-systems and external systems (RSSB, 2016b) highlighting 
a significant research gap.  
Case studies of past failure events can provide useful insights into the range of vulnerabilities 
faced by interdependent systems. In particular, key lessons can be learnt from detailed 
analyses of extreme weather events such as the 2004 hurricane season in Florida (Bigger et 
al, 2009) and the 2009 heatwave in Melbourne (McEvoy, 2012). Both studies use a 
combination of literature review and expert interviews to improve understanding of 
interdependent infrastructure vulnerabilities and aid resilience planning. However, they are 
limited by their commentary on specific and extreme failure cases. The work of Chang et al 





interdependent infrastructure failures, based upon observed power outages from the 1998 
Canadian 1998 ice storm. Empirical patterns in a database of power outages are analysed, 
although there is significant subjectivity in both the source of the database in newspaper 
articles and the judgement of societal consequences from such events.  
Such limitations of qualitative research can be overcome through the objectivity of 
quantitative methods. Zimmerman & Restrepo (2006) explore how metrics can be used to 
quantify infrastructure interdependencies, in terms of strength, directionality and cascades, 
with a metric of relative duration proposed as a potential indicator of cascade risk from a 
failure event. It is highlighted how useful metrics can be developed despite the challenges of 
the nature of the data and its availability. Rinaldi (2004) explored the role of modelling and 
simulation approaches to analysing infrastructure interdependencies, proposing that such 
approaches are vital to understanding complex infrastructure behaviour under failure 
conditions.  
A review of modelling and simulation methods for interdependent infrastructure systems is 
presented by Ouyang (2014). Models are grouped into six broad categories; empirical, agent-
based, system dynamics, economic theory, network based and others. Whilst all models may 
provide useful insights into interdependent infrastructure vulnerabilities, for a high-resolution 
spatial network criticality assessment network modelling approaches are of most interest, 
where assets are represented as nodes and relationships between assets as edges. Network 
models are further categorised by Ouyang (2014) as topology or flow-based methods. 
Johansson & Hassel (2010) propose that in order for a model to be of practical value, 





the structure of physical components using graph theory (topology) and functional models 
that describe the operational characteristics (flows).  
Significant advances in the field of interdependent infrastructure network modelling have 
been made by the UK Infrastructure Transitions Research Consortium (ITRC), focusing on 
national-scale multi-infrastructure vulnerabilities. As part of this research programme, 
Thacker et al (2017a) undertook a network criticality assessment that identified geographic 
risk hotspots across multiple connected infrastructure systems, using Kernel density 
estimation to highlight spatial concentrations of assets with a high number of users who would 
be disrupted should they fail. Thacker et al (2017b) performed a multi-scale disruption analysis 
for the interdependent domestic flight network and integrated electricity network, defining 
functional pathways between systems weighted with customer demands. The most pertinent 
study is that of Pant et al (2016) which developed a vulnerability assessment framework for 
interdependent infrastructure systems, applied to a case-study of GB rail infrastructure 
dependencies on external systems. Interdependency mapping models are used to establish 
cross-infrastructure relationships between assets, with failure consequence defined as a 
metric of disrupted railway passenger trip flows. 
The utility of these approaches is governed by the way in which they model network topology 
and dependencies, failure scenarios and failure consequence. There is a high degree of 
similarity between the three studies. In each case, infrastructure network topology is primarily 
derived from a combination of industry network maps and open source spatial data, such as 
OS MasterMap. As the exact nature of physical connections between infrastructure systems 





least cost algorithms, where functional pathways are created between an asset and its nearest 
dependent asset. For example, Pant et al (2016) join electric traction substations to the 
nearest railway station or track section it is assumed to supply. The generation of failure 
scenarios varies, with Thacker et al (2017a) testing 200,000 synthetic scenarios whilst Pant et 
al (2016) obtain flood likelihood maps to apply realistic predicted hazards. Failure 
consequence is estimated from service demand data and usage statistics where available, 
such as rail station entries, interchanges and exits (Pant et al, 2016), or in the absence of data 
techniques such as capacity constrained location allocation algorithms and Voronoi 
decomposition are employed to estimate the customer demand that would be lost should an 
asset fail (Thacker et al, 2017a; 2017b). 
There are clear advantages to such national-scale network models. A wide range of failure 
scenarios, infrastructure systems and real-world geographic locations can be simulated, 
without the burden of computationally expensive low-level detail, offering insights into 
infrastructure vulnerability across the UK. However, there are limitations to this work when 
considering the applications for localised asset management. The absence of data and 
information regarding individual physical asset dependencies, system behaviour and service 
levels, and the subsequent assumptions highlighted within the research, introduce significant 
sources of uncertainty to the results. For a methodology that is designed to assess high-level 
risks and inform national policy, uncertainty can be tolerated, but for decision making 
surrounding the prioritisation of specific assets at the local-level, uncertainty significantly 





Methods of interdependency analysis based upon geographic proximity do not adequately 
capture the complex micro-scale dependencies between railway assets and external systems 
(RSSB, 2016b). There remains the need to identify and assess the influence of infrastructure 
interdependencies upon system vulnerability to cascading failure and associated disruption, 
using an evidence-based approach. There is currently an absence of published academic 
literature that uses evidence of both network disruption and asset dependencies to produce 
a network criticality assessment for interdependent infrastructure networks. Therefore, this 
chapter adds value to the existing literature by making progress towards overcoming the 
challenges of reliability and uncertainty in interdependency analysis by applying previously 
underutilised data and information sources from infrastructure owners to produce a high 
resolution and localised dependent infrastructure network criticality assessment.  
4.3 Methodology 
The approach of this chapter can be distinguished from existing literature regarding 
interdependent infrastructure network criticality assessment through the focus on a forensic 
examination of underutilised industry data and information sources for network topologies, 
asset dependencies and failure consequence in order to evaluate the degree to which such 
evidence may overcome assumptions and reduce uncertainty. There is a clear trade-off 
between the scope and complexity of analyses, therefore a local-scale case study is used to 
undertake a detailed assessment of the spatial distribution of risk across dependent railway 
and electricity distribution networks, to inform decision making for localised asset 
management within that geographic area. All asset failures, and thus their consequences, are 





resolution spatial information and historical performance data can identify specific assets 
where resilience improvements could be targeted across infrastructure system boundaries 
with mutual benefits.  
4.3.1 Study Area 
A local-scale case study of an electrified railway dependent on an external power distribution 
network for the supply of traction power is used in this chapter (Figure 4.1). Thacker et al 
(2017a) advocates mapping criticality within urban areas, such as cities, as they are usually the 
focal point for risk management and resilience interventions, therefore a highly urbanised 
case study region that contains a major city (Birmingham) is selected for analysis. 
The Cross-City railway line is situated in the West Midlands region of the UK, with train services 
running between the south terminus at Redditch at the north terminus at Lichfield Trent 
Valley, via the major hub Birmingham New Street. This is a heavily utilised suburban electrified 
line, with the main traffic being Class 323 Electrical Multiple Units (EMUs) operated by West 
Midlands Railway. In addition to frequent local services, on the section of the line to south of 
Birmingham there is significant long-distance traffic to the South West and North West of 
England, Scotland and Wales as well as numerous freight paths. These trains operate as a 
combination of Diesel Multiple Units (DMUs) and diesel locomotives. The Cross-City line is an 
interesting case study due to the variety of service patterns and the contrast between the 
north and south of the line. Should electrical rolling stock fail, there is high potential for 
widespread propagation of disruption. Rail infrastructure is owned and maintained by a single 





Electric trains operating on the Cross-City line require a supply of electricity from the external 
power grid for traction power. The ownership and maintenance of electrical substations, 
cables and towers depends upon the voltage at which electricity is supplied. From generation 
sites, electricity is transported to GSPs on 400kV/275kV circuits which are the responsibility of 
NG who maintain the electricity transmission network in the UK. Any assets below these 
voltages are the responsibility of DNOs which, for the West Midlands, is WPD. 132kV circuits 
distribute electricity to BSPs which have 33kV circuits to primary substations. As Overhead 
Line Electrification (OLE) is supplied at 25kV, circuits and substations below this level at 11kV 
and the LV system at 230V are not of interest for this case study. However, it is acknowledged 
that lower voltage substations are dependent on the function of a higher voltage substation 
for their supply, presenting direct internal dependencies within the electricity system. 
The complexity of operating the traction power supply for the Cross-City line is clear, with a 
reliance on multiple assets and multiple agencies at a number of levels across system 
boundaries. Effective infrastructure management requires the coordination and cooperation 
of activities between stakeholders, where the results of this chapter can be applied in industry 




















Figure 4.1. The main map shows the Cross-City railway line, transmission substations and 






4.3.2 Data and Metrics 
In order to support a detailed local-scale case study, a multi-system evidence base is collated 
from the sources of data and information outlined in Table 4.1 comprising both spatial and 
topological elements as well as service performance. Collating and interpreting multiple 
datasets, for multiple networks from multiple agencies is a challenging and time-consuming 
task but presents a clear advantage to the methodology in overcoming uncertainty and 
facilitating a network criticality assessment that can be applied to interdependent real-world 
systems to prioritise interventions. However, it is important to acknowledge the access 
restrictions to the data and information sources used in this chapter. Details and metrics of 
electrical supply systems have confidentiality and security implications; therefore, they are 
not publicly available. 
Table 4.1. Details of data and information sources used in network criticality assessment. 




(Owned by: WPD 
and NG) 
• Distribution assets derived using 
WPD Area ESRI Shapefile for assets 
11kV and above, obtained from 
WPD Planning Data Portal. 
• Asset dependencies derived using 
WPD Network Diagrams, obtained 
from WPD Planning Data Portal. 
• Transmission assets derived using 
NG Transmission Network ESRI 
Shapefile, obtained from NG 
website (NG, 2017). 
 
• Distribution service 
performance consequence 
metric derived using asset 
fault database, obtained 
from WPD for 2009-2014. 
Rail Transport 
(Owned by: NR) 
• Rail edges and nodes derived using 
baseline Mapping database, 
obtained from NR. 
• Asset dependencies derived using 
LNW Alternative Feeding Diagrams 
(Rugby ECR) document, obtained 
from NR (NR, 2015b). 
• Rail service performance 
consequence metric derived 
using TRUST database of train 







Spatial and topological data is used to map real-world infrastructure assets, edges and nodes 
offering insights into network topology and system dependencies. This includes a 
representation of the Cross-City railway line as stations, junctions and track sections using a 
mapping database from NR and the electricity transmission and distribution networks as 
substations and cables using mapping data from NG and WCML respectively. Dependencies 
within and between the two systems can then be determined through examining network 
diagrams, which avoids geographic proximity-based assumptions, such as the dependency of 
the railway on geographically closest substations in Pant et al (2016), by allowing the 
identification of connections between specific assets. The use of network diagrams is a key 
feature of this chapter, where existing research may have spatial asset data for network 
topologies there is an omission or simplification of physical asset connections. The feeder 
stations through which traction power is supplied to the Cross-City railway line are identified, 
along with the distribution and transmission substations that supply them, therefore tracing 
through the external assets which present a risk to railway operations. Redacted examples of 
the network diagrams used in this chapter are included in Appendix D. 
Service performance data is used to calculate network criticality for both systems, based on 
the consequence metrics for historical asset failures used in Chapters 2 and 3. For the rail 
network, NR’s TRUST database records incidents that cause delays to trains, reporting a 
service punctuality metric of DM which is defined as the length of time in minutes a train is 
delayed behind the working timetable. For the electricity distribution network, WPD have a 
fault database which records individual asset faults, reporting two metrics of consequence for 
customers connected to the substation. CA is the aggregate number of customers without 





without supply. By calculating CML / CA a metric of SML can be obtained per fault, being the 
actual duration in minutes that a supply was lost from the reported substation.  
The metrics used to quantify asset failure consequence are considered appropriate due to 
their high spatial granularity and similarity, being temporally based. Both metrics are 
measures of pure network disruption with no pre-defined priorities, for example, railway lines 
are not weighted by passenger numbers and substations are not weighted by connected 
customers. In this case, the focus is on one particular ‘customer’ or user of the electricity 
network, therefore a metric based on the duration of a power outage is more informative than 
a measure accounting for all CA. It is recognised that the time series for electricity distribution 
and rail performance data do not match exactly, however, this was the best available data at 
the time the analysis was undertaken and there remains significant overlap for the four years 
from 2011 to 2014.  
4.3.3 Network Criticality 
Metrics of network criticality are calculated for locations on the Cross-City railway line and 
local electricity distribution substations, based on service performance metrics from the 
historical disruption and fault databases obtained. The calculated network criticality bands 
from Chapters 2 and 3 were combined to assess dependent network criticality in this chapter, 
applied to the case-study area. To recap, the process for calculating network criticality bands 
for each network location is described in Figure 4.2.  
In order to ensure that the metrics had applications for local-scale asset management, 





network management regions in which the study area is located, namely the LNW (South) 
route of the railway network and the West Midlands licence area of the electricity distribution 
network. Network criticality is examined in detail for the case study in focus, spatially filtered 
for Cross-City line stations, junctions and track sections along with the set of electricity 
distribution substations that are identified as supplying traction power. The criticality bands 
and thus the prioritisation of critical locations is relative to all locations within the 
management regions used in practice. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Traction Feeder System 
Mapping physical connections between the railway system and the external power 
distribution system facilitates the identification of key substations that supply power to 
electric trains on the Cross-City railway line. The organisation of the traction power feeder 
system is described in this chapter but owing to confidentiality and security implications the 
attributes of substations are anonymised as far as possible. 
The traction power feeder system comprises both internal and external elements. Within the 
railway system, for the majority of the UK traction power is supplied via AC 25kV OLE where 
trains collect current from overhead lines, suspended by masts and gantries, using a 
pantograph on the train roof to power on-board electric motors. Such a system is in operation 













Traction power feeder stations, situated trackside, receive current from the external 
electricity transmission and distribution networks. These substations transform the current 
down to 25kV and supply the internal OLE system.  In order to identify the feeder stations that 
supply traction power to the Cross-City railway line, feeding diagrams were obtained from NR 
(NR, 2015b) which detail the schematics of the feeder system, including the feeder stations 
and the circuits they supply under normal operating conditions (all feeder stations 
operational) and alternate scenarios (loss of supply to one or more feeder stations). The Cross-
City line is managed from Rugby Electrical Control Room (ECR) and split into North and South 
sections at Aston, presenting four possible feeder stations for the line (Figure 4.3). In normal 
operating conditions, the North section draws from feeder A (primary supply) and the South 
draws from feeder B, whilst in alternate scenarios the North can draw from feeder A 
(secondary supply) or C and the South from feeder A or D. This system therefore offers N-2 
redundancy as there are two alternative feeder station supplies available to switch and 
reconfigure the supply, should the normal feed experience a loss of supply. Feeder stations B-
C have one outgoing supply circuit, whereas A has two circuits, hence it can provide both 
normal and alternate supplies to the North section of the line. The normal feeder station 
supplies for the Cross-City line act as alternate supplies for other lines, just as the alternate 
supplies normally supply other lines.  
Having identified the four traction power feeder stations that supply power to the Cross-City 
railway line, circuit diagrams for the external electricity distribution network obtained from 
WPD were used to trace through the substations and cables supplying each feeder station. 
Feeder stations could be identified in these diagrams as they have a unique identifier and are 





in Figure 4.4, the supply to each feeder station was traced through connections to WPD 
substations at 33kV and 132kV up to NG substations at 275kV. All four feeder stations have 
similar pathways through the same voltage levels, involving both distribution and transmission 
assets. Power generation is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is acknowledged that external 
substations will also have a degree of redundancy and switching/reconfiguration in alternate 
conditions, however, this information was unavailable and would add significant complexity 













Figure 4.3.  
Cross-City (NORTH) 
Cross-City (SOUTH) 
Figure 4.3. Map of traction power feeder stations for North and South sections of the Cross-





With an understanding of the traction feeder system for the Cross-City line, including both 
internal and external elements, a set of specific substations can be defined that may present 
a risk to the operation of electric rolling stock should they experience a loss of supply. These 
substations can be mapped in a GIS, alongside railway stations, junctions and track, with 
network criticality metrics applied in order to understand the distribution of risk across both 
systems. Uncertainty regarding the physical locations and connections between assets is 
reduced, negating the need for assumptions on dependencies. It is observed that none of the 
four feeder stations in focus are trackside to the Cross-City line itself, therefore geographical 
proximity assumptions would likely be invalid in this case.  
4.4.2 Spatial Correlations in Criticality 
Network criticality metrics of DM per incident for stations, junctions and track sections on the 
Cross-City railway line along with SML per fault for external electricity distribution substations 
supplying the traction feeder system are mapped in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. The 
criticality bands correspond to the relative criticality of a location within the management 
region, either the LNW (South) route of the railway network or the West Midlands licence area 
of the electricity distribution network, therefore the actual magnitude of disruption 
associated with a particular band may be different between management regions and 
between systems. The distributions of criticality and the resultant prioritisation of locations is 
described within the individual networks, before the applications of the criticality assessments 















Focusing on the criticality of electricity distribution substations, an initial observation is the 
absence of metrics for any of the four 25kV trackside feeder stations, and therefore no 
calculated criticality band. It is likely the case that as these substations supply only the rail 
network, they fall beyond the reporting scheme of the database and thus the system 
boundary. Despite this, metrics were available for all of electricity distribution substations 
supplying the feeder stations. Based on these metrics, the distribution of criticality has limited 
variability across the four feeder supplies and that most substations are towards the lower 
end of the risk spectrum, with criticality bands ranging from 3-5. The network topology and 
service patterns of the feeder supplies are highly similar and so more uniformity in criticality 
would be expected. Low criticality metrics could be a factor of the efficiency in response or 
switching should these substations fail, reducing the duration of supply losses, or the effect of 
relatively more serious failures elsewhere in the West Midlands dampening the criticality of 
the substations in the study area. However, low criticality does not immediately translate to 
low risk as there remains a potential for widespread cascading failure between the energy and 
railway systems.  
It is though possible to distinguish between the four feeder supplies and the individual 
substations using the calculated criticality bands. Feeders C and D, which are designated as 
alternate supplies to the North and South of the Cross-City line respectively, are both supplied 
by substations each ranked at criticality band 5, the lowest risk to supply. Feeder B, the normal 
supply to the South of the line, has two substations at band 4 and one at band 5, indicating a 
higher risk. Feeder A, offering normal supply to the North of the line as well as alternate supply 
to both sections, has the greatest risk with one band 3 substation and two ranked at band 4. 





Feeder A which has two outgoing supplies. The alternate supplies would seem to be more 
resilient, which highlights the benefit of redundancy in supply should the normal feeders fail. 
For individual substations, the 132kV site at criticality band 3 for Feeder A would be greatest 
priority overall, presenting a clear single point of failure risk to the traction feeder system. 
However, there is no clear pattern to suggest that higher voltage substations present a greater 
risk than lower voltage substations across the system, in this application only the connection 
to the railway system is of interest therefore although 132kV failures would likely impact more 
customers and connected substations, such consequences do not impact the traction power 
supply.  
Focusing on the criticality of the Cross-City railway line, it is observed that there is significant 
variability in the distribution of criticality throughout the line and that that most locations are 
towards the upper end of the risk spectrum, with bands ranging from 1-5. The network 
topology and service patterns vary along the line and so such differences in criticality would 
be expected. Higher criticality metrics indicate that the Cross-City railway line overall is a 
priority within the LNW (South) route, with the majority of the line designated as criticality 
band 2. However, there is a clear difference between the North and South sections, with the 
mid-point at Aston corresponding the divisions in traction power feeding. The North section 
of the line has average criticality band of 3.14, whereas the value for the South section is 2.18. 
Traffic patterns are significantly different, where the North of the line has only local electric 
train services the South has more variable traffic of local and long-distance services using 
diesel and electric traction. More services covering a variety of paths present a greater 
potential for the accumulation and propagation of delay to trains. The South of the line also 





Birmingham New Street and Aston. Longbridge is highlighted as the most critical location, 
situated on the part of the line between Barnt Green and Kings Norton which is also used by 
freight trains as well as long and short-distance passenger services. 
The presented individual network criticality assessments have a greater value when used in 
conjunction to assess service performance risks across system boundaries and identify 
priorities for interventions that may present mutual benefits to both railway and electricity 
distribution network owners and operators, such as NR and WPD. Taking a holistic view of 
asset management, the potential consequences to the rail system of failures in the energy 
system may provide the case for resilience enhancements targeted to traction power feeder 
substations. Spatial correlations in risk can also influence internal prioritisation schemes for 
both networks. Based purely on the network criticality metrics, the balance of risk is 
significantly weighted to the railway system, with a higher magnitude of asset failure 
consequence overall. At a regional level, the traction power feeder substations would receive 
less prioritisation whereas the Cross-City line assets would be a higher priority.  
However, within the study area, there are correlations of risk. It has been identified that the 
South section of the Cross-City railway line is highly critical. This section of the line can draw 
traction feeder power from Feeder B in normal arrangements, or Feeders A or D in alternate 
conditions. The supply to Feeder B from external electricity distribution substations is the 
second priority out of the four feeder supplies, whilst the supply to Feeder A is the first 
priority. Here, there are critical normal and alternate supplies to a highly critical railway line, 
therefore, there is risk to both systems from connected assets. This is an example of a situation 





increasing systemic resilience whether through enhanced protection, response or 
redundancy.  
This information can be used to refine internal prioritisation schemes. Railway system 
priorities can be refined based on the risk to external substations, whilst energy system 
priorities can be refined based on the risk to railway locations supplied. The high resolution of 
the criticality assessments presents granular single points of failure, as electricity substations 
or railway stations, junctions and track, within the study area. Such locations can further refine 
prioritisation schemes, for example, specifically targeting Longbridge within the South section 
of the Cross-City railway line and the connected external band 3 substation supplying Feeder 
A or the band 4 substations supplying Feeder B. 
Prioritisation schemes based solely on single system criticality assessments only account for 
single system risks, failing to capture interactions and externalities which can present a more 
complete spectrum of risks to a system. In this case, criticality metrics indicating traction 
feeder supplies as lower risk do not account for the fact that these substations are supplying 
highly critical railway. Only by examining metrics from both connected systems can the picture 
become clearer, providing another layer of information for prioritising asset management 












































































































The results of the criticality assessment have highlighted the overall pattern of network 
criticality for the Cross-City railway line and traction feeder system supplies, alongside the 
presence of specific and localised single points of failure. Using network criticality metrics, 
spatial correlations in risk between the railway and energy systems have been identified which 
can be used to inform a more holistic prioritisation scheme for interventions to both systems. 
The interpretation of the criticality assessment requires an evaluation of the evidence base 
behind the assessment, and the caveats involved, to establish the degree of reliability and 
uncertainty in the resultant prioritisation. 
Two categories of data and information were used to conduct the criticality assessment: 
spatial/topological and service performance. Focusing on the former, the detail and 
granularity of information presented in the spatial databases and network diagrams was 
considered to be sufficient both for understanding network topologies and system 
dependencies at the local-scale. Precise geographical locations of substations, cables, rail 
track, stations and junctions alongside specific system connections facilitated a spatial 
mapping of railway and electricity distribution infrastructure networks. Such data and 
information provide reliability and certainty to the criticality assessment so long as it is 
assumed that the sources obtained are accurate and complete. In the absence of extensive 
site visits and interviews with key management personnel, it is not possible to verify the 
information and so it is taken as a true reflection of the real-world systems. The information 





quality controls and the level of detail is significantly greater than existing criticality 
assessment literature, overcoming topological assumptions. 
With asset dependencies defined, network criticality is derived from service performance 
databases and metrics which again are used operationally within NR and WPD. Historical 
records of network disruption provide certainty in the fact that the consequence of incidents 
or faults has been observed on the real-world network and therefore is evidence of the 
criticality of an asset and network behaviour, as opposed to simulated failure scenarios and 
consequence. The caveat to such data sets is that the reliability of a resultant prioritisation 
can be limited by the presence or absence of faults within the time series obtained and the 
high spatial resolution presenting issues with low sample sizes for some assets and locations. 
Therefore, the criticality of a location should be taken as an indication of the potential for a 
given magnitude of service performance consequence to occur, rather than expecting that 
exact level of disruption to occur upon every asset failure. The high spatial granularity is 
however necessary to facilitate a local-level prioritisation scheme, with specific asset 
connections. 
The reporting requirements and attribution for such databases are motivated by their primary 
purpose in fulfilling regulatory obligations to report network performance to ORR for the 
railway network and Ofgem for the electricity distribution network. Whilst there is clear value 
to overlaying service performance metrics from two connected networks, the metrics 
themselves and thus the reliability of the resultant prioritisation are limited by the definition 
of what elements and assets on a network fall within the system boundary. A clear omission 





WPD’s fault database. It may be the case that there were no faults at any of these substations 
within the time series. However, it is more likely that as these substations only have outgoing 
supplies to an external system, supplying traction power to the railway, they fall beyond the 
regulatory reporting scheme and thus the system boundary. Traction feeder stations are 
present in WPD’s network diagrams and listed as their assets, but the fault database only 
contains faults at 11kV, 33kV and 132kV voltage levels. Therefore, a key element of risk in 
assessing the criticality of traction feeder supplies remains unknown. 
Another omission relates to the definition of a ‘customer’ to the electricity distribution 
network in the calculation of consequence metrics. By way of an example, a fault reported in 
WPD’s database at one of the 132kV substations supplying Feeder D coincides with an external 
power failure incident at the feeder site in NR’s database. According to the electricity 
distribution network database, the substation fault had no consequence with the reported 
metrics of CA and CML both null. However, for the railway network there was a reported 
consequence of 12 aggregate DM to train services. Whilst this incident had a relatively minor 
impact on service levels, it is clear that the reporting of the same event across the two systems 
is not uniform. The impact of the substation fault may have been beyond the system 
boundary, but still impacted at least one ‘customer’ in NR along with the passengers on the 
delayed services. As a result, railway system metrics would appear to consider external risks, 
yet energy system metrics do not seem to account for external consequence. Prioritising 
interventions based solely on such single-system metrics could jeopardise the resilience of the 






There are further issues relating to the reporting and attribution of incident or fault causation. 
Risk can be inferred from the spatial and temporal correlation of events, but this does not 
necessarily imply causation. Using the available metrics, the criticality of connected assets and 
locations is defined, however, not all substation faults to traction supplies result in a 
consequence for the railway supplied just as not all delay incidents on railway sections 
supplied by the feeders are caused by the failure of those feeders. Such cascading failure 
events may be high magnitude but occur infrequently, meaning that wider asset failure events 
are included in the criticality assessment to obtain a more representative sample. It is though 
helpful to examine to what degree of certainty cascading failure between the two systems can 
be identified in the evidence base. Returning to the example for Feeder D, the attribution for 
the railway system provides the information that an external power failure has occurred at a 
location where there is a trackside feeder station. There is no specific reference to traction 
power or feeder stations, but with a reasonable degree of certainty it can be assumed that it 
was the feeder station that experienced a loss of supply. For the electricity distribution 
network, a cause is attributed to the fault but there is no context or description regarding the 
external connection or consequence. It is only from consulting the network diagrams that the 
substation is identified as supplying a traction feeder station. This lack of detail means that 
there is significant uncertainty and limited evidence for cascading failure pathways and 
external consequences in the service performance data. 
There is also the issue of what is regarded as an ‘asset failure’ on the railway system and the 
location for reporting external power failures. Railway criticality metrics were based upon 
asset failure incidents in NR’s database, filtered to a specific set of causation codes used by 





external supplier (DAB, 2018) was not included in this set. In the case of a loss of supply to a 
traction feeder station, it is likely that the asset has not physically failed itself, but the external 
asset failure has resulted in a loss of incoming current. Therefore, external power failures 
result in consequence for the railway network but the responsibility of restoring the supply to 
the feeder stations rests with WPD as the failed asset is beyond the system boundary. 
Furthermore, as none of the four traction feeder stations are trackside to the Cross-City line, 
if the location of the external power failure on the railway system is reported as the feeder 
site then these incidents and their consequence would not contribute to the Cross-City line 
criticality metrics. There is a disparity between the point at which an incident is reported and 
the widespread power outage that failure has the potential to cause. 
Overall, there is clear value in the prioritisation of interventions based upon the criticality 
assessment in this chapter. The data and information sources used are the best available, as 
the authors are unware of any cross-system databases currently in use for infrastructure 
network operations and management. It is important however to understand the various 
caveats to the data when interpreting and applying the results of the criticality assessment, in 
particular the omissions and their influence on the reliability and certainty of the prioritisation. 
The limitations of the data and information sources highlight the need to look beyond 
traditional and regulatory system boundaries in order to manage the risk of cascading failure 
and identify opportunities for interventions offering mutual benefits. 
The implications of the presented network criticality assessment and interpretation are two-
fold. Network criticality metrics can aid the identification of priority locations where 





distribution networks. Also, the insights gained from the evaluation of data and information 
sources can be used to recommend improvements to service performance and asset failure 
reporting mechanisms. The ultimate goal of the research is to promote cost-effective and 
holistic decision making when considering resource allocation for localised asset 
management. Therefore, the recommendations of this chapter can be applied to drive 
progress towards this goal.  
A combined prioritisation scheme, complementing the existing processes and metrics within 
NR and WPD with the addition of localised multi-system single points of failure, would likely 
deliver the most useful applications for network management. The criticality assessment 
provides an objective and high-resolution prioritisation of locations across two connected 
networks, which can be used to refine high-level single-system priorities and reinforce 
information which may only exist as subjective tacit knowledge. The exact application of such 
a prioritisation scheme depends upon the nature of the intervention in focus and is principally 
a question of the scale, timeframe and agencies involved. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a network criticality assessment methodology for dependent 
power distribution and electrified railway systems, applied to a local-scale case study for the 
Cross-City railway line (West Midlands, UK) and electricity distribution substation 
dependencies for traction power. The resultant criticality assessment can add value through 
integration with existing prioritisation schemes to inform cost-effective and holistic decision 





two connected systems can provide mutual benefits through increased resilience and the 
mitigation of external risks and consequence.  
Taking an evidence-based approach, both for identifying system dependencies and calculating 
network criticality bands, avoids the need for assumptions and simplifications present in 
existing modelling and simulation approaches. A greater understanding of network criticality 
at a high-resolution facilitates the identification of localised single points of failure within 
feeder supplies and railway lines that can be used to refine high level financial allocations, 
translating funding into specific projects, whilst also objectively defining and challenging 
priorities that currently exist only as subjective tacit knowledge and raising awareness for 
unknown failure pathways. The enhanced granularity and cross-system risk provide new 
layers of information for decision making. 
More of the complexity of system dependencies and behavioural mechanisms of the 
electricity distribution and railway networks are captured in the criticality assessment, yet the 
reliability of the assessment and resultant prioritisation is dependent upon the reliability of 
the evidence base. This is ultimately a function of where system boundaries are drawn, 
influencing reporting requirements and metrics for asset failures. There is clear value in the 
prioritisation of interventions based upon the criticality assessment in this chapter, with the 
data and information sources being the best available, but it is important that criticality 
metrics are interpreted with an understanding of the caveats to the underlying data. 
Traditional system boundaries are no longer suitable for analysing risks to increasingly 
interdependent and interconnected infrastructure. Decision making based purely on single-





consequences which would likely incur significant costs in recovery and response after an 
event. 
Although demonstrated for a specific local-scale case study in the UK, the presented criticality 
assessment methodology is transferable and can be applied to any system but is dependent 
on the availability and quality of spatial and operational data. Overall, the key contributions 
of the research are the formalisation of localised critical locations across system boundaries 
to inform decision making and promote cost-effective and holistic resource allocation, 
alongside the documentation of the caveats and limitations of the underlying evidence base. 
Chapter 5 discusses the overall implications of the criticality assessments, exploring how a 
network criticality layer can be applied and integrated within infrastructure management 
functions and information systems to inform a variety of resilience interventions, as part of a 












 IMPLICATIONS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM MANAGEMENT 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
A series of network criticality assessments have been presented through Chapters 2-4, each 
covering a different application with different levels of geographic and infrastructure system 
complexity. Initially, the criticality of a comparatively simple electricity distribution network 
was explored, before the criticality of a more complex railway transport network was 
assessed. The two dependent and connected networks were then brought together, to 
examine more systemic and cross-network criticality, applied to the external electricity supply 
for an electrified railway traction system. This chapter discusses the overall implications of the 
criticality assessments, exploring how a network criticality layer can be applied and integrated 
within infrastructure management functions and information systems to inform a variety of 
resilience interventions, as part of a holistic decision-making process for infrastructure owners 
and operators. 
5.2 Formalising and Challenging Priorities  
An assessment of network criticality has a key role in formalising priority locations through a 
quantitative and objective prioritisation scheme. It is important to move from ad-hoc 
prioritisations based on expert or tacit knowledge that may include personal, departmental or 
sectorial bias to a quantitative and objective approach to network criticality, using value-based 
metrics (Parlikad & Jafari, 2016: Verner et al 2017). The distribution of network criticality is 
formalised and mapped for both rail transport and electricity distribution infrastructure, as 





or assets warrant prioritisation. Information on the types of substations, track, stations or 
junctions that are often classified as highly critical can support current understanding, 
reinforcing subjective tacit knowledge of significant risk sites at the licence area or route level 
with an objective and formal classification of priorities. For electricity distribution and rail 
transport, it is understood that supply and demand dynamics influence network criticality, and 
key areas of high demand/high load centres will likely be known.  
However, network criticality may also challenge existing priorities and tacit knowledge, by 
documenting the low-level details on locations that are classified as highly critical to a high 
resolution. Using mapped network criticality to discuss and explore the underlying reasons for 
the important and highly localised single points of failure provides a new layer of information 
and understanding for decision making and may highlight previously unknown critical 
locations and network effects. The high resolution of the criticality assessment provides the 
ability to prioritise interventions within well understood key load centres or main lines, a 
granularity of detail that may not widely exist as tacit knowledge and focuses resource 
allocation further.  For the rail network, localised risk in more remote locations is particularly 
important to document, highlighting risk hotspots to investigate further. If local knowledge, 
particularly for maintenance, does exist it is usually the collective experience of a team of 
engineers in a geographic area, and is rarely documented. Whilst in this thesis, network 
criticality is not derived from this information, reliable and detailed tacit knowledge can be an 
output where objectively defined priorities provide an improved understanding of the 






Furthermore, network criticality has a knowledge retention function, reducing the risk of key 
information surrounding priority locations being lost should there be a turnover in personnel 
as critical locations would be documented. Applying a metric of service performance 
consequence can standardise prioritisation throughout a licence area or route, whilst also 
encouraging a more holistic view of risk. The correlations in risk between the two networks 
have a role in increasing awareness and reinforcing understanding of dependencies for 
network management personnel. The formalisation and documentation of network criticality 
can also aid information sharing both between management regions within an organisation, 
and between organisations/systems overall. 
5.3 Infrastructure Management Functions 
Infrastructure owners and operators must manage a broad spectrum of activities, at multiple 
organisational, sectorial and geographic levels, and within the constraints of a limited 
management budget and finite resources. These activities can include day-to-day 
maintenance programmes, network operations, incident response, and fault resolution as 
well as implementing long-term asset renewal and upgrade programmes (WPD, 2014; NAO, 
2015). Therefore, both operational functions, managing service levels, and infrastructure 
functions, managing physical assets and equipment, are required in order to maintain the 
functionality of infrastructure systems.  
Such a broad range of applications across interdependent infrastructure systems from 
different sectors can be aided by a network criticality assessment. Through the analysis of 
network performance metrics, priority single points of failure have been identified where 





effective and holistic decision making when considering resource allocation for localised asset 
management. The criticality assessments in this thesis provide an objective and high-
resolution prioritisation of locations within and between two dependent networks, which can 
be used to refine high-level single-system priorities whilst both reinforcing and challenging 
information which may only exist as subjective tacit knowledge.  
The exact application of such a prioritisation scheme depends upon the nature of the 
intervention in focus and is principally a question of the scale, timeframe and agencies 
involved. The difficulty level involved with an application is also a function of the network 
complexity, and the number of networks or systems involved in the decision making as more 
complex topologies, flows and management systems need to be considered. However, there 
is clear commonality in the functions of infrastructure management across systems, 
highlighting the potential for the transferability and scalability of the methodology as well as 
the coordination and standardisation of processes across sectors. Potential applications of the 
criticality assessments are outlined below. 
5.3.1 Renewals and Upgrades 
For long-term investment in infrastructure projects, the added value of the criticality 
assessment is through the integration with existing internal prioritisation schemes such as 
CNAIM (Ofgem, 2017a) and NR’s route criticality (NR, 2016d). Investment decisions will 
require a clear business case for the system(s) in question, and so initially single-system 
financial costs of power outages and railway delays could be used to allocate funding to broad 
electrical circuits and track sections at the national-level. The criticality assessment presented 





allocations into localised multi-system priorities for specific projects. All interventions are 
ultimately made at the local-level, therefore a combined approach with layers of financial and 
service performance metrics is recommended.  
Ageing infrastructure assets are a particular issue across multiple sectors, which incur repair 
costs for public and private sectors whilst increasing the risk of business and supply chain 
interruptions (Zurich, 2017). Therefore, the like for like replacement of assets at or 
approaching the end of their lifetime, and the upgrade of assets where capacity improvements 
or more robust equipment is required, are essential parts of infrastructure management. For 
electricity distribution, renewal, refurbishment and upgrade projects cover a breadth of 
activities, mainly centred around improving network capacity and reliability, and a range of 
assets such as gantries, overhead lines, underground cables and transformers. Key tasks are 
the design, development, planning and delivery of a combination of larger one-off projects 
with a greater number of smaller local projects (WPD, 2014). Locally, asset replacement 
interventions can improve security of supply and reduce the need for maintenance with more 
modern equipment, whilst reinforcement interventions can reduce faults and increase 
equipment longevity. Increasing network redundancy can also provide greater resilience 
through alternate supplies in the event of a fault. The capacity for distributed generation and 
the installation of smart grid and automation technology are increasingly important concerns 
for dynamic network control and management. For the rail network, key NR business activities 
include small renewal projects under the Network Operations division, and the strategic 
planning and delivery of large projects, renewals (modernising infrastructure) and all upgrades 
(performance and capacity) under Infrastructure Projects (NAO, 2015). Projects can have a 





such as resignalling, and the management of major structures such as bridges and tunnels. 
Furthermore, understanding external risks and consequences helps to avoid unintended 
consequences, for example, through the degradation of service from a traction feeder 
substation or using a budget on internal priorities only to experience unexpected cascading 
failure elsewhere. 
5.3.2 Event Response 
Real-time decision making for service regulation and incident response is the responsibility of 
Control Centres within licence areas and Route Control within routes. This includes the 
implementation of contingency plans including electrical switching/load reconfiguration and 
emergency timetables, along with the allocation of personnel to investigate and restore failed 
assets. A multi-system criticality assessment complements existing prioritisation, adding value 
by identifying localised dependent critical locations, the importance of which may have 
previously been unknown. 
Service management decisions, such as switching and supply restoration, as well as 
cancellations or amendments to train services, can be made dependent on the expected level 
of disruption from an incident. For the rail network, train service management can be highly 
complex due to the number of trains and operators running at different times on different 
lines. In the case of electricity distribution, there are also vulnerable/priority customers to 
consider, who are known to WPD. Contingency plans can be simultaneously enacted for both 
systems to reduce the impact of the disruption. A criticality assessment based upon service 





an indication of the degree of difficulty in managing an incident occurring at a particular 
location, therefore allocating resources to minimise disruption would be beneficial.  
Across all infrastructure systems, the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) provides a framework for 
civil protection in the UK, defining local arrangements and emergency powers in the event of 
major incidents. Different categories of responders have different levels of allocated duties, 
where Category 1 responders are emergency services, health services and local authorities 
who coordinate the response, whilst Category 2 responders are transport and utility 
organisations who must cooperate with a joint operation. Mapped criticality provides a 
visualisation which is easy to interpret and apply for decision making in real time.  
A key function of a DNO is dealing with ‘trouble calls’ which involve the resolution of faults 
causing interruptions to customer supplies (WPD, 2014). Some electrical facilities such as BSPs 
and primary substations are remotely monitored and controlled from Control Centres. If 
issues cannot be solved remotely, engineers are on call to respond on site. Real-time 
information on the network state, combined with a criticality layer, can be used to 
communicate with and dispatch field teams or helicopter units to electrical sites. A large 
directly employed workforce helps with contingency arrangements, alongside a generator 
fleet and bunkered fuel provision. For the rail network, event response and operational 
management including signalling would be the responsibility of Network Operations within 
NR (NAO, 2015). Mobile operation managers (MOMs) are on call to respond to incidents and 







5.3.3 Maintenance Programmes 
Inspections and remedial work can be increased for key substations and assets in locations 
likely to cause a high magnitude of disruption. Maintenance is devolved within routes and 
licence areas, and at the level of specific assets a high degree of granularity for priority 
locations is essential. The Brown Review (DfT, 2014a) highlighted simple maintenance as a 
vital activity, with the routine inspection and maintenance of drainage systems, clearance of 
vegetation and high-risk trees, and monitoring of structures and embankment slopes all being 
important tasks in ensuring infrastructure resilience yet historically they have not always been 
given adequate priority. Funding for ongoing maintenance to reduce risks is essential (ICE, 
2009). For electrical substations, inspections can be completed on-site or via remote 
monitoring, to detect problems developing before they occur. Inspection and maintenance of 
key assets, as well as regular activities such as tree cutting, are priority tasks for DNOs (WPD, 
2014). WPD’s helicopter can carry out visual and thermal line patrols, as well as post-fault 
inspections. For the rail network, almost three quarters of NR’s workforce are allocated to 
Network Operations, including in-house maintenance and day-to-day activities (NAO, 2015). 
Track access may be an issue with rail maintenance, particularly for more remote sites. 
5.4 Assessing Risks to Inform Resilience 
With network criticality having applications for a broad range of assets, systems, sectors and 
activities, it is important to consider how a network criticality layer can both inform the 
assessment of risks to an infrastructure system and prioritise a range of potential resilience 
interventions. A combined prioritisation scheme, complementing the existing processes and 





would likely deliver the most useful applications for infrastructure management. Network 
criticality has greater value when integrated within a holistic and systemic risk assessment to 
inform holistic and systemic resilience interventions. 
5.4.1 Risk Assessment 
Within a risk assessment, a layer of network criticality adds value to the assessment of 
consequences from asset failure. However, there are multiple perspectives on consequence. 
Existing internal prioritisation schemes, such the CNAIM methodology (Ofgem, 2017a) for 
electricity distribution and NR’s internal route criticality (NR, 2016d) for railway transport are 
based upon a single type of a metric in financial costs, for a single network. Whilst such metrics 
have their value in isolation, they form part of a broader perspective of network criticality 
when combined with the service performance metrics used in this thesis, across multiple 
connected systems.  
In the same vein, network criticality fits within a broader spectrum of infrastructure risk 
assessment. For the rail network, NR (2015a) prioritise risks based on performance and safety 
impacts, hazards, vulnerability of assets, and consequences, using a “bow tie” risk assessment 
methodology (Figure 5.1). This method allows an assessment of the adequacy of controls on 
causes and consequences, with a separate risk assessment per asset group. It is therefore 
necessary to combine a consequence layer, such as network criticality, with other layers of 






Figure 5.1. NR’s “Bow Tie” Risk Assessment (NR, 2015a). 
 
The resolution of network criticality increasingly matches that at which information on 
hazards and vulnerability is achievably or currently available at, assisting risk-based targeting 
of decisions. Therefore, specific sites that have a high vulnerability to a hazard and a high 
potential for disruption or cascading failure can be prioritised. GIS risk mapping is common 
practice within natural hazard risk assessment, with spatial layers of exposure, vulnerability 
and consequence. For the rail network, NR (2015a) use data layers for safety risks, 
performance risks such as Schedule 8 compensation data, localised gridded weather data from 
proprietary weather stations, weather thresholds for failure rates, and aerial surveys using 
Light Detecting and Ranging (LIDAR) data for visualising lineside tree risk (Figure 5.2a). The 
METEX decision-support tool also allow an output of key weather vulnerability statistics for 
individual routes or maintenance delivery units. For electricity distribution, WPD (2011; 2015) 
combined asset data and CI profiles with layers of future weather probabilities based on 
UKCP09 data, Environment Agency fluvial and pluvial flood maps, vegetation management, 
and UHI impacts. WPD have also been working with Cranfield University and the British 





geological rock permeability for the risk of ‘drying out’ for earthing infrastructure (Figure 
5.2b). 
 
Figure 5.2. (a) Visualisation of lineside tree risk using LIDAR (NR, 2015a) (b) Surface map of soil and 
geology sensitivity to climate change (WPD, 2015). 
 
5.4.2 Resilience Interventions 
Within the process for selecting and implementing resilience interventions, a layer of network 
criticality adds value to the generation of potential options. As existing internal prioritisation 
schemes, such the CNAIM methodology (Ofgem, 2017a) for electricity distribution and NR’s 
internal route criticality (NR, 2016d) for railway transport are designed for a single purpose in 
prioritising investment in asset renewals and upgrades, and for a single network, their 
application is limited to increasing resilience through financial investment in the robustness 
of physical assets. However, with the addition of a network criticality layer based on 
operational service performance, the applications are extended to a wider range of potential 
interventions, including more process-based options such as maintenance schedules and 





resilience. At a broad level, the UK’s sector security and resilience plans highlight a range of 
critical risks and resilience measures (Cabinet Office, 2017). 
A highly granular assessment of the potential consequence of an asset failure within and 
between connected systems has pertinence for the long and short-term protection, 
preparedness and response to extreme weather. For response during extreme weather 
events, which may cause asset failures in multiple locations in a short space of time, the 
criticality assessment can be applied to determine which sites personnel should be dispatched 
to first. The rail network has a strategic crisis management process to coordinate and aid rapid 
response to extreme weather events (NR, 2015a). Criticality can also be incorporated in 
preparedness actions and resource allocation for extreme weather before, during and after a 
forecast event. For electricity distribution, criticality can be combined with Environment 
Agency targeted flood warnings and daily bespoke forecasts, to inform how a workforce can 
be distributed in key locations prior to an event. For the rail network, criticality can also be 
incorporated in NR’s EWAT (Extreme Weather Action Teleconference) procedure which 
involves a series of teleconferences to define route level preparedness actions and resource 
allocation for extreme weather before, during and after a forecast event. For long-term 
response to predicted climate change, adaptation programmes for high risk assets and can be 
informed by a criticality assessment. 
In their climate change adaptation reports for electricity distribution, WPD (2011; 2015) 
explore a range of options including changes to industry specifications and company 
directives, altering specifications for pole mounted transformers to improve their resilience 





requirements for ground clearance and conductor ratings given the predicted rise in 
temperature, resilient tree cutting near overhead lines, and substation protection through 
raising equipment above ground level or relocation.  
For the rail network, NR (2016c) have developed a coordinated business-wide WRCC 
programme, involving six sub-programmes and 23 constituent projects (Figure 5.3). This 
programme involves technical enhancements and adaptations to assets alongside broader 
operational response to extreme weather events, such as the design of new infrastructure, 
managing existing assets, third party actions, corporate strategy, asset policies, governance, 
design standards, risk registers, and long-term planning NR (2015a; 2016c). Specific solutions 
include the development of a more detailed drainage asset register to improve asset 
knowledge, better management of earthworks (natural or man-made cuttings, embankments 
and slopes) located on adjacent land (Outside Party Earthworks) to deliver a susceptibility 
rating for adjacent land, enhanced vegetation management schemes, structure waterproofing 
solutions to reduce the risk of icicle formation, and improved weather monitoring capability.  
Urban climate resilience is a particular priority, with growing urban populations exposed to 
increasing extremes (Tyler & Moench, 2012). Chapman et al (2013) highlight the need to adapt 
to urban heat and UHI impacts, including railway buckling and the degradation of electrical 
transformers where increased temperatures reduce the efficiency of operation and the 
subsequent life expectancy of assets. Transformers located in the core areas of the UHI will 
have significantly shorter life expectancies, whilst the risk of failure is also a function of the 
transformer loading due to high urban population densities. Network criticality for electricity 





combining a criticality layer with a UHI layer would allow the prioritisation of adaptation work 
to transformers at the city-scale.   
 
Figure 5.3. The constituent components of NR’s WRCC programme (NR, 2016c). 
 
Flood resilience is also a major issue across all infrastructure sectors. The National 
Infrastructure Assessment (NIC, 2018) recommends that a long-term strategy for flood 
protection should include a nationwide standard of resilience to flooding, with catchment-
based plans. Such plans should explore a full range of options including traditional ‘grey’ flood 
defences and ‘green infrastructure’ (through natural flood management or sustainable 
drainage). The Pitt Review (Pitt, 2008) advocated a systematic approach to reducing disruption 
to essential services from flooding, building resilience through improved contingency and local 
emergency plans. Improved information sharing and cooperative engagement at the local-





The need for a broader approach to flood resilience is demonstrated by the example of the 
December 2015 floods in Lancaster (Ferranti et al, 2017), both in terms of the variety of 
interventions required and the cross-system implications. When key substations are out of 
action, essential services such as communication and transport are affected. Protecting 
substations with hard flood defences, or ‘soft engineering’ through blue and green 
infrastructure are options, but operational resilience measures are also important. Emergency 
or backup generators could be employed for mobile phone base stations to maintain 
communications, and at railway stations for heating and lighting, as well as looking at 
alterative substation sites away from the floodplain. A high-resolution and localised criticality 
assessment can help to target such interventions to where they are needed most, in 
conjunction with flood risk maps or projections. 
WPD have a significant programme of flood prevention work alongside emergency response 
procedures for their electrical infrastructure (WPD, 2015) as shown in Figure 5.4. Physical 
enhancements and adaptations at substation sites include siting equipment on raised plinths 
above projected flood levels and erecting flood barriers. However, WPD have also developed 
their capability to respond to flood damage through portable equipment and mobile pumps. 
A fleet of emergency response vehicles, converted from fire engines, have a combination of 
high capacity pumps, flood barriers and sandbags operated by trained first response staff. 
Helicopters can also be used to deliver diesel powered pumps and fuel to remote locations. 
The protection of substations, and the dispatch of emergency response teams can be aided 






Figure 5.4. (a) Raised electrical equipment (b) Flood barriers around a transformer (c) Emergency 
response vehicle and equipment (WPD, 2015). 
 
It is important that, rather than investing solely in infrastructure that is less likely to fail, there 
consideration is given to the resilience of the system when assets do fail. Beyond asset 
robustness, it is important to consider the continuity of service provided by an infrastructure 
system. The redundancy of system elements and the provision of alternatives is crucial. The 
Brown Review (DfT, 2014a) highlights the need to reduce the vulnerability of transport 
networks to extreme weather and speed up the restoration of normal service. Contingency 
plans for how to manage disruption and clear crisis management procedures are vital 
preparation for disruption management rapid recovery. For the rail network, this may involve 





providing diversionary routes or cross-TOC ticket acceptance, emergency timetables or 
adaptive train/crew diagrams to recover services should rolling stock, drivers or guards 
become stranded during extreme weather. Single ticketing options across transport operators 
and modes can improve system efficiency and resilience, where pressure on certain modes 
during extreme weather events may be addressed by targeted demand management (Armitt 
et al, 2016), whilst also providing passengers with the flexibility to choose alternative modes, 
as is the case with integrated ticket options such as Oyster in London and Swift in the West 
Midlands. For electricity distribution, this may extend to redundancy of circuits and 
substations for rerouting power flows, support for energy storage and demand-side 
generation, backup generators or for longer-term outages, the provision of water, food, 
sanitation and essential services to vulnerable or isolated communities (Guthrie & Konaris, 
2012). Support networks are also vital, similar to the function of the Civil Contingencies Act 
(2004). 
A holistic approach to resilience is particularly important for interdependent infrastructure 
systems. Traction power feeder systems have an element of redundancy on the supply side, 
offering alternate substations where current can be drawn from should the normal substation 
experience a loss of supply. The potential implementation of distributed generation and smart 
grid technology may help the electricity network to reconfigure. For a more holistic view of 
resilience, there should also be redundancy on the demand side. Assets can be physically 
protected to make them more robust to hazards but such measures are unlikely to completely 
eradicate faults, therefore, contingencies to maintain and recover service levels should be in 
place. A localised and multi-system criticality layer can inform targeted decision making 





cascading failure and consequence to the railway system is greatest. Redundancy of power 
sources and alternative fuels would be one way to increase resilience. Uninterruptable Power 
Supplies (UPS) can be used to provide a backup supply to signalling systems but are not 
appropriate for high-voltage electrification. If half of the UK’s power is provided by renewables 
by 2030 this will ensure resilience to extreme drought (NIC, 2018), but with localised 
renewable generation this would also diversify the UK’s electricity generation mix and 
increase resilience should the main electricity grid fail. In densely populated areas, the 
repurposing of the existing gas grid for hydrogen might also be an option (Armitt et al, 2016).  
Diesel rolling stock could be on standby for introduction to service and to rescue stranded 
EMUs at critical locations should a loss of electric traction supply be experienced. However, 
more innovative and sustainable solutions may be achieved through alternative fuels such as 
hydrogen power, bi-mode or battery-powered trains given the desire to decrease reliance on 
petroleum and plans to phase out diesel trains by 2040 in the UK (Chapman, 2007; Baker, 
2018). A battery-powered Bombardier Electrostar Class 379 IPEMU (Independently Powered 
Electrical Multiple Unit) entered passenger service in the UK in 2015 (Bombardier, 2015) and 
can be powered via 25kV OLE or on-board batteries, charged from the traction power feed 
(Figure 5.5). The primary function of the IPEMU is to bridge gaps in existing electrification 
where the installation of OLE would not be cost-effective, whilst also being more 
environmentally friendly than diesel-only rolling stock. In the context of risks to electric 
traction feeds, IPEMUs would be an excellent resilience measure as they would be able to 
switch to battery power in the event of a loss of external power supply, avoiding stranded 







Figure 5.5. Overview of Electrostar IPEMU before and after modification (Bombardier, 2015). 
 
At a broader level, there is no National Power Outage Plan in the UK, but railway organisations 
should have Business Continuity Plans (BCPs) for managing core business functions (RDG, 
2017). These plans may include procedures for electric trains to be ‘rescued’ by diesel 
locomotives or substituting electric powered trains for diesel units, however there are 
practical issues to consider such as signalling systems may not be functioning, spare diesel 
units may be unavailable, trained drivers may not be available and fuelling diesel trains may 
be an issue. Therefore, cascading infrastructure failure can lead to systemic issues which 
requires a systemic and multi-agency solution, beyond physical infrastructure. However, there 
is little current evidence that there is a general multi-agency approach to power outages 
within the railway industry (RDG, 2017). Network criticality can help to highlight the need for 
a coordinated and systemic response to infrastructure risk and resilience.  
5.4.3 Climate Services 
Network criticality can also be integrated within commercial services for weather and climate 
resilience, where a company offers a bespoke service to a client which provides them with 





involve the preparation, interpretation and delivery of information based on climate science, 
for bespoke requirements across multiple timescales, from months to years, and spatial 
scales, from global to regional to local (Met Office, 2017).  
The Global Framework for Climate Services (GFCS) as shown in Figure 5.6, provides guidance 
on delivering climate services (WMO, 2014; 2018). Climate services take two forms of 
information in A) national and international databases of weather variables, risk and 
vulnerability maps, long-term scenarios and projections along with B) socio-economic 
variables and non-meteorological data such as agriculture, health and infrastructure 
indicators to produce an output of bespoke products projections, trends, economic analyses 
for decision support (WMO, 2018). A layer of network criticality, as non-meteorological data, 
can be integrated into a Climate Services Information System to provide detailed information 
on failure consequence and improve the value of the service offered. 
   





By way of an example, Copernicus is the European Union’s earth observation programme, 
comprising a set of systems collecting data from multiple sources, such as satellites and 
sensors (Copernicus, 2018). These systems process data and provide information services to 
users. One strand of Copernicus is the Climate Change Service (C3S) which is currently in the 
development phase but will use climate system observations and climate science for the 
development of information on past, current and future climates. Key indicators on climate 
change drivers can support adaptation and mitigation across multiple sectors in Europe, 
offering economic value through informing policy development, improving planning and 
adaptation and promoting the development of new services. C3S is also the EU’s contribution 
to WMO’s GFCS.  
5.5 Holistic Decision Making 
Established processes for both risk assessment and the planning of resilience interventions 
within infrastructure owners and operators can be informed and enhanced by a layer of 
network criticality. However, activities should not be carried out in isolation, or within 
different departments of an organisation. Risk and resilience form part of a holistic and 
systemic decision-making process, which should account for multiple perspectives and types 
of hazards alongside a range of options for controlling them, across multiple infrastructure 
systems from different sectors. It is therefore important to consider the ‘bigger picture’ of 
how activities and information sources can be coordinated as part of an overall drive for 







5.5.1 Organisational Standards and Models 
At a high-level, international standards developed by the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) can provide context and a starting point for the consideration of asset 
management within an organisation. The ISO 55000 series of standards presents guidance on 
the fundamentals, management systems, requirements and applications of asset 
management. ISO 55000 outlines how effective and efficient asset management that is 
consistent and sustainable over time is required in order for an infrastructure management 
organisation to realise value from their asset portfolio. A broad range of factors influence an 
organisation’s function, such as the operational context, financial constraints, regulation and 
legislation, along with stakeholder priorities and thus define the objectives of the 
organisation. These objectives can be translated into asset-related decisions using a risk-based 
approach. A prioritisation of asset management interventions would be driven by the need to 
balance risk, opportunity, costs and performance. Therefore, there is a clear role for network 
criticality and metrics of performance consequence to help inform overall asset management 
policy.  
It is, however, important to consider the wider decision-making process when looking at the 
applications of network criticality. A key principal of ISO 55000 is the integration of activities 
at the organisational level. Asset management can be supported by an asset management 
system which is a collection of interrelated and interacting elements designed to establish 
policy, objectives and processes with which to manage an asset portfolio. Such a system can 
be comprised of tools including information systems, which can help to coordinate activities 





across stakeholders and external service providers. Figure 5.7 outlines the relationship 
between key elements of an asset management system according to ISO 55000:2014. 
Network criticality can be integrated as a tool into an asset management system, alongside 
broader considerations such as the context of the organisation, leadership strategies, planning 
processes, support, operations, performance evaluation and improvement schemes. 
 






An asset management system therefore comprises a variety of information sources, systems 
and people across an organisation and beyond. How such elements are organised, structured 
and integrated within an infrastructure company influences the potential for realising value 
from assets. It is therefore important to consider organisational models. Effective decision 
making requires the effective use and management of information, which must in turn be 
supported by an effective organisational structure. Beckford (2016) presents an adaptive 
model of an “Intelligent Organisation” which integrates structure, individuals and information 
in order to make the best use of new information sources and the increasing volume of 
information that is generated in modern infrastructure management. Fundamental 
organisational changes are proposed, shifting to the design of organisations based upon 
customer, user and decision needs. If people and systems work closer together, and smarter, 
increasing communication both within a company and with the organisations or individuals 
who use that company’s services, information flows will be more effective. The value of 
information can be realised when organisations continually adapt, breaking down siloes and 
recognising the interdependencies of internal systems and externalities, developing an 
organic rather than rigid structure. Central to the model is the role of information systems and 
the information they contain. Information systems can enable communication channels and 
information flows, providing the dual-function of value-generation from existing assets and 
value-enablement for future assets, together maintaining identity and fulfilling purpose of an 
organisation (Figure 5.8). An organisation should mirror the structure of the information 
system and vice versa, comprising operational and strategic levels with appropriate degrees 
of information and autonomy with which to make the best possible decisions. In the context 





an organisation to add value to asset management, but only if that organisation is structured 
to make effective use of a new information source. 
 
Figure 5.8. The Intelligent Organisation (Beckford, 2016). 
 
5.5.2 Frameworks for Resilient Infrastructure 
The broad scope of international standards and organisational models can be refined and 
focused towards specific sectors and applications through the development of frameworks for 
decision making. Such frameworks are most mature in the field of natural hazard, extreme 
weather and climate change resilience, mainly due to the characteristics and experience of 
such events compared to other hazards. In terms of the comparability of hazards, Golany et al 
(2009) assessed the contrast in optimal resource allocation policies between probabilistic 
risks, involving an element of chance, and strategic risks, determined by an adverse interested 
party. Climate and weather risks are natural phenomenon (although with a degree of 
anthropogenic forcing) with natural variability in space and time. Other risks such as cyber-





events in space and time is deterministic. Natural events have a degree of predictability based 
upon an understanding of the physical processes governing climate and earth systems and are 
experienced more frequently. Human driven events are much more difficult to predict, 
experienced infrequently, and the information available on the spatiotemporal distribution of 
hazard likelihood and frequency depends upon the level of intelligence gathered by security 
organisations. Therefore, Golany et al (2009) recommend that the best policy for probabilistic 
risk is to target investment and resources towards priority sites which will have the greatest 
benefit, whereas for strategic risk the optimal policy is to spread resources through a system 
to decrease the damage potential around the most vulnerable sites. Therefore, the level of 
information available for decision making is likely to be greater for weather and climate 
applications, including spatial distributions of likelihood and frequency of events, hence such 
frameworks are more abundant. However, taking cyber-attacks as an example, there are still 
facilities that are more and less likely to be targeted and assets or equipment within such 
facilities that are more and less vulnerable to attack. Therefore, it is possible to extend the 
application of frameworks developed for natural hazards and climate risk to strategic risks, 
dependent on the availability of information. 
A useful starting point for assessing natural hazard risks to and resilience of infrastructure 
systems is a framework developed by the UK Cabinet Office (2011) outlining an approach to 
improving and maintaining the resilience of infrastructure and essential services, supported 
by practical guidance and advice for owners, operators, emergency responders, industry 
groups, regulators and government agencies. This is based on the ‘Resilience Cycle’ (Figure 
5.9) comprising segments of risk assessment and resilience building, centred around the 





communication and information sharing between relevant agencies, with an assessment of 
external dependencies, is crucial for civil emergency planning, awareness of consequences, 
and information for service planning. A layer of network criticality can be integrated into the 
identification and assessment process for risks to infrastructure systems, with an additional 
function of highlighting dependencies and relevant organisations for information sharing such 
as rail and electricity network owners and operators. 
 
Figure 5.9. Resilience Cycle for Infrastructure Owners (Cabinet Office, 2011). 
 
A comprehensive framework is presented by Quinn et al (2018) with specific applications for 
the adaptation of transport infrastructure to extreme weather and climate change (Figure 
5.10). This framework aligns with the asset management system structure of ISO 55000, and 
the general cyclical structure of the Cabinet Office (2011) framework. There are two sections: 
an adaptation strategy and an implementation plan. A two-sided framework helps to break 





implementation. Network criticality has potential applications for both sides of the 
framework, informing risk assessment and facilitating a range of resilience options. Although 
this framework is applied to the transport sector and climate hazards, the processes and 
elements involved in decision making will be highly similar across any infrastructure sector. 
The framework includes considerations of factors influencing asset management on both 
sides, including risk perceptions and stakeholder engagement.  
 
The framework of Quinn et al (2018) is designed to be iterative and circular, incorporating 
learning alongside new information on risks, vulnerabilities, technology and socioeconomic 
conditions through each cycle which recognises that the risk landscape is dynamic and not 
static. Therefore, future revisions of the network criticality assessments with a greater sample 





size and increased reliability could be integrated. The framework can be used by any 
organisation, regardless their current knowledge and preparedness levels with aim of 
embedding adaptation within organisational practices so that it becomes ‘business-as-usual’ 
and not a separate activity or funding source. The theme of communication and integration is 
again present, with a desire to bring together disparate activities, systems and information 
layers to avoid repetition and segregation of organisational functions.  
Focusing on risk, the framework developed by the Cabinet Office (2011) involves both the 
identification of risks (including likelihood, frequency, hazard links, primary impacts, 
secondary impacts, and vulnerability to risks) and an assessment of the identified risks 
(including flood resilience, benchmarking, prioritising risks, and the development of standards 
on the resilience of infrastructure involving asset design, network design, service levels, 
recovery time, and events). Risk assessment in Quinn et al (2018) comes under the ‘Adaptation 
Strategy’ side of the framework. The purpose of this strategy is to first define broad high-level 
objectives which are then used to drive the assessment of potential impacts of climate change 
on infrastructure through patterns of hazards, vulnerabilities and consequences (economic, 
social and environmental). Such an assessment can incorporate system performance metrics, 
meteorological data and localised tacit knowledge. Data needs are driven by input from 
stakeholders and specialists, with multiple perspectives on consequence, such as the costs of 
asset repair or delays/cancellations, alongside socioeconomic consequences. These layers of 
information are used to identify priority risks for adaptation interventions. For a holistic risk 
assessment, it is necessary to have multiple layers of information on hazards, vulnerabilities 
and consequence, from multiple perspectives that are both within and external to the 





layer from the perspective of the infrastructure management company within an information 
system.  
Focusing on resilience, there is recognition in the framework developed by the Cabinet Office 
(2011) that a range of measures, including improvements in protection, the ability to absorb 
shocks and recover, and local and national response to emergencies are necessary to achieve 
resilience. Within the ‘Resilience Cycle’ there are segments of building resilience (including 
governance, long-term interests of stakeholders, organisational resilience strategies, strategic 
leadership and business continuity plans) and evaluating resilience (including sector resilience 
plans – there is a focus on regular updates and reviews of vulnerability and risk, ambition for 
continuous improvement, monitoring progress with implementing programmes of measures 
and updating plans). Resilience interventions in Quinn et al (2018) come under the 
‘Implementation Plan’ side of the framework. The purpose of this plan is to take the scope of 
work from the adaptation strategy and generate potential options to increase the resilience 
of the system to each identified risk. Such options must take account of the various constraints 
imposed upon an organisation (technical, social, environmental and financial) and the finite 
amount of resources available including budget constraints. An iterative option generation 
and analysis phase allows the proposition and evaluation of various types of intervention over 
multiple timescales.  Quinn et al (2018) advocate the application of adaptation pathways for 
phased adaptation, where different options are enacted when risk thresholds are reached 
rather than at defined time horizons. Resilience options are finally translated into specific 
action plans, which can be implemented within an infrastructure system. The circular design 
of the framework allows the evaluation of resilience intervention implementation, in terms of 





Both frameworks have the functionality to consider all components of resilience in the 
generation of options and action plans, and the influence of multiple perspectives and 
experience of stakeholders. The evaluation of interventions is also crucial, allowing new 
information, lessons and socioeconomic context to be incorporated into future decision 
making. It may be the case that a selected component of resilience is not adding anticipated 
value, and that a different component and alterative options may be more appropriate. The 
specific options and interventions selected will differ dependent on the type of risk and hazard 
in focus. Returning to the assessment of Golany et al (2009) for resource allocation applied to 
strategic and probabilistic risks, if there is greater confidence in the likely location of failure, 
such as for extreme weather predictions, hard interventions for that location will be easier to 
facilitate alongside softer elements such as redundancy and recovery, whereas for strategic 
risks there is often less confidence in the likely location of attack and so an even greater focus 
on softer or operational options would be more appropriate. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
In summary, this chapter has explored the wider context of network criticality assessment and 
the overall implications for the decision-making process and infrastructure system 
management. Network criticality can help to inform prioritisation for resource allocation 
across multiple geographic scales, multiple systems or combinations of systems, at multiple 
levels of operational and topological complexity. The role of network criticality within risk 
assessment and the planning of resilience interventions has been explored, within the context 
of the broader decision-making process for the implementation of different options. The key 





of value from information. This involves the effective and intelligent management of 
information of various forms through a range of systems, actors and perspectives and the 
development of information sharing and communication mechanisms for coordinated 
decision making and actions.  
Network criticality is one layer of information that can inform the prioritisation of risks, which 
has far greater value when integrated with other layers, such as hazards and vulnerabilities as 
well as multiple perspectives, such as operational and financial. Combined, these layers of 
information can support the implementation of multiple perspectives on resilience options, 
from investment in asset robustness to broader options of redundancy and recovery. Risk 
assessment and resilience interventions should fit within an adaptive decision-making 
process, with continuous monitoring and evaluation of control measures and the revision of 
processes based on feedback from implemented projects. Overall, the vision is for holistic 
decision making where holistic risks inform holistic resilience. This can be achieved through 
coordinating activities within and between organisations from multiple infrastructure sectors, 
recognising interdependencies where there is potential to combine efforts for mutual benefit. 
Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) coordinate multi-agency resilience efforts (Cabinet Office, 
2013) under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and offer a platform for cross-sector working. 
Chapter 6 will provide an evaluation and critique of the methodological approach of this 
thesis. This includes an interpretation of the characteristics of identified critical locations, an 
exploration of the advantages and limitations of the data and information sources used to 
define network criticality along with a series of recommendations for potential improvement 





 EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Chapter Overview 
In the previous chapter, the overall implications of the infrastructure network criticality 
assessments presented in this thesis were explored. This involved the consideration of how a 
network criticality layer can be applied and integrated within infrastructure management 
functions and information systems to inform a variety of resilience interventions, as part of a 
holistic decision-making process for infrastructure owners and operators.  This chapter offers 
a reflection on the overall approach and methodology of the thesis. The nature of the single 
points of failure identified is explored, including the contribution of the methodological 
approach to their identification and comparisons to existing literature. A critique of the 
methodology is then provided, assessing the various benefits and limitations. Finally, 
recommendations are provided regarding the improvement of the existing network criticality 
assessment methodology, opportunities for extending the analysis, and a consideration of 
potential future developments and how they may influence both the distribution of network 
criticality and the methodology for identifying single points of failure.   
6.2 Interpretation of Critical Locations 
The nature of the locations identified as highly critical for maintaining service performance 
within a network are influenced by a combination of network topology, service patterns and 
flows, and the management of network operations. These factors are driven by the degree of 
complexity within the network(s) in focus. Criticality assessments were demonstrated for two 





comparatively less complex GB electricity distribution network in Chapter 2 and the more 
complex rail transport network in Chapter 3. There are differences in the distribution of 
criticality between these regions; the West Midlands licence area of the electricity distribution 
network and the Wessex route of the railway network have more distinct centres of criticality 
whereas the South West licence area and LNW (South) route have a greater distribution of 
criticality throughout the respective areas. When comparing the networks overall, it is evident 
that the railway network has a significantly greater spatial distribution of single points of 
failure, whereas critical locations on the electricity distribution network are highly 
concentrated in key areas.  
The distribution of network criticality is a function of the degree of connectivity between 
nodes and edges, and the number of potential source-sink pathways available. Electricity 
networks have quite a simplistic and hierarchical topology, where power flows from source to 
sink, from a small number of HV substations to a greater number of lower voltage substations. 
Flows are, in the majority of cases, unidirectional and the pathways between substations, and 
thus the footprint of assets are clearly defined. In contrast, railway networks have a more 
complex topology, where stations can act as both sources and sinks for train services. Flows 
are multidirectional, and pathways can be created between any pair of stations, dependent 
on constraints such as traction type, driver training and train-crew diagrams or timetables. 
Therefore, the key difference between the two networks is the potential for the spatial 
propagation and dispersion of disruption.  
An incident at a relatively minor location on the railway network such as Barnt Green (Figure 





far north as Scotland (Jaroszweski et al, 2015) due to reactionary delays to long-distance 
services, whereas a substation failure will typically only impact the substations and customers 
to which it supplies electricity. Therefore, electricity distribution network criticality is highly 
concentrated around major towns and cities, whilst single points of failure exist on relatively 
minor and branch lines of the railway network. 
 
Figure 6.1. Recorded train delays from the TRUST database for a flooding event at Barnt Green. 
Adapted from Jaroszweski et al (2015). 
 
The variation in the type of locations in a network can also contribute to the distribution of 
criticality. For the electricity distribution network, only nodes are included in the criticality 





contrast, the railway network criticality assessment includes nodes and edges, which have a 
greater variety in their characteristics, with different categories of track, stations and 
junctions. There is therefore a greater variability in the types of location classified as highly 
critical on the relatively complex railway network. Another distinction between the two 
networks is the complexity of network operation and management. For the electricity 
network, infrastructure management and service management are combined, falling under 
the jurisdiction of either the DNO or NG. The railway network has quite distinct infrastructure 
and operational elements, with NR owning and maintaining the infrastructure whereas train 
services are operated by TOCs and FOCs. With different operators on the railway, there are 
competing priorities for traffic management during disruption. It may be the case that trains 
operating on branch lines are left to accumulate delay whilst services on main lines take 
priority for restoration, therefore single points of failure occur in more remote locations. 
Despite the differences in complexity between the two networks, similar drivers of criticality 
can be highlighted. Essentially, criticality is a result of network supply and demand dynamics 
where the network is designed to serve customers or passengers. For the electricity 
distribution network, highly critical locations are typically concentrated around larger towns 
and cities, which act as major load centres. Higher voltage substations overall are more critical, 
supporting a greater load. The identification of such critical locations aligns well with network 
performance factors used to calculate network criticality under the CNAIM methodology 
(Ofgem, 2017a) including the number of customers served, amount of load affected, and the 
time to restore (switching and repair). The added value of the approach in this thesis is that 
more locally important substations are likely to be identified including industrial connections 





to the national average. However, a direct comparison of mapped network criticality is not 
possible as the actual calculated criticality bands for assets under CNAIM are held by individual 
DNOs and are restricted access due to the sensitive nature of the information. 
For the railway network, high criticality locations are centred around major hubs, key junctions 
and mainlines, which are areas of high demand for train services and/or high frequency and 
volume of traffic. This aligns well with the work of Pant et al (2014) who produced a criticality 
analysis of the GB rail network with an Origin-Destination trip assignment model, using data 
on observed passenger flows to estimate and visualise daily passenger trips and thus travel 
pattern importance. The daily passenger trip flows shown in Figure 6.2 highlight that a small 
number of lines, mainly in the London area, have significantly greater flows than the 
remainder of the rail network. It is clear that major urban conurbations and mainlines are 
highly critical, as identified in this thesis, but the national-scale focus skews the distribution 
heavily towards these locations and dampens the influence of more locally important single 
points of failure, which this thesis identifies.  
Although the distribution and types of location may differ between the networks, there is 
commonality in the reasons behind locations being identified as highly critical. The nature of 
the underlying metrics is also highly similar. Regulatory reporting requirements are the 
principal reason for recording fault data for electricity distribution, driven by Ofgem, and delay 
data for the railway network, driven by ORR. The metrics are also temporally based, as a 
measure of the ‘punctuality’ or ‘continuity’ of service, through electricity SML to customers or 






Figure 6.2. Results of trip assignment analysis showing estimates of daily number of passenger trips 
across individual railway network edges on the GB rail network. Adapted from Pant et al (2014). 
 
The key advantage of the network criticality assessment methodology is the identification of 
high resolution, and locally specific, single points of failure. The granularity of critical locations 
is evident within both the electricity distribution and railway networks, particularly at the city-
scale. Within cities, the density of both forms of infrastructure increases, as does the demand 
for services and the loads upon assets. Major substations supplying key residential or business 
areas exist alongside major railway hubs with a combination of frequent local services and 
longer distance services. Therefore, whilst key centres of criticality, such as London and 





ability to determine which substations, track sections, stations and junctions are most critical 
within these areas.  
The added value of the increased resolution and granularity of network criticality assessment 
can be highlighted through a comparison of the railway network criticality assessment in this 
thesis and the approach of NR (2016d). Figure 6.3 maps NR’s internal route criticality bands 
for LNW (South), using financial compensation metrics at the SRS-level. The low resolution 
means that the same level of risk is allocated for long track sections, such as Rugby to London 
Euston, and the national-scale assessment is, as with Pant et al (2014), heavily skewed towards 
the WCML. For broad financial allocations such a scale is adequate, yet for localised asset 
management the benefit of this thesis is the high-resolution single points of failure identified 
at the STANOX level, for both track sections and individual locations such as stations and 
junctions. 
It is also worth an examination of how the network criticality assessments in this thesis may 
compare to the prioritisation based upon tacit or expert knowledge within infrastructure 
owners and operators. An example for the railway network is used in this case for illustration. 
As part of the stakeholder engagement activity for this thesis, rail experts for the Wessex route 
including the Route Control Manager (RCM) and Seasons Specialist, based at the former 
Wessex Integrated Control Centre at Waterloo station in London (now based at the 
Basingstoke Rail Operating Centre - ROC) were asked to annotate a route map highlighting 






Figure 6.3. Mapped Route Criticality for LNW (South) using criticality bands calculated by NR (2016d). 
 
Figure 6.4 shows the hand-drawn map produced, with locations of different priorities 
indicated. The most critical section, highlighted in orange, is between Clapham Junction and 
Woking. A line is drawn across the map from Reading to indicate the boundary between ‘inner’ 
and ‘outer’ lines which are managed as distinct units with different characteristics. Of the 
‘outer’ lines, the most critical are highlighted in pink, around the South Coast including 
Basingstoke, Southampton, Salisbury and Portsmouth. Green locations are classified as 
‘isolated’ and received less prioritisation during disruptive events. The general pattern 
identified is represented well through the network criticality assessment in this thesis, 
including the importance of London Waterloo to Woking and the lines to Southampton, along 





that the methodology applied in this thesis is representative of current understanding within 
infrastructure organisations and could be applied document priorities. However, this thesis 
also challenges tacit knowledge with the identification of localised single points of failure, 
particularly in the London area, that are classified as low priority by route personnel. An 
examination of such locations can enhance current prioritisation and target resilience 
interventions to limit the impact of potential asset failure.  
 
Figure 6.4. Hand-drawn map of perceived network criticality by operations team at Wessex 
Integrated Control Centre. 
 
The granularity of critical locations is even more evident when undertaking an interdependent 





feeder system for the Cross-City railway line was used as a local-scale case-study to 
demonstrate a cross-system criticality assessment. The complexity of criticality increases 
further, with single points of failure incorporating elements of network topology, service 
patterns and flows across the electricity distribution network and the railway network. For 
individual cases of feeder station supplies to specific sections of railway, the criticality of a 
feeder pathway and an electrified track section can be identified, as well as the criticality of 
substations within that pathway and locations within the track section. With connections 
between individual assets used to bring consequence metrics on both networks together, a 
high spatial resolution is paramount.  
When the criticality assessment is scaled up to include two connected networks, criticality 
depends upon both internal and external factors. The footprint of an electricity substation is 
extended to include the sections of the railway network it supplies, with the consequence 
being a factor of DM as well as SML. Sources on the electricity distribution network have sinks 
on the railway network. Alongside cross-network flows, cross-network management is 
required between multiple agencies including DNOs, NR, TOCs, FOCs and NG. Examining the 
criticality of connected networks presents a greater variety of types of critical location to 
interpret and understand in combination. However, the underlying drivers of criticality remain 
the same. A highly loaded substation supplying a section of track with frequent and high-
volume rail traffic presents a risk to service performance across both networks. The 
distribution of criticality is more variable within and weighted more towards the railway 
network, with a distinction between the north and south of the Cross-City line, whereas the 
substations that supply traction feeder power to the line exhibit very similar characteristics 





Across different infrastructure, management regions, and applications of varying complexity, 
different spatial distributions of network criticality are likely to be produced. As the complexity 
increases, through network characteristics or the addition of multiple networks, the behaviour 
of the system and subsequent management of operations becomes increasingly complex. The 
more connected networks become, the larger an asset footprint becomes, increasing the 
potential for disruption to propagate or cascade and thus the number of single points of failure 
identified is likely to increase. However, despite such differences in the geographical 
distributions, the drivers of criticality in supply and demand dynamics remain the same, with 
major demand centres and high frequency and volume of flows influencing the location of 
single points of failure. Therefore, although the criticality assessments in this thesis have been 
applied to selected management regions and case-studies, the overall understanding of 
network criticality in terms of the types of critical locations, network behaviour, and system 
dynamics can be applied nationally, across an entire network, to inform the targeted 
prioritisation of locations for resource allocation and resilience interventions. Across 
infrastructure systems, it is the city-scale interdependencies that are most crucial, highlighting 
the presence of and the need to account for external sources of risk and consequence in any 
prioritisation of interventions. 
6.3 Critique of Methodology 
It is necessary to interpret the results of the network criticality assessments with respect to 
the limitations of the underlying data and information sources, so as to understand the impact 
such limitations may have on the conclusions drawn. Essentially, the caveats to the criticality 





The electricity distribution and railway transport network criticality assessments, presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3, are based upon similar historical fault and disruption databases for a single 
system. The main limitation with the databases is the sample size constraint, with five-year 
time series of both electricity supply interruptions and railway delays. Whilst this sample 
provides an adequate volume and variety of events for analysis, any historical sample remains 
a ‘snapshot’ of the wider distribution of events. Therefore, the presence or absence of failures 
along with network and operational changes within a time series influence the single points 
of failure identified. This is particularly evident for the electricity distribution network, with a 
high number of substations and thus potential failure points overall. There is also the general 
rarity of power cuts at a single location to consider, as the normal state of the electricity 
distribution network is for power to flows between all substations and from source to sink at 
all times. As a result, the calculated criticality bands for the majority of substations are based 
upon the service performance consequence of a single fault, although the distribution of 
consequence magnitude per failure is likely to be quite narrow due to the defined asset 
footprint of a substation. For the railway network, there is a significantly greater variety in the 
sample size of incidents at individual locations. Most of the major locations, such as main lines 
and key hubs, have very high incident counts whereas the more isolated locations, such as 
branch lines, tend to have low incident counts. Whilst there may be fewer potential failure 
points, with track sections including a range of assets, failures are more common overall due 
to the complexity of the system and the range of sub-systems required for a railway to 
function. Incident occurrence and magnitude is also more variable as this largely depends on 





With low sample sizes at the majority of electrical substations and more remote railway 
locations, the reliability of allocated criticality band may be reduced requiring careful 
interpretation of the characteristics of a particular location. However, the reliability of a 
criticality band depends upon how representative a single event is of the wider distribution at 
a location. Although the criticality of an electricity distribution substation may be based on 
one fault, the asset footprint and thus the potential consequence for connected substations 
and customers is quite clearly defined. For the railway network, the consequence of failure at 
a particular location is likely to be more variable due to the spatiotemporal variability of train 
service patterns and the potential for propagation and dispersion of disruption. The 
management of the railway network is also more complex, with personnel issues causing 
propagation of delays if, for example, train crew become delayed and cannot operate the 
subsequent service they were scheduled for.  
Therefore, the low sample sizes at more remote railway locations present more of an issue 
than the single failures at electrical substations. Such locations should be interpreted on a 
case-by-case basis, with a more forensic examination of the nature of the location. The 
location of critical electrical substations in towns and cities aligns with common understanding 
of priority areas, whereas understanding of single points of failure on railway branch lines is 
less common. It is for this reason that locations with high Z-scores and only one observation 
were omitted from the railway network criticality assessment, whereas such locations were 
retained for the electricity distribution network criticality assessment. The removal of 
substations with a single observation would have reduced the number of substations included 






The caveats to the analysis become increasingly complex with an interdependent 
infrastructure network criticality assessment, presented in Chapter 4. Evaluating criticality 
across two connected networks involves integrating both service performance databases and 
spatial information from different infrastructure companies from different infrastructure 
systems. The degree of reliability and certainty within the resultant criticality assessment 
depends upon the commonality between the data and information sources. In this case, 
granularity of the evidence base is essential when assessing the connectivity of individual 
assets between systems. The spatial information supporting the criticality assessment is 
assumed to be accurate and complete, having been obtained from the infrastructure 
companies directly. The information is adequate for tracing pathways between external 
electricity substations and railway track sections without any issues. It is the service 
performance databases that present issues with integration between systems. As with the 
single system criticality assessments, the same issues surrounding sample sizes, low frequency 
high severity events and remote single points of failure remain. However, the principal issue 
in this case is the definition from regulators of what infrastructure elements fall within the 
system boundaries for fault reporting requirements.  
It was found that, in general, there is very limited consideration of externalities in both 
causation and consequence across the reporting of electricity supply interruptions and train 
delays. The only direct reference is the ‘external power failure’ delay reason code in the 
railway delay database. Fault or incident reporting requirements define what types of assets 
and what types of failures are recorded. For electricity distribution, traction feeder 
connections to the railway network at 25kV appear to fall beyond the system boundary, where 





reported fails to account for external consequences. Tracing failure pathways from source to 
sink, and from asset failure to consequence, is a major challenge with the limited amount of 
information reported. There is a significant overlap between the metrics, where spatial 
correlations can provide an indication of the potential for cascading failure, but ultimately only 
internal consequences are quantified.  
Ultimately, the limitations and caveats to an infrastructure network criticality assessment 
methodology, both for this thesis and the existing literature, are a factor the scale of 
application, in terms of geography and systems. Network criticality assessments for single and 
dual networks use similar methodological approaches. They are largely based on modelling 
and simulation, involving Complex Network Analysis (CNA) with topological (graph theory) and 
system-based (supply and demand flows) methodologies (Pagani & Aiello, 2013; Ouyang, 
2014; Mattsson & Jenelius, 2015). Such models are useful for incorporating a range of hazards, 
vulnerabilities and risks across multiple connected systems at the national-scale, to provide 
general direction on infrastructure planning and provision. However, there is a trade-off 
between the scope of analysis and the detail and reliability of the output.  
Evaluating vulnerability using purely topological metrics can be misleading (Hines et al, 2010), 
whilst a number of assumptions on networks flows and behaviour are, quite necessarily, made 
for simplification when analysing multiple complex networks for the whole of GB. Thacker et 
al (2014) assessed the vulnerability of present and future configurations of the GB electricity 
network to climate hazards using a model of national-scale transmission and distribution, 
assuming that electricity follows the shortest path between two points. Thacker et al (2017b) 





and integrated electricity network, estimating customer demands from flight and population 
statistics, and assuming connections between airports and substations based on geographic 
proximity. Pant et al (2016) also assume geographic dependencies between electrical 
substations and railway lines in order to undertake a vulnerability assessment of GB rail 
infrastructure dependencies on external electricity systems. 
Given the simplifications made, there are challenges when downscaling the output and 
examining local-level network criticality. For example, Thacker et al (2017a) undertook a 
network criticality assessment of interdependent critical infrastructure in England and Wales, 
identifying geographic hotspots to target investments and enhance network resilience. At the 
national-scale, the mapped hotspots (Figure 6.5) are useful for highlighting areas where 
resilience interventions are most in need, such as the periphery of urban areas where there 
are large highly loaded facilities or central urban areas where several critical infrastructure 
networks are concentrated in one location presenting major demand hubs. However, when 
local-scale output is assessed, with criticality metrics calculated for 1km x 1km grid squares 
(Figure 6.6), the assumptions made on infrastructure demand and shortest path flows reduce 
the reliability of results to a level where decision making around specific assets is not 
particularly viable. Pant et al (2016) assess flood vulnerability of railway and electrical 
infrastructure using NaFRA flood likelihood maps intersected with infrastructure maps.  
Spatial intersections can identify assets in flood risk areas, but the consequence of failure from 
those assets and their interdependencies is not as reliable at the local-level, as there is no 
certainty regarding whether a particular substation supplies power to a track section in reality. 
Therefore, modelling and simulation approaches have applications at a high-level but present 






Figure 6.5. (a) Composite Z-scores of user demand and disruption of assets, electric network, rail, and 
road. (b) Statistically significant composite hotspots at a 99% significance level (Z-score > 2.56) 
(Thacker et al, 2017a). 
 
 
Figure 6.6. (a) London’s electricity infrastructure asset user demand hotspots at a 99% significance 
level (Z-score > 2.56). (b) Electricity infrastructure asset user demand hotspots at a 99% significance 






This thesis has therefore contributed towards a research gap in assessing localised single 
points of failure across dependent infrastructure systems using industry data and information 
sources. There is a different set of caveats for this thesis compared to the literature, regarding 
the data and information sources used which, despite being the best available, mean that the 
single points of failure identified require careful interpretation. There is clear trade-off 
between spatial resolution and sample size, whilst when the complexity of the criticality 
assessment increases through the integration of multiple networks and data sets, the 
definition of system boundaries presents challenges for interpretation. However, there is clear 
value in the prioritisation of interventions based upon the criticality assessments presented in 
this thesis. Whilst the existing literature presents criticality methodologies that are designed 
for national-scale applications, a methodology specifically designed for local-scale asset 
management has reduced the degree of uncertainty and improved reliability in targeting 
resilience interventions. 
6.4 Recommendations 
6.4.1 Opportunities for Improving Network Criticality Assessment  
Given the limitations identified, potential improvements to the data and information sources 
used would enhance the evidence base upon which the network criticality assessment is 
established. Ideally, with historical service performance databases, longer time series would 
increase the sample size of faults or incidents at locations, providing a more reliable indication 
of whether a particular criticality band, particularly for more localised single points of failure, 
is based upon a systematic issue or an ‘extreme’ event by assessing the distribution of events. 





increase the geographic coverage of a criticality assessment within a management region, 
whilst accounting for more variation in network developments and service patterns. For 
infrastructure interdependencies, a longer time series may provide more reliable evidence of 
cascading failure pathways and consequences, whilst increasing the potential for scalability. 
In the same vein, obtaining electricity transmission performance data from NG would help to 
complete a more systemic assessment of risk for the electricity sector and connections to the 
rail network.  
However, there are more fundamental issues with the data and metrics that need to be 
addressed. A recommendation of the National Infrastructure Assessment (NIC, 2018) is that 
long-term decisions can be improved through robust analysis of the quality and performance 
of existing infrastructure, and that the information supporting this analysis should be as 
detailed and systemic as possible. If the reporting requirements for asset failures and 
consequence metrics are driven by regulation, then Tran et al (2014) suggest that regulators 
have the opportunity to drive improvements in this area, through improving the quality of 
data recorded, reforming policies and contradictory incentives between regulators from 
different sectors and increasing the potential for data-sharing agreements and cooperation 
between organisations. It is recommended that the UK government adopt an integrated 
approach to governing infrastructure interdependencies, involving more proactive incentives 
and facilitating urban-scale intermediary platforms for coordination within and between 
infrastructure sectors and stakeholders. Sharing information is crucial for local-level 
emergency planning, maintaining essential services and emergency services assistance 
(Cabinet Office, 2011) in line with statutory guidance from the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) 





operators. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (HM 
Government, 2015b) also suggests that the sharing and improvement of information is 
important, with the Government working with infrastructure owners and operators to create 
a regulatory framework to ensure that infrastructure is resilient to future threats and that 
responsibilities for integrated infrastructure policing are shared across a number of 
organisations with different levels of capability and capacity. 
Progress towards this goal has been made by the UKRN (UK Regulators Network) which was 
launched in March 2014 and brings together CEOs from different regulators across different 
sectors, including Ofgem and ORR, to discuss common issues and projects (UKRN, 2018). UKRN 
have a cross-sector project looking at making better use of non-financial vulnerability data 
involving collaboration between energy and water sectors for the purpose of identifying and 
responding to vulnerable customers (UKRN, 2017). The same principles could be applied to 
sharing vulnerability data between other sectors, such as the non-financial railway delay and 
electricity fault databases. Regulatory reporting requirements should be changed to reflect 
the increasing sources of external risk and consequence, and the flexible nature of system 
boundaries. This can be achieved by improving consequence metrics to account for impacts 
to external assets, as well as more detailed fault reporting and attribution to acknowledge 
external sources of risk and allow cascading failure pathways to be traced. Either the reporting 
should be extended or the system boundary itself should be extended.  
For spatial and topological data, more detailed low-level information such as LV electricity 
assets and connections to external networks i.e. railway signalling would allow a more 





(Building Information Modelling) as part of the Digital Built Britain strategy which would 
improve the level of detail regarding information recorded for construction of buildings and 
infrastructure (HM Government, 2015a). Making better use of infrastructure data would help 
to understand dependencies, realise value from assets, assess their health and criticality, and 
inform planning for resilience interventions.  
For the rail network in particular, the Joint Rail Data Action Plan (DfT, 2018) is centred around 
making better use of the increasing amounts of data that are available, removing barriers to 
collaboration between rail and other sectors, with new initiatives between transport modes, 
and between the rail and technology sectors promoting open sharing of non-personal data to 
drive innovation. Furthermore, the Data and Analytics Facility for National Infrastructure 
(DAFNI) is under development which will collate and host datasets on national infrastructure 
for detailed simulation and analysis (DAFNI, 2018). The system architecture, outlined in Figure 
6.7, will provide the UK with a national facility to both host infrastructure datasets and 
facilitate detailed analysis using a system science driven modelling platform. They key 
resource to come from DAFNI will be the National Infrastructure Database (NID) due by 2021, 
which would provide a centralised repository of infrastructure data that could significantly 







Figure 6.7. DAFNI Architecture (DAFNI, 2018). 
 
Ultimately, the utility of any evidence base for analysing interdependencies is determined by 
where the system boundaries are drawn. If data and metrics, and in turn network owners and 
operators do not consider external risks and consequence the management of the national 
infrastructure system is jeopardised. This thesis presents a criticality assessment using the 
best available data, which can inform future network management. Improved decision 
making, both locally and holistically focused, is required alongside developments in the data 
and metrics used to underpin those decisions. 
6.4.2 Opportunities for Extending Network Criticality Assessment 
The infrastructure network criticality assessment methodology presented in this thesis has 
several natural extensions. Focusing on the consequence metrics used, network criticality was 
calculated based upon one perspective, from the infrastructure owner or operator, and one 
type of performance metric, relating to service levels in terms of delays to trains and the 
duration of power outages. However, as has been highlighted in this thesis, there are a variety 





demand (e.g. Pant et al, 2014) and a broad range of stakeholders involved with the planning 
and operation of infrastructure, with different viewpoints. Therefore, a network criticality 
assessment methodology could be developed that incorporates several different candidate 
metrics, with layers of criticality developed in conjunction with different organisations and 
stakeholders, to progress towards a more holistic assessment of risk. ISO 55000:2014 on Asset 
Management highlights that the needs and expectations of an organisation and its 
stakeholders, as well as external service providers, influence rules for consistent decision 
making and general organisational objectives.  
In this thesis, such candidate metrics were not explored as they were beyond the scope of the 
research, with a focus on network effects and pure service disruption dynamics, as well as 
there being issues with the reliability and availability of data to inform such metrics. A key 
factor in the originality of the network criticality assessment methodologies developed in 
Chapters 2-4 is the use of observed data on service performance for both railway transport 
and electricity distribution. However, in order to calculate metrics based on, for example, the 
number of passengers on delayed trains or the electric load carried, observed data is either 
not recorded or difficult to access. Weighting links by user numbers would involve estimations 
such as the O-D trip assignment model used by Pant et al (2014) which would impact upon the 
reliability of metrics, unless such data was recorded by other means i.e. travel diaries, 
questionnaires or interviews (Hayden et al, 2017).  
Furthermore, there is the potential to translate the service disruption metrics in this thesis 
into financial costs yet similar limitations apply. A user-focused approach might explore the 





what and to whom presents a major challenge as individual circumstances can be vastly 
different. For the economic appraisal of transport projects, values of travel time for road 
transport can be translated into financial values, based on evidence of ‘willingness-to-pay’ for 
travel time savings (DfT, 2014b). There is also a GB national average cost of a delay minute on 
the railway network of £73.47 (Burr et al, 2008) which relates to the economic impact per 
passenger. However, using such arbitrary values fails to capture the unique circumstances of 
users, such as whether they are travelling for business or leisure, or whether a power cut is 
experienced to a residential property and the associated vulnerability of residents, or to a non-
residential property, and the nature of the function or business. Such complexity would be 
difficult to observed and capture, involving an extensive research programme, and raises a 
question over the prioritisation of different user groups.   
Accounting explicitly for different types of hazards would also enhance the application of 
network criticality in different scenarios, such as extreme weather contingency planning and 
climate change adaptation. However, individual hazards were not assessed in this thesis due 
to sample size limitations as, for example, weather-related incidents comprise approximately 
1% of NR’s TRUST database, and issues surrounding the reliability of coding and attribution of 
such incidents, as some delays associated with an extreme weather event may not be 
attributed to that event if the initial cause of failure is unclear. There is, however, the potential 
for the integration of weather and climate information into the overall decision-making 
process for the resilience and adaptation of infrastructure. A layer of network criticality, along 
with weather forecasts, asset condition, natural hazards and climate projections, presents the 
opportunity for a more holistic assessment of infrastructure and environmental risk. As shown 





incorporated into such an assessment, supported by ongoing research at the University of 
Birmingham (UoB) (Fisher et al, 2018) which aims to define a series of failure pathways for 
railway infrastructure, by using fault data from all railway asset types with a range of weather 
variables to quantify the role of ‘day-to-day’, extreme and antecedent temperatures and 
precipitation in the causation of faults to inform better decision making for asset resilience. 
 
Figure 6.8. Data layers and asset/weather relationships in the decision-making process for 
resilience and adaptation of infrastructure to extreme weather and climate change. 
 
It is clear that there are benefits to ‘scaling up’ a network criticality assessment, in terms of 
both geography and infrastructure systems, provided that the limitations outlined can be 
overcome or reduced. Geographically, network criticality could be extended nationally within 
GB to assess the spatial distribution of risk within other management regions. To explore 
further licence areas of the electricity distribution network, initially all DNOs were contacted 





therefore extending the assessment is possible but relies upon the cooperation and 
willingness to share data of individual DNO companies. However, all DNOs must report 
performance data to the regulator Ofgem, with most using NaFIRS to achieve this, so every 
DNO should have an equivalent data set to WPD. For exploring other routes of the railway 
network, this thesis obtained NR’s TRUST database for the entire GB rail network, therefore 
the only inhibiting factor is the time required to manually digitise STANOX track sections in 
GIS. Increasing spatial coverage of network criticality would examine the transferability of the 
methodology and have benefits for decision making across a variety of different types of 
management regions. The principal issues with increasing the geographic coverage of network 
criticality would be with access to detailed information on interdependencies, such as traction 
feeding diagrams and electricity network diagrams, and the subsequent time required to both 
interpret this information and examine spatial correlations between cross-sector metrics.  
It would also be beneficial to both understand how infrastructure network criticality 
assessment is approached internationally, and to assess the transferability of the 
methodology in this thesis to networks overseas. During the literature review process for this 
thesis, international examples of network criticality were identified in the academic literature, 
but no examples were found of the internal processes within infrastructure owners and 
operators. It is likely that this information is restricted, commercially sensitive, or there is no 
formalised process with a reliance on tacit knowledge for less developed infrastructure 
systems. In terms of transferability of the methodology, international applications may in fact 
be simpler than in GB, in cases where performance monitoring systems and data architecture 
were developed alongside the construction of infrastructure. For example, it is likely that the 





understanding of the dependencies on external electrical traction substations, as well as more 
streamlined reporting systems for delay reporting, given the drive for efficiency and the fact 
that trains are timed to the second.  
The network criticality assessment methodology could also be extended to include further 
interdependent infrastructure systems, such as water, waste and ICT. Initially, a case-study of 
an urban conurbation, such as Birmingham, would be useful with multiple transport modes 
across rail, road, metro and air alongside electricity transmission and distribution, ICT and 
communications networks, water and waste. An assessment could follow a similar evidence-
based approach to this thesis, assessing the availability, accessibility, and quality of both 
performance databases and spatial information from multiple infrastructure owners and 
operators and the potential degree of reliability and certainty these sources would present. 
Different data sets from different sectors may present different challenges for integration, 
therefore a case-study would present a useful scoping exercise, with progress towards a 
common reporting format for infrastructure faults across sectors. There is the potential to 
combine metrics, and associated criticality bands, if they are in a similar format with different 
weightings for infrastructure systems and assets. To facilitate such a ‘scaling up’ of 
infrastructure systems, it would be helpful to understand more about the evolution and 
cascades of disruption between assets on an event basis. It has been highlighted in this thesis 
that tracing interdependent failure pathways, using consequence metrics, is a challenge due 
to the differences in fault reporting and definitions of system boundaries between sectors. 
However, if enhanced data were available, tracing cascades of failure through interdependent 
infrastructure systems, from the initial asset failure to propagation of disruption, there would 





response measures could control or limit disruption. Furthermore, with a longer time series 
and thus greater sample sizes, a more detailed forensic examination of the distribution of 
incidents originating at single points of failure could occur. Locations influenced by extreme 
events can be separated from locations where incidents are systematically problematic. 
The spatial distribution, or propagation, of reactionary disruption through a network has been 
investigated by Jaroszweski et al (2015) particularly for rail transport, who advocate that 
future research could involve analyses of ensembles of historical incidents at single points of 
failure to understand the spatial disruption profile from each location, accounting for delay 
propagation mechanisms. Locations could therefore be categorised, building upon a metric of 
aggregate service level disruption (train delay or power cut duration), by the spatial extent or 
dispersion of disruption originating from an asset failure, whether typically dispersed or 
contained. Metrics could be developed dependent on the actual distance over which ‘knock-
on’ disruption spreads and/or weightings for the geographic areas into which disruption 
spreads, for example, prioritising locations that propagate disruption across management 
regions and increase the complexity of incident management. Different locations will have 
different spatial profiles of disruption dependent upon the service patterns and flows through 
that location, for example, a railway asset failure on the WCML or the failure of an electricity 
transformer at a HV substation are likely to spread disruption further than railway branch lines 
or 11kV local electricity substations. Locations that are net importers and exporters of 
disruption, particularly at route or licence area boundaries, would be of significant interest to 





A layer of network criticality, as developed in this thesis, has a role in the validation of models 
and simulations in order to assess the degree to which real-world network behaviour and 
dynamics are represented and/or improve the model input by providing a baseline and 
training simulations towards more realistic output. The Birmingham Centre for Railway 
Research and Education (BCRRE) at UoB have developed the Birmingham Railway Virtual 
Environment (BRaVE) which is a suite of software tools featuring a microscopic simulator that 
can provide a virtual laboratory for exploring the influence of new technologies, timetables 
and train routing for railway operations, with the option to insert various disruption scenarios 
and examine the impact on train movements and performance (Dai, 2016).   
6.4.3 Implications of Future Developments for Network Criticality Assessment 
It is important to explore the range of potential future developments that may either influence 
the distribution of network criticality or enhance and direct the methodological approach to 
identifying single points of failure. Infrastructure networks contain assets that have long 
lifetimes, therefore, they are likely to be influenced by high-level long-term trends in 
infrastructure supply and demand, including population and demographic change (such as 
population growth, ageing, migration and urbanisation),  macroeconomic drivers (such as 
national and regional economies, economic growth and energy prices) and societal change 
(such as governance, devolution and behavioural change) (Tran et al, 2014; Armitt et al, 2016). 
Environmental change also presents the need to for protection and adaptation of 
infrastructure, through the general warming of the global climate system, which is highly likely 
to be driven by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Jenkins et al, 2008) with projections 





extreme storms (Murphy et al, 2009). Dawson et al (2016) highlights how projections of 
increasing sea levels are likely to increase days with line restrictions by up to 1170% and lead 
to repair costs in the £10s of millions as well as socio-economic costs. 
The political and governance landscape could change significantly, dependent on the outcome 
of negotiations surrounding the Withdrawal Agreement for implementing the UK’s Exit from 
the European Union, scheduled for March 2019. The Department for Transport (DfT) and the 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy are assessing potential outcomes for 
transport users and energy programmes (NAO, 2017; 2018). The devolution of responsibility 
within transport owners and operators to local business units (NR, 2017a) and from central 
government to local authorities (TfWM, 2018) has implications for the way in which 
infrastructure is managed and funded. More localised responsibility for infrastructure 
heightens the need for localised assessment of network criticality and interdependent failure 
pathways, with greater potential to highlight and act upon single points of failure within 
management regions and local government.  
The most direct influence on network criticality and the spatial distribution of operational 
service risk comes from the introduction of new technologies to an infrastructure system. For 
the rail network, NR’s Upgrade Plan (NR, 2017b) involves a range of developments such as 
rebuilding stations and opening new lines such as the upcoming Elizabeth Line (Crossrail) for 
London and the South East. Changing the design of the network and creating or modifying 
service paths can influence the potential for propagation of disruption and the distribution of 
single points of failure. Electrification of existing lines is also a priority, such as the extension 





(WMR, 2018b). Electrification enhances service levels with shorter journey times, but also 
increases the need for efficiency of operation, with less headway between services. The 
resilience of the external electricity supply is also crucial, with greater redundancy and 
capacity required. The future introduction of High Speed Two (HS2) in the UK, connecting 
London to Birmingham, Manchester, the East Midlands and Leeds (HS2, 2018), will increase 
capacity but also present a major change to supply and demand dynamics and service patterns 
of the rail network as a whole, given that a large proportion of HS2 will run on the existing 
infrastructure, and present a challenge for the electricity transmission network and NG in 
providing electrical capacity and security for traction power supply.  
Perhaps the most significant development is the increasing digitalisation of infrastructure 
systems. Infrastructure is becoming increasingly reliant upon IT and communications systems 
to enhance the efficiency and capacity of operations, through technological advances and the 
increased amount of data available, with the analytical capability that presents. Modern 
transport systems are dependent upon ICT systems for the operation of services (such as 
smart motorways, railway signalling systems and air traffic control) and the management of 
transport system users through stations and terminals, on to trains and planes (DfT, 2014a). 
The digitalisation of railway transport is demonstrated through the Digital Railway Strategy 
(Digital Railway, 2018) which is designed to overcome the capacity challenges of full trains and 
limited train paths through the replacement of conventional systems with digital signalling, 
operations and train control. The vision is for technology to be embedded across the rail 
system, including real-time train control, mainly through the European Train Control System 
(ETCS). ETCS will allow trains to run closer together, moving from traditional fixed block 





speed with less headway. Traditional signal aspects will also be replaced with in-cab signalling, 
placing greater reliance on communications. The increased efficiency of operation will remove 
bottlenecks and relieve pressure and ‘pinch points’ on the network, but the consequence of 
the system failing is significantly greater. Across the railway system, the Rail Technical Strategy 
Capability Delivery Plan (RSSB, 2017) outlines twelve key capabilities, shown in Figure 6.9, all 
of which are enabled by digital technology, such as greater efficiency in passenger flows and 
energy use. 
 
Figure 6.9. Twelve Key Capabilities of Rail Technical Strategy Capability Delivery Plan (RSSB, 2017). 
 
The digitalisation of electricity distribution is exemplified by the transition of WPD from a 
Distribution Network Operator (DNO) to a Distribution System Operator (DSO), as shown in 
Figure 6.10, in order to move towards a low carbon future, integrating more renewable 





smart meters, distributed generation and demand side management (DSM) are key 
technologies (POST, 2011). Distributed generation involves the decentralisation of generation 
sites, from large power stations to more localised and renewable sources, often on a small 
scale at residential or commercial premises. Challenges include the greater complexity of 
reverse power flows and the intermittent nature of generation. This thesis has demonstrated 
that connections to distributed generation sites can present localised single points of failure. 
Such challenges can be managed by smart grids, which have the ability to forecast and manage 
power flows through a system, moving from passive operation to active management through 
increased sensing and technical mechanisms (WPD, 2017).  
 
Figure 6.10. Distribution System Operations (WPD, 2017). 
 
However, whilst such technological advancements may increase efficiency and capacity, they 
also step-up the complexity and diversity of infrastructure systems, increasing the number of 





heightens the need for system-wide resilience. The proliferation of digital systems increases 
the vulnerability to cyber-attacks. Cyber security also becomes even more essential against 
the threat of malware, hacking, botnets and phishing which can have widespread impacts such 
as electricity blackouts and disruption to water supply control systems (BT, 2017). As a result, 
it is important that the future direction of network criticality assessment focuses upon ICT 
systems, assessing the distribution of risk within ICT infrastructure, such as fibre broadband, 
and single points of failure in systems embedded within other infrastructure, such as digital 
signalling, accounting for their dependence on external assets. 
ICT and digital systems also influence the methodological approach to network criticality 
assessment, through the quantity and resolution of data recorded and processed. Smart 
infrastructure is a transformative technology that facilitates the functionality of systems 
through improved collection and use of data (The Resilience Shift, 2018). As shown in Figure 
6.11, increasing the ‘smartness’ of infrastructure presents both opportunities and 
vulnerabilities. Digital systems have the potential to increase resilience through, for example, 
smart grids regulating power flows or remotely restoring and maintaining substations, as well 
as presenting a greater need for backup or alternative methods of operation should digital 
systems fail. For applications in network criticality assessment, the power of the data collected 
by these systems can also be harnessed to help to inform resilient decision making through 







Figure 6.11. The different ways in which smart infrastructure solutions can impact on the resilience 
of infrastructure and the people who use and operate it (The Resilience Shift, 2018). 
 
Looking at the ‘bigger picture’ of network criticality assessment, improved data sets and 
monitoring of infrastructure can greatly improve the evidence-base available upon which 
single points of failure are based, improving both reliability and certainty in targeting 
resilience interventions. The National Infrastructure Assessment (NIC, 2018) advocates a 
move towards a ‘digital society’ centred around data and digital connectivity and enabled by 
full fibre broadband, artificial intelligence (AI), virtual reality (VR) and internet of things (IoT) 
technology. In particular, IoT technology drives smart infrastructure, through connecting 
‘things’ or ‘objects’ (in this case infrastructure assets) to the internet and each other (Evans, 
2011) using electronic internet-enabled devices and sensors. Urban-scale sensor technology 
has the potential to improve the whole-life approach to infrastructure management and 
cutting costs by, for example, identifying leaks in water mains (Armitt et al, 2016). Assets can 





and maintenance interventions based upon the information being collected, such as asset 
loadings and sensor-based condition monitoring.  
The data collected and used by smart infrastructure sensors and observations can be 
described as ‘big data’ due to the complexity, high volume, accessibility and spatiotemporal 
resolution, providing a digital reflection of the physical world which enables the management 
and prediction of disruptive events (Jin et al, 2015). ‘Big data’ is stored on servers, either 
owned by an infrastructure company or using a cloud-based system, which can be used for 
analysis both in near real-time or as a historical data set. Smart infrastructure also fits in with 
the smart cities agenda and forms part of Birmingham City Council’s ICT and Digital Strategy, 
which proposes a whole-system and evidence-based approach to targeting key priorities for 
decision making using emerging technologies such as IoT, 5G communications, robotics, 
autonomous vehicles and virtual reality (Birmingham City Council, 2016). The data collected 
through smart infrastructure systems can therefore be integrated within a network criticality 
assessment, either as a static assessment of single points of failure or as a dynamic decision-
making tool.  
IoT technology has particular applications in enhancing the resilience of urban infrastructure 
to extreme weather and climate change. Chapman et al (2013) advocate the implementation 
of high resolution monitoring and sensor networks to identify localised city-scale issues on 
infrastructure networks, with increasing temperatures and associated energy use impacting 
electrical transformers and resulting in cascades of failure for transport and ICT networks. 
Therefore, internet-enabled sensors can be used to monitor weather conditions, located 





and non-meteorological information. Urban climate resilience is a significant issue, as cities 
are concentrations of both people and infrastructure with many highly loaded assets. A 
demonstration of a high-resolution urban meteorological sensor network is the Birmingham 
Urban Climate Laboratory (BUCL) involving the installation of 84 low-cost air temperature 
sensors [more information available in Young et al (2014)] to model the impact of 
Birmingham’s UHI on local infrastructure and provide a test-bed for high-density low-cost 
urban meteorological sensor networks (Chapman et al, 2015). Figure 6.12 provides examples 
of interpolated UHI maps, based on data from the wireless air temperature sensors. For a 
heterogeneous urban environment, with significant variations in meteorological conditions 
and infrastructure systems, high-resolution data on weather-related hazards and network 
criticality can be overlaid in order to undertake a more robust risk assessment at the local-
scale and identify locations with intersections of both a high risk to infrastructure service 
performance, such as highly loaded substations, and a higher meteorological risk, such as high 
air temperature, where resilience interventions can be targeted.  
 
Figure 6.12. (a) Interpolated UHI map at 0100 LT 6 May 2013 (based on available data from 18 
sensors) plus aerial imagery, (b) interpolated UHI map at 0100 LT 19 Feb 2014 (based on available 





Further projects at UoB highlight the range of applications for deploying self-contained low-
cost IoT meteorological sensors at a high resolution in an urban area, and potential integration 
with a layer of infrastructure network criticality. Low-cost infra-red (IR) thermopile sensors 
can be attached to street furniture to measure high resolution thermal variations in road 
surface temperatures, informing selective salting and dynamic routing for gritters in winter 
(Chapman & Bell, 2016) or used to measure railway track temperatures to assess the risk of 
track buckling in summer (Ferranti et al, 2016). Also, leaf wetness sensors on the railway 
network can measure moisture levels, which are important for anticipating autumn leaf-fall 
related adhesion issues of SPADs (signals passed at danger) and platform over-runs (Chapman 
et al, 2016). Network criticality could be combined with adhesion forecasts and buckling 
vulnerability information to inform the implementation of speed restrictions, targeting 
specific track sections and avoiding the need for blanket speed restrictions. 
Beyond IoT sensors, crowdsourcing of data could change the way in which measurements are 
collected. Chapman et al (2017) explored the potential of using data from low-cost Netatmo 
weather stations to quantify the UHI in London. It was found that there are quality issues to 
resolve, but the results are promising for the future direction of urban meteorology. 
Furthermore, ‘big data’ can also be sourced from social networks or focus on flows of people, 
such as in transport corridors, providing large, complex data sets (Jin et al, 2015). In particular, 
the use of mobile phone data is an emerging area of research for travel behaviour to identify 
movements and flow patterns across transport modes (Wang et al, 2018). Mobility can be 
determined by multiple positioning systems from mobile devices, such as cell triangulation, 
GPS and wi-fi access. If high-resolution weather data can be combined with existing network 





transport system users behave in different weather conditions, a more resilient transport 
system could be realised that not only focuses on physical infrastructure and operations, but 
aligns more with user needs and requirements. 
Ultimately, the benefits of any future developments are only realised with stakeholder 
engagement and cooperation. Mattsson & Jenelius (2015) advocate more cross-disciplinary 
collaborations to create practical strategies for resilience between agencies and stakeholders 
and to translate the learning and knowledge from research into actions. This is particularly 
pertinent when considering the range of agencies and stakeholders involved with the 
provision and operation of infrastructure systems, such as local and national government, 
regulators, infrastructure owners and service operators. System level resilience is 
compromised if infrastructure is designed for one purpose and funded by one agency (The 
Resilience Shift, 2018). Decision making and thus network interventions should be holistic, 
considering external risks to assets and external consequences for connected networks, and 
locally driven.  
The importance of visualising data and effective communication with key organisations, 
particularly at the local-level, cannot be underestimated. A novel concept is described by 
Eckersley et al (2018) of Newcastle City Council’s use of ‘decision theatres’ for simulating the 
potential impacts of extreme weather on urban infrastructure services. Local partners were 
invited to interactive workshops held in a dedicated room, with large screens, where 
computer models of different scenarios and their consequences were visualised. Stakeholders 
were invited to change the model inputs and explore how different interventions would 





key local actors to develop a common understanding of challenges and a collective business 
case for interventions. The ‘decision theatre’ workshops could integrate the various sources 
of data outlined above, from IoT sensors, crowdsourcing and mobile phones, along with a 
layer of network criticality to provide an evidence-based and high-resolution assessment of 
consequence. As well as using network criticality to inform stakeholders, the feedback from 
stakeholders could also be used to refine the network criticality assessment methodology and 
learn more about local-scale infrastructure interdependencies. 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
In summary, this chapter has provided a reflection on the overall methodological approach of 
the thesis. The nature of the single points of failure identified was explored, finding that whilst 
differences in complexity and propagation potential exist between sectors, similar drivers and 
types of critical locations were found to exist. The criticality assessments in this thesis are 
generally representative of those in the existing literature, particularly for rail, and criticality 
defined by tacit knowledge. This information is however challenged by the high resolution and 
localised single points of failure in urban areas, a key contribution of the thesis. A critique of 
the methodology was then provided, highlighting the limitations of low sample sizes and 
system boundary definitions with their influence on fault reporting and performance metrics. 
The methodological caveats depend mainly on the scale of analysis, with a trade-off between 
national-scale analysis and a low level of detail in the existing literature and a trade-off 
between a high resolution and a low sample size in this thesis.  
Recommendations were provided regarding the improvement of the existing network 





performance databases and enhanced fault reporting and cooperation between organisations 
from different sectors, driven largely by regulators. There are a variety of opportunities for 
extending the analysis, such as including a greater variety of stakeholder perspectives of 
criticality, scaling the assessment up to cover national and international management regions, 
as well as further interdependent networks including ICT infrastructure, and a more detailed 
event-based assessment of disruption evolution and propagation. Finally, potential future 
developments were considered in terms of how they may influence both the distribution of 
network criticality and the methodology for identifying single points of failure. High level 
drivers such as political and governance change can alter the way in which infrastructure is 
managed and funded, whilst the most direct impact will be the introduction of new 
technologies, mainly through the digitalisation of infrastructure and an increased reliance on 
IT and communications systems. The growth in ‘big data’ from IoT technology and sensors, for 
both smart infrastructure and weather conditions, allows the potential for integration of high 
resolution information at the local-scale. 
Chapter 7 will highlight the key findings and overall conclusions of the thesis. The contribution 











7.1 Chapter Overview 
Within this thesis, Chapter 1 has provided an introduction and overall background to the 
research, Chapters 2-4 have presented network criticality assessments for three different 
infrastructure applications (electricity distribution, rail transport and railway traction power 
dependencies on external electricity feeder substations), Chapter 5 has explored the 
implications of calculated network criticality for infrastructure system management within the 
decision-making process whilst Chapter 6 has evaluated the output and methodological 
approach of the network criticality assessments, providing recommendations on potential 
improvements, extensions and the influence of projected future developments for the nature 
and identification of single points of failure. In this chapter, the overall conclusions and key 
findings of the thesis are outlined, organised by the five specific objectives of the research, as 
described in Chapter 1. 
7.2 Fulfilment of Aim and Objectives 
The overall aim of this thesis was to develop and demonstrate a local-scale and high-
resolution network criticality assessment methodology for the evidence-based identification 
of single points of failure within infrastructure systems of different scales of complexity and 








7.2.1 Objective One 
To evaluate network criticality for a relatively less complex infrastructure system – electricity 
distribution. 
Chapter 2 presented a network criticality assessment for electricity distribution infrastructure, 
identifying single points of failure that can inform a prioritisation scheme for the targeted 
delivery of a range of resilience interventions across GB DNOs. The existing literature in the 
field mainly involves large national-scale models and simulations of electricity network 
vulnerability, either based purely on network topology or including system supply and demand 
dynamics, such as power flows and substation loadings. However, the scale of the models 
necessitates simplifications of network behaviour, including the assumption that electricity 
follows the shortest path between two points. Therefore, due to the inherent uncertainty in 
existing models, an evidence-based approach to quantifying network criticality was required, 
using historical DNO performance data to capture the complex behavioural mechanisms of 
the electricity distribution network and increase the reliability and certainty of the resultant 
prioritisation scheme. Performance metrics can be used to identify single points of failure, 
however the current approach within the electricity industry is to use high-level financial costs 
of disruption relative to the national average. To facilitate a more localised and high-resolution 
assessment of network criticality, historical asset fault data was obtained for WPD’s South 
West and West Midlands licence areas between 2009 and 2014, with a pure service-level 
metric of SML applied to quantify and map network criticality within the two management 
regions, with a criticality band assigned to each substation reflecting the average duration of 





The resultant network criticality assessment demonstrated that a data-driven methodology 
was able to define highly localised single points of failure for a relatively low complexity 
electricity distribution network, particularly within urban areas, that can add value to the 
current understanding of priority substations, as well as highlighting the overall pattern of 
operational service risk, with commonly appreciated centres of high criticality, at high-voltage 
substations in major conurbations. There is a contrast in the spatial distribution of criticality 
between the two licence areas, mainly influenced by geography, with the South West having 
a broad coverage of critical locations with an influence of renewable generation sites, whilst 
the West Midlands has more focused clusters of criticality, influenced by heavy industrial sites. 
There is, however, commonality between the licence areas in that the majority of critical 
substations are concentrated around major urban areas, such as Bristol and Birmingham, with 
a higher concentration of infrastructure supplying a higher population density resulting in 
higher substation loadings. City-scale networks are clearly evident, with the relative criticality 
of substations within the boundaries of an urban area providing a detailed layer of information 
for decision making. There are clear advantages through defining criticality bands within single 
licence areas, allowing the identification of locations that may not feature as prominently in a 
national assessment but are very important regionally, whilst a service-level performance 
metric treats all power outages of the same magnitude equally, identifying the influence of 
industrial and distributed generation connections which would be unlikely to be identified 
using a financial metric. However, the caveats and limitations to the performance data must 
be recognised, with the general rarity of power cuts at a single site resulting in small sample 





but for licence area level management a high resolution of analysis is essential despite the 
limitations. 
7.2.2 Objective Two 
To evaluate network criticality for a relatively more complex infrastructure system – railway 
transportation. 
Chapter 3 presented a network criticality assessment for railway transport infrastructure, 
identifying single points of failure that can inform a prioritisation scheme for the targeted 
delivery of a range of resilience interventions across the routes of the GB rail network. The 
existing literature in the field mainly involves large national-scale models and simulations of 
transport network vulnerability, either based purely on network topology or including system 
supply and demand dynamics, such as passenger flows and timetables. However, the scale of 
the models necessitates simplifications of network behaviour, with the omission of highly 
complex elements such as TOC prioritisations and train-crew diagrams. Therefore, due to the 
inherent uncertainty in existing models, an evidence-based approach to quantifying network 
criticality was required, using historical performance data from NR to capture the complex 
behavioural mechanisms of the railway network and increase the reliability and certainty of 
the resultant prioritisation scheme. Performance metrics can be used to identify single points 
of failure, however the current approach within the rail industry is to use high-level financial 
compensation costs of disruption relative to the national average, and at a coarse spatial 
resolution. To facilitate a more localised and high-resolution assessment of network criticality, 
historical train delay data was obtained from NR’s TRUST system for the Wessex and LNW 





of DM applied to quantify and map network criticality within the two routes, with a criticality 
band assigned to each track section, station, junction or siding reflecting the average 
magnitude of delay to services experienced should equipment at that location fail.  
The resultant network criticality assessment demonstrated that a data-driven methodology 
was able to define highly localised single points of failure for a comparatively more complex 
rail transport network, particularly within urban areas, that can add value to the current 
understanding of priority locations, as well as highlighting the overall pattern of operational 
service risk, with commonly appreciated centres of high criticality, in major conurbations, on 
mainlines and at key junctions. There is a contrast in the spatial distribution of criticality 
between the two routes, mainly influenced by connectivity and service patterns, with Wessex 
having quite distinct critical clusters dominated by London and the South Coast given that the 
west of the route is quite isolated, whilst LNW (South) is dominated by the WCML and has 
more long-distance services leading to a greater coverage of critical locations through the 
route. There is, however, commonality between the routes in that the majority of critical 
locations have similar attributes, such as freight lines, key junctions, major hubs and depots. 
City-scale networks are clearly evident, particularly for London and Birmingham, with the 
relative criticality of locations within the boundaries of an urban area providing a detailed 
layer of information for decision making. The same is true for mainlines, which may be worthy 
of prioritisation in their entirety but still have more and less critical sections. There are clear 
advantages through defining criticality bands within single routes, allowing the identification 
of locations that may not feature as prominently in a national assessment but are very 
important regionally, whilst a service-level performance metric treats all delays of the same 





would be unlikely to be identified using a financial metric. The granularity of critical locations 
is particularly apparent for a highly complex network, where locations away from traditional 
criticality centres are also identified as highly critical, on branch lines and at relatively minor 
stations, highlighting the contribution of an increase spatial resolution. The increased 
granularity is highlighted by the fact that of the 41 Band 1 critical locations across both routes, 
23 are track sections, with 18 sections less than 10km in length. Using shorter track sections 
allows prioritisation of resource allocation to have a much more localised focus, targeting 
more specific locations and saving time and money. However, the caveats and limitations to 
the performance data must be recognised, as the sample size of incidents at different 
locations can vary significantly, for example, there are generally smaller sample sizes for 
branch lines and greater sample sizes for mainlines. There is a clear trade-off between spatial 
granularity and sample size, but for route level management a high resolution of analysis is 
essential despite the limitations. Some of the more minor single points of failure may require 
careful interpretation to separate systematic issues from rare yet high impact events. 
7.2.3 Objective Three 
To evaluate network criticality for two dependent infrastructure systems – traction feeder 
supplies to an electrified railway. 
Chapter 4 presented a network criticality assessment for two dependent infrastructure 
systems. A case-study of a traction feeder system for an electrified railway was used the 
illustrate the dependency of railway infrastructure on external electricity distribution 
infrastructure, identifying single points of failure that can inform a cross-system prioritisation 





NR. The existing literature on interdependent infrastructure network vulnerability takes a 
similar methodological approach to single-system studies, involving large national-scale 
network models and simulations incorporating both topological and operational 
characteristics. Therefore, the scale of the models necessitates similar simplifications of 
network behaviour, principally regarding network dynamics by modelling demand through 
passenger and population statistics. However, with interdependent network criticality there 
is also a need to model the connectivity between infrastructure, either through their co-
location in the same geographic corridor or through physical asset connections. Increasing the 
complexity of analysis amplifies the issues regarding uncertainty and reliability. When there 
are also simplifications of dependencies, such as proximity-based assumptions where 
pathways are created between an asset and its nearest dependent asset. For example, it is 
assumed that the geographically closest electrical substation is the source of the power supply 
to airports and traction power to railway lines. Uncertainty in both system behaviour and 
dependencies means that the application of such methods for local-level infrastructure 
management is significantly compromised.  
As a result, an evidence-based approach was required for both identifying cross-system 
dependencies and quantifying dependent network criticality. To achieve the latter, the 
electricity distribution network criticality bands calculated in Chapter 2 and the railway 
network criticality bands from Chapter 3 were applied to a localised case-study of the Cross 
City railway line (West Midlands, UK) and electricity distribution substation dependencies for 
traction power. To overcome the assumptions in the existing research, specific dependencies 
between track sections and substations were identified using information supplied by WPD 





along with GIS mapping data for both networks. The sources of information used were found 
to be highly detailed and valuable for identifying dependences at a high resolution. It was 
found that traction power to the Cross City line is supplied by four possible external feeder 
substations, including normal and alternate supplies offering an N-2 degree of redundancy. 
These substations are then directly supplied by a series of substations in WPD’s distribution 
network and ultimately a higher voltage substation in NG’s transmission network. It was also 
observed that none of the four feeder stations are trackside to the Cross-City line itself, 
therefore geographical proximity assumptions would likely be invalid in this case.  
The resultant dependent network criticality assessment demonstrated that a data-driven 
methodology was able to define highly localised spatial correlations in single points of failure 
across two connected infrastructure systems, that can add value to the current understanding 
of prioritisation within networks by assessing external risk and consequence. Whilst the 
distribution of criticality had limited variability across the four feeder supplies, with most 
substations towards the lower end of the risk spectrum, it was possible to distinguish between 
the four feeder supplies and the individual substations using the calculated criticality bands to 
suggest the order in which they should be prioritised. The alternate supplies seem to be more 
resilient, which highlights the benefit of redundancy in supply should the normal feeders fail. 
There are clear advantages to an evidence-based assessment of dependent network criticality 
at the local-scale, providing a high-resolution prioritisation of specific assets or locations with 
increased certainty of asset dependencies, highlighting the need for cross-system resilience 
interventions. However, the definition of system boundaries presents a reliability challenge 
when combining performance databases designed for single-sector use and identifying 





transport network criticality bands remain, but the main issue in this case is the lack of 
coordination between the two metrics used, for example, failures at feeder stations have no 
reported consequence in WPD’s database yet they have a consequence for railway operations 
in terms of delay to services. Therefore, whilst it is possible to examine spatial correlations 
between the metrics, the difference in fault reporting and attribution between infrastructure 
sectors is identified as an area for potential improvement, with greater coordination required 
between infrastructure owners and operators to move towards a common cross-network 
reporting scheme. 
7.2.4 Objective Four  
To explore the practical implications of the presented network criticality assessments for 
infrastructure system management.  
Chapter 5 explored the wider context of network criticality assessment and the overall 
implications for the decision-making process and infrastructure system management. 
Network criticality can help to inform prioritisation for resource allocation across multiple 
geographic scales, multiple systems or combinations of systems, at multiple levels of 
operational and topological complexity. A key role of network criticality is in the formalisation 
of priorities, within and between infrastructure systems, through the documentation of 
objectively defined critical locations. Information on the types of locations classified as highly 
critical can reinforce existing tacit knowledge, whilst the high resolution single points of failure 
can also challenge the existing understanding of criticality. Network criticality also has a broad 
applicability across a range of infrastructure management functions. By calculating the 





measure of the likely degree of operational management difficulty resulting from incidents 
occurring at each location is attained. Therefore, network criticality has applications for day-
to-day functions such as event response, maintenance as well as longer-term investment in 
infrastructure renewals and upgrades.  
The role of network criticality within risk assessment and the planning of resilience 
interventions was also explored, within the context of the broader decision-making process 
for the implementation of different options. Network criticality is one layer of information 
that can inform the prioritisation of risks, which has far greater value when integrated in a risk 
assessment with other layers, such as hazards, vulnerabilities including defined asset-weather 
relationships and asset condition as well as multiple organisational and stakeholder 
perspectives, such as passengers and finance. The resolution of network criticality increasingly 
matches that at which information on hazards and vulnerability is achievably or currently 
available at, assisting risk-based targeting of decisions using GIS risk mapping. Combined, 
these layers of information can support the implementation of multiple types of resilience 
options, from investment in asset robustness to broader options of redundancy and recovery. 
Criticality can be incorporated in preparedness actions and resource allocation for extreme 
weather before, during and after a forecast event, for example, should asset failures occur in 
multiple locations simultaneously, the criticality assessment can be applied to determine 
which sites personnel should be dispatched to first. Practical interventions such as lightning 
protection for electrical transformers and railway vegetation management can also be 
targeted more efficiently. Urban climate resilience is a particular priority and combining a 
criticality layer with a UHI layer, for example, would allow the prioritisation of adaptation work 





measures, particularly for cascades of failure, involving interventions such as the installation 
of backup generators at mobile phone base stations to maintain communications should they 
experience a loss of power. Contingency plans for how to manage disruption and clear crisis 
management procedures are vital preparation for disruption management rapid recovery, 
such as having buses on standby at railway stations to transport passengers in the event a line 
is blocked. A localised and multi-system criticality layer can inform targeted decision making 
regarding the locations around which contingencies should be arranged, where the risk of 
cascading failure and consequence to a system is greatest. Diesel rolling stock could be on 
standby for introduction to service and to rescue stranded EMUs at critical locations should a 
loss of electric traction supply be experienced, as well as the introduction of IPEMUs. 
An overall vision for holistic decision making, where holistic risks inform holistic resilience, is 
based upon the realisation of value from infrastructure through the realisation of value from 
information. This involves the effective and intelligent management of information of various 
forms through a range of systems, actors and perspectives and the development of 
information sharing and communication mechanisms for coordinated decision making and 
actions. A specific example is the role of Climate Services, integrating meteorological 
information and non-meteorological information, such as network criticality, to provide 
bespoke services to organisations based on their individual decision needs. At a high level, 
international standards and organisational models can inform a decision-making process by 
highlighting the range of factors that influence an organisation’s asset management approach 
and offering direction for the application and design of information systems for integrating 
activities within and between organisations. The broad scope of international standards and 





through the development of frameworks for decision making. Such frameworks involve 
elements of risk assessment and the generation of resilience options, providing the 
functionality to consider all components of resilience and the influence of multiple 
perspectives and experience of stakeholders. The cyclical nature of frameworks also allows 
for continuous development of system resilience, through the evaluation of interventions 
which incorporates new information, learning and socioeconomic context into future decision 
making. 
7.2.5 Objective Five  
To evaluate the contribution of the developed network criticality assessment methodology and 
explore future directions for the quantification of infrastructure network criticality. 
Chapter 6 provided a reflection on the overall methodological approach of the thesis. An 
interpretation of the single points of failure identified was provided, highlighting the influence 
of the differences in complexity between the railway and electricity distribution sectors on 
their respective criticality distributions. The railway network has significantly greater 
operational difficulty, complex service patterns and disruption propagation potential, and 
therefore has a significantly greater spatial distribution of single points of failure compared to 
the electricity distribution network where critical locations tend to be concentrated in key 
areas. However, similar drivers and types of critical locations were found to exist between 
infrastructure systems. Essentially, criticality is a result of network supply and demand 
dynamics, therefore, critical substations tend to be within or around larger towns and cities, 
which act as major load centres, and critical railway locations tend to be around major hubs, 





frequency and volume of traffic. The criticality assessments in this thesis were found to be 
generally representative of those in the existing literature and of criticality defined by tacit 
knowledge, particularly for rail where direct comparisons were possible. The main difference 
is that the larger national-scale simulations and tacit knowledge either do not identify the high 
resolution and localised single points of failure in urban areas, or do not recognise the 
importance of these locations - a key contribution of the thesis is the definition of these 
localised priorities. The granularity of critical locations is even more evident when undertaking 
a dependent infrastructure network criticality assessment, with connections between 
individual assets used to bring consequence metrics on both networks together a high spatial 
resolution is paramount. 
A critique of the methodology was provided, highlighting the main limitations with the 
network criticality assessments. The low sample size constraints of the service performance 
databases used influence the reliability of the results and therefore careful interpretation of 
the characteristics of more localised single points of failure is recommended. However, the 
low sample sizes at more remote railway locations present a greater issue than the single 
failures at electrical substations, due to the greater variability in asset footprints. 
Furthermore, for dependent infrastructure network criticality, system boundary definitions 
influence fault reporting and performance metrics.  In general, there is very limited 
consideration of externalities in both causation and consequence across the reporting of 
electricity supply interruptions and train delays. The methodological caveats depend mainly 
on the scale of analysis, with a trade-off between national-scale analysis and a low level of 





size in this thesis. Therefore, downscaling existing models and simulations and upscaling the 
single point of failure methodology in this thesis would present a different set of challenges. 
Recommendations were provided regarding the improvement of the existing network 
criticality assessment methodology. Obtaining a longer time series for the performance 
databases would provide a greater distribution of event magnitudes, increase the spatial 
coverage of network criticality, and provide more reliable evidence of cascading failure 
pathways and consequences. Enhanced fault reporting and cooperation between 
organisations from different sectors, driven largely by regulators, would increase the level of 
detail in the information provided and a greater appreciation of system-wide consequences. 
This can be achieved by improving consequence metrics to account for impacts to external 
assets, as well as more detailed fault attribution to acknowledge external sources of risk and 
allow cascading failure pathways to be traced. This thesis presents a criticality assessment 
using the best available data, which can inform future network management. Improved 
decision making, both locally and holistically focused, is required alongside developments in 
the data and metrics used to underpin those decisions. 
There are a variety of opportunities for extending the analysis. Including a greater variety of 
stakeholder perspectives of criticality would help progress towards a more holistic assessment 
of risk. Scaling the assessment up to cover national and international management regions, as 
well as further interdependent networks including ICT infrastructure, would improve the 
application and transferability methodology, provided that data of the appropriate quality was 
available and accessible. A more detailed event-based assessment of disruption evolution and 





allow them to adapt their response and contingency plans further. Potential future 
developments were also considered in terms of how they may influence both the distribution 
of network criticality and the methodology for identifying single points of failure. High level 
drivers including political and governance change, such as Brexit and devolution, can alter the 
way in which infrastructure is managed and funded. The most direct impact on infrastructure 
network criticality will be the introduction of new technologies and network developments, 
such as railway electrification and electric vehicle usage. The main transformation is likely to 
be the increasing digitalisation of infrastructure and the reliance on IT and communications 
systems, such as ETCS signalling on the railway network as part of the Digital Railway Strategy 
and smart grids for electricity distribution as DNOs transition to DSOs. Whilst such 
technological advancements may increase efficiency and capacity, they also heighten the 
need for system-wide resilience. A major benefit of digital technology is the growth in ‘big 
data’ from IoT technology and sensors, for both smart infrastructure and weather conditions, 
alongside mobile phone or social network data which allows the potential for integration of 
high resolution information at the city-scale. Ultimately, the benefits of any future 
developments are only realised with stakeholder engagement and cooperation, therefore 
visualisations and tools can be used to encourage stakeholder interaction and coordinated 









7.3 Concluding Remarks 
Overall, this thesis has achieved its aim by developing and demonstrating a local-scale and 
high-resolution network criticality assessment methodology for the evidence-based 
identification of single points of failure within infrastructure systems of different scales of 
complexity and dependency through the fulfilment of the five research objectives. The utility 
of the network criticality assessments in this thesis is not only through the direct application 
of mapped single points of failure for the prioritisation of resource allocation and targeted 
resilience interventions, but also through the influence of the limitations and opportunities 
identified. The recommendations of this thesis can help to promote the improvement of data 
and information systems within and between infrastructure owners and operators, increasing 
the potential for cross-sector collaboration in network criticality assessment and the planning 
and delivery of resilience measures. The ultimate vision is for a local-scale, high-resolution and 
holistic systems-of-systems analysis of interdependent infrastructure, to be informed by 
robust, current and accessible data on hazards, vulnerability and consequence alongside 











Ackoff, RL. (2001) A brief guide to interactive planning and idealized design [Online] 
https://www.ida.liu.se/~steho87/und/htdd01/AckoffGuidetoIdealizedRedesign.pdf [Accessed 
11/2/2019]. 
African Development Bank, (2018). Financing Africa’s Infrastructure: New Strategies, Mechanisms, and 
Instruments, Chapter 4, p95-124 in African Development Bank (eds.) Financing Africa’s Infrastructure 
[online] 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2018AEO/African_Economic_
Outlook_2018_-_EN_Chapter4.pdf [Accessed 20/7/2018]. 
Armitt, J. Baggs, M. Baveystock, N. Dalton, G. Dickie, J. Hall, J. Holliday, S. Kelly, R. Lamonte, J.  Mair, R. Owen, 
R. Threlfall, R. and Williams, G. (2016) National Needs Assessment - A Vision for UK Infrastructure 
[online] https://www.ice.org.uk/getattachment/news-and-insight/policy/national-needs-assessment-
a-vision-for-uk-infrastr/National-Needs-Assessment-PDF-
(1).pdf.aspx#_ga=2.222494995.946978139.1528376974-335235961.1523267290 [Accessed 3/5/2018]. 
Asian Development Bank, (2017). Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs [online] 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/227496/special-report-infrastructure.pdf 
[Accessed 25/7/2018]. 
Association for Project Management, (2018). Systems thinking: How is it used in project management? 
Research Fund Series [Online] https://www.apm.org.uk/media/17308/systems-thinking_final.pdf  
[Accessed 11/2/2019]. 
Augutis, J. Joksas, B. Krikstolaitis, R. and Urbonas, R. (2016) The assessment technology of energy critical 
infrastructure. Applied Energy, 162, 1494-1504. 
 
Azevedo, JA. Chapman, L. and Muller, CL. (2016) Urban heat and residential electricity consumption: A 
preliminary study. Applied Geography, 70, 59-67. 
Baker, CJ. Chapman, L. Quinn, A. Dobney, K. (2010) Climate change and the railway industry: a review. 
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part C: Journal of Mechanical Engineering 
Science, 224, 519-527  
Baker, J. (2018) The UK’s Diesel Phase-Out and Rail Innovation. FutureRail, 61 [online] 
https://rail.nridigital.com/future_rail_may18/the_uk_s_diesel_phase-out_and_rail_innovation 
[Accessed 1/6/2018]. 
Baruah, PJ. Eyre, N. Qadrdan, M. Chaudry, M. Blainey, S. Hall, J. Jenkins, N. and Tran, M. (2014) Energy system 
impacts from heat and transport electrification. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – 
Energy, 167 (3), 139-151. 
Beckford, J. (2014) The Railway System. Beckford Consulting. Presentation [Online] 
http://beckfordconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/The-Railway-System-TRACCA.pdf 
[Accessed 2/5/2018]. 
Beckford, J. (2016). The Intelligent Organisation: Realising the Value of Information; Routledge: Abingdon, UK. 
Bier, VM. Haphuriwat, N. Haphuriwat, J. Zimmerman, R. and Culpen, AM. (2008) Optimal Resource Allocation 
for Defense of Targets Based on Differing Measures of Attractiveness. Risk Analysis, 28 (3), 763-770. 
Bigger, JE. Willingham, MG. and Krimgold, F. (2009) Consequences of critical infrastructure interdependencies: 





Birmingham City Council, (2016). Information Communication Technology & Digital Strategy 2016 – 2021 
[online] 
https://www.birmingham.gov.uk/download/downloads/id/5029/birmingham_city_council_ict_and_di
gital_strategy_2016-2021.pdf [Accessed 10/8/2018]. 
Blockley, D. and Godfrey, P. (2017) Doing it Differently: Systems for rethinking infrastructure, Second edition, 
ICE Publishing. London, UK. 
Bollinger, LA. And Dijkema, GPJ. (2016) Evaluating infrastructure resilience to extreme weather – the case of 
the Dutch electricity transmission network. EJTIR, 16 (1), 214-239. 
 
Bombardier, (2015). Battery-driven Bombardier Electrostar Electrical Multiple Unit [online] 
https://www.bombardier.com/content/dam/Websites/bombardiercom/Projects/supporting-
documents/BT_Battery-Driven-Bombardier-Electrostar_LowRes.pdf [Accessed 5/6/2018]. 




BS ISO 55000:2014. Asset management – Overview, principles and terminology, BSI Standards Publication. 
Buldyrev, SV. Parshani, R. Paul, G. Stanley, HE. and Havlin, S. (2010) Catastrophic cascade of failures in 
interdependent networks. Nature, 464, 1025-1028. 
Burr, T. Merrifield, S. Duffy, D. Griffiths, J. Wright, S. and Barker, G. (2008) Reducing passenger rail delays by 
better management of incidents, National Audit Office for the Office of Rail Regulation [online] 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmpubacc/655/655.pdf [Accessed 
19/8/2018]. 
Cabinet Office, (2011). Keeping the Country Running: Natural Hazards and Infrastructure - A Guide to improving 
the resilience of critical infrastructure and essential services [online] 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
61342/natural-hazards-infrastructure.pdf [Accessed 20/7/2018]. 








Carbno, C. (1999) Optimal Resource Allocation for Projects. Project Management Journal, 30 (2), 22-31. 
Cardona, OD. van Aalst, MK. Birkmann, J. Fordham, M. McGregor, G. Perez, R. Pulwarty, RS. Schipper, ELF. and 
Sinh, BT. (2012) Determinants of risk: exposure and vulnerability. In: Managing the Risks of Extreme 
Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation [Field, CB. Barros, V. Stocker, TF. Qin, D. 
Dokken, DJ. Ebi, KL. Mastrandrea, MD. Mach, KJ. Plattner, GK. Allen, SK. Tignor, M. and Midgley, PM. 
(eds.)]. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA, p 65-108. 
Cats, O. Yap, M. and van Oort, N. (2016) Exposing the role of exposure: Public transport network risk analysis. 






Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (2018) Critical National Infrastructure [online] 
https://www.cpni.gov.uk/critical-national-infrastructure-0 [Accessed 26/7/2018]. 
Chang, SE. McDaniels, TL. Mikawoz, J. and Peterson, K. (2007) Infrastructure failure interdependencies in 
extreme events: power outage consequences in the 1998 Ice Storm. Natural Hazards, 41(2), 337-358. 
Chapman, L. (2007) Transport and climate change: a review. Journal of Transport Geography, 15, 354-367. 
Chapman, L. and Bell, SJ. (2016) Low-cost Road Surface Temperature sensing enabled by the Internet of Things. 
Proceedings of the 18th SIRWEC Conference, 28th-30th April 2016, Fort Collins, Colorado. 
Chapman, L. Azevedo, JA. and Prieto-Lopez, T. (2013) Urban heat and critical infrastructure networks: a 
viewpoint. Urban Climate, 3, 7-12. 
Chapman, L. Bell, C. and Bell, S. (2017) Can the crowdsourcing data paradigm take atmospheric science to a 
new level? A case study of the urban heat island of London quantified using Netatmo weather 
stations. International Journal of Climatology, 37, 3597-3605. 
Chapman, L. Muller, CL. Young, DT. Warren, EL. Grimmond, CSB. Cai, X-M. and Ferranti, EJS. (2015) The 
Birmingham Urban Climate Laboratory: An open meteorological testbed and challenges of the smart 
city. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 96, 1545-1560. 
Chapman, L. Warren, EL. and Chapman, VL. (2016) Using the internet of things to monitor low adhesion on 
railways. Transport, 169, 1-9. 
Checkland, P. (2000) Soft systems methodology: A thirty year retrospective. Systems Research and Behavioral 
Science, 17, S11-S58. 
Civil Contingencies Act, (2004). [online] 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/36/pdfs/ukpga_20040036_en.pdf [Accessed 22/7/2018]. 
Copernicus, (2018). Copernicus Climate Change Service [online] https://climate.copernicus.eu/ [Accessed 
21/7/2018].  
Curtis, S. Fair, A. Wistow, J. Val, DV. and Oven, K. (2017) Impact of extreme weather events and climate change 
for health and social care systems. Environmental Health, 16(Suppl 1):128, 23-32. 
Dai, L. (2016) Intelligent Real-Time Train Rescheduling Management for Railway System. A thesis submitted to 
the University of Birmingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, School of Engineering, 
Birmingham, UK. 
Data and Analytics Facility for National Infrastructure, (2018). Homepage [online] http://www.dafni.ac.uk/ 
[Accessed 3/6/2018]. 
Dawson, D. Shaw, J. and Gehrels, WR. (2016) Sea-level rise impacts on transport infrastructure: The notorious 
case of the coastal railway line at Dawlish, England. Journal of Transport Geography, 51, 91-109. 
Dawson, RJ. Thompson, D. Johns, D. Wood, R. Darch, G. Chapman, L. Hughes, PN. Watson, GVR. Pauslon, K. 
Bell, S. Gosling, SN. Powrie, W. and Hall, JW. (2018) A systems framework for national assessment of 
climate risks to infrastructure. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A, 376. 
Delay Attribution Board, (2018). Delay Attribution Principles and Rules [online] 
http://www.delayattributionboard.co.uk/documents/dag_pdac/April%202018%20DAPR.pdf [Accessed 
1/6/2018]. 
Department for Transport, (2014a). Transport Resilience Review – A review of the resilience of the transport 






resilience-review-web.pdf [Accessed 10/4/2018]. 
Department for Transport, (2014b). Values of Time and Vehicle Operating Costs, TAG Unit 3.5.6, Transport 
Analysis Guidance (TAG) [online] 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140304110038/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/webtag/documen
ts/expert/pdf/U3_5_6-Jan-2014.pdf [Accessed 17/8/2018]. 
Department for Transport, (2016). Rail Cyber Security, Guidance to Industry [online] 
https://www.rssb.co.uk/Library/improving-industry-performance/2016-02-cyber-security-rail-cyber-
security-guidance-to-industry.pdf [Accessed 2/5/2018]. 
Department for Transport, (2018). Joint Rail Data Action Plan - Addressing Barriers to Make Better use of Rail 
Data [online] 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
733043/joint-rail-data-action-plan-2018.pdf [Accessed 12/8/2018]. 
Dey, P. Mehra, R. Kazi, F. Wagh, S. and Singh, NM. (2016) Impact of Topology on the Propagation of Cascading 
Failure in Power Grid. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 7 (4), 1970-1978. 
 
Digital Railway, (2018). Digital Railway Strategy April 2018 [online] http://digitalrailway.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Digital-Railway-Strategy.pdf [Accessed 10/8/2018]. 
Dobney, K. Baker, CJ. Chapman, L. and Quinn, AD. (2010) The Future Cost to the UK’s Railway Network of Heat 
Related Delays and Buckles Caused by the Predicted Increase in High Summer Temperatures Due to 
Climate Change. Proc IMechE Part F- J Rail and Rapid Transit, 224(1), 25-34. 
 
Dobney, K. Baker, CJ. Quinn, AD. and Chapman, L. (2009) Quantifying the Effects of High Summer Temperatures 
due to Climate Change on Buckling and Rail Related Delays in south-east UK. Meteorol Appl, 16(2), 245-
251. 
 
Dunn, S. and Wilkinson, SM. (2013) Identifying Critical Components in Infrastructure Networks Using Network 
Topology. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 19 (2), 157-165. 
Durango-Cohen, PL. and Madanat, SM. (2008) Optimization of inspection and maintenance decisions for 
infrastructure facilities under performance model uncertainty: A quasi-Bayes approach. 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 42, 1074–1085. 
 
Eckersley, P. England, K. and Ferry, L. (2018) Sustainable development in cities: collaborating to improve urban 
climate resilience and develop the business case for adaptation. Public Money & Management, 38 (5), 
335-344. 
Eddowes, MJ. Waller, D. Taylor, P. Briggs, B. Meade, T. and Ferguson, I. (2003) Rail Safety and Standards Board: 
Safety Implications of Weather, Climate and Climate Change. Issue 2, Report no. 
AEAT/RAIR/76148/R03/005 [online] http://www.climate-change-
uk.info/sites/RailSafetyclimatechange.pdf [Accessed 2/3/2018]. 
 
Ellis, I. (2010) Ellis’ British Railway Engineering Encyclopaedia, Second Edition, Self-Published, UK.  
Energy Networks Association, (2012). Instructions for Reporting to the National Fault and Interruption 
Reporting Scheme. Engineering Recommendation G43, Issue 3, Amendment 1, 2012. 
 








Evans, D. (2011) The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the Internet Is Changing Everything, Cisco 
Internet Business Solutions Group (IBSG) White Paper [online] 
https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/about/ac79/docs/innov/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf [Accessed 
10/8/2018]. 
Faramondi, L. Setola, R. Panzieri, S. Pascucci, F. and Oliva, G. (2018) Finding critical nodes in infrastructure 
networks. International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 20, 3-15. 
Farrell, D. Gebre, B. Hudspeth, C. and Sellgren, A. (2013) Risk-based resource allocation – Focusing regulatory 
and enforcement efforts where they are needed the most, McKinsey Working Papers on Risk, Number 
42, McKinsey & Company. 
Ferranti, E. Chapman, L. and Whyatt, D. (2017) A Perfect Storm? The collapse of Lancaster’s critical 
infrastructure networks following intense rainfall on 4/5 December 2015. Weather, 72 (1), 3-7. 
Ferranti, E. Chapman, L. Lowe, C. McCulloch, S. Jaroszweski, D. and Quinn, A. (2016) Heat-Related Failures on 
Southeast England’s Railway Network: Insights and Implications for Heat Risk Management. Wea. 
Climate Soc, 8, 177-191. 
 
Fisher, R. Quinn, A. and Jaroszweski, D. (2018) Hazardous Weather, Susceptible Infrastructure and Vulnerable 
Railways, School of Engineering, University of Birmingham, UK. Academic Poster. 
Frontier Economics, (2012). Systemic Risks and Opportunities in UK infrastructure [online] 
https://www.frontier-economics.com/documents/2013/10/frontier-report-systemic-risk-and-
opportunities-in-uk-infrastructure-2.pdf [Accessed 5/7/2018]. 
Golany, B. Kaplan, EH. Marmur, A. and Rothblum, UG. (2009) Nature plays with dice – terrorists do not: 
Allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 192, 198-208. 
Guthrie, P. and Konaris, T. (2012) Infrastructure Resilience, Report produced for the Government Office of 
Science, Foresight project ‘Reducing Risks of Future Disasters: Priorities for Decision Makers [online] 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
286993/12-1310-infrastructure-and-resilience.pdf [Accessed 30/7/2018]. 
Hall, J. Thacker, S. Ives, M. Cao, Y. Chaudry, M. Blainey, S. and Oughton, E. (2017) Strategic analysis of the 
future of national infrastructure. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers - Civil Engineering, 
170 (1), 39-47. 
Haughwout, AF. (2001) Infrastructure and social welfare in metropolitan America. FRBNY Economic Policy 
Review, December 2001. 
Hayden, A. Tight, M. and Burrow, M. (2017) Is Reducing Car Use a Utopian Vision? Transportation Research 
Procedia, World Conference on Transport Research - WCTR 2016 Shanghai. 10-15 July 2016, 25C, 
3948-3960. 
Heathcote, C. (2017) Infrastructure demand: A major global challenge, Global Infrastructure Hub Blog [online] 
https://www.gihub.org/blog/global-infrastructure-demands/ [Accessed 25/7/2018]. 
Hickman, AL. Baker, CJ, Cai, X. Delgado-Saborit, JM. and Thornes, JE. (2018) Evaluation of air quality at the 
Birmingham New Street Railway Station. Proc IMechE Part F: J Rail and Rapid Transit, 232 (6), 1864-
1878. 







Hines, P. Cotilla-Sanchez, E. and Blumsack, S. (2010) Do topological models provide good information about 
electricity infrastructure vulnerability? Chaos, 20 (3), 033122. 
 
HM Government, (2015a). Digital Built Britain Level 3 Building Information Modelling – Strategic Plan [online] 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
410096/bis-15-155-digital-built-britain-level-3-strategy.pdf [Accessed 3/4/2018]. 
HM Government, (2015b). National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 - A 
Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom [online] 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf [Accessed 27/7/2018]. 
HM Treasury, (2013). National Infrastructure Plan 2013 [online] 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263159/national_in
frastructure_plan_2013.pdf [Accessed 8/9/2014]. 
Hodgkinson, S. Jaroszweski, D. Quinn, A. and Chapman, L. (in review) Single point of failure assessment 
methodology for evaluating railway network criticality. Manuscript submitted for publication to 
Transportation Research Part A – Policy and Practice. 
 




Hutchen, A. Gibson, S. and Taylor, K. (2016) Using a Risk Framework - Applying the Common Network Asset 
Indices Methodology in practice. Asset Management Conference (AM 2016), London, 2016, p1-15. 
 
iBUILD, (2018). Closing the Gap: Local infrastructure business models to support inclusive growth, iBUILD 
Research Centre Final Report, Newcastle University [Online] http://www.ibuild.ac.uk/2018finalreport 
[Accessed 14/2/2019]. 
 
International Council on Systems Engineering, (2018). About Systems Engineering [Online] 
https://www.incose.org/about-systems-engineering [Accessed 11/2/2019]. 
 





Institution of Civil Engineers, (2009). The state of the nation, defending critical infrastructure [online] 
https://www.ice.org.uk/getattachment/news-and-insight/policy/state-of-the-nation-critical-
infrastructure-2009/SoN_DCIreport_final_web.pdf.aspx [Accessed 12/5/2018]. 
 
Institution of Engineering and Technology, (2013). Electricity Networks - Handling a shock to the system [online] 
https://www.theiet.org/factfiles/energy/elec-shock-page.cfm?type=pdf [Accessed 25/6/2018]. 
 
International Electrotechnical Commission, (2015). Strategic asset management of power networks – White 
Paper [online] http://www.iec.ch/whitepaper/pdf/iecWP-assetmanagement-LR-en.pdf [Accessed 
5/7/2018].  
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (2012). Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to 
Advance Climate Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the 





K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner, S.K. Allen, M. Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA, 582 pp. 
Independent Television, (2018). Power cut hits Birmingham's Bull Ring and New Street Station [online] 
http://www.itv.com/news/central/2018-04-10/power-cut-hits-birminghams-bull-ring-and-new-street-
station/ [Accessed 25/6/2018]. 
Jaroszweski, D. Hooper, E. Baker, C. Chapman, C. and Quinn, A. (2015) The impacts of the 28 June 2012 storms 
on UK road and rail transport. Meteorol Appl, 22, 470-476. 
 
Jenkins, GJ. Perry, MC. and Prior, MJ. (2008) The climate of the United Kingdom and recent trends, Met Office 
Hadley Centre, Exeter, UK [online] https://ukcip.ouce.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/PDFs/UKCP09_Trends.pdf 
[Accessed 9/8/2018]. 
Jin, X. Wah, BW. Cheng, X. and Wang, Y. (2015) Significance and Challenges of Big Data Research. Big Data 
Research, 2, 59-64. 
Johansson, J. and Hassel, H. (2010) An approach for modelling interdependent infrastructures in the context of 
vulnerability analysis. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 95, 1335-1344. 
Jonsson, H. Johansson, J. and Johansson, H. (2008) Identifying critical components in technical infrastructure 
networks. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part O: Journal of Risk and 
Reliability, 222 (2), 235-243. 
Khaled, AA. Jin, M. Clarke, DB. and Hoque, MA. (2015) Train design and routing optimization for evaluating 
criticality of freight railroad infrastructures. Transportation Research Part B – Methodological, 71, 71-
84. 
 
Kitching, C. (2015) Operation Stack turns M20 into lorry park and tailbacks stretch 20 MILES as Channel Tunnel 
travel chaos enters sixth day [online] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/travel_news/article-
2921376/Channel-Tunnel-power-supply-crisis-enters-SIXTH-day-Eurostar-delays-20-mile-tailbacks-
M20-turned-lorry-park.html [Accessed 28/7/2018]. 
Koc, Y. Raman, A. Warnier, M. and Kumar, T. (2016) Structural Vulnerability Analysis of Electric Power 
Distribution Grids. International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, 12 (4), 311-330. 
 
Leviakangas & Saarikivi (2012) D6 European Extreme Weather Risk Management – Needs, Opportunities, Costs 
and Recommendation, Extreme weather impacts on European networks of transport (EWENT) [online] 
http://ewent.vtt.fi/Deliverables/D6/Ewent_D6_SummaryReport_V07.pdf [Accessed 25/7/2018]. 
Li, H. Liu, Y. and Peng, K. (2018) Characterizing the relationship between road infrastructure and local economy 
using structural equation modelling. Transport Policy, 61, 17-25. 
London Economics, (2013). The Value of Lost Load (VoLL) for Electricity in Great Britain [online] 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/82293/london-economics-value-lost-load-electricity-
gbpdf [Accessed 2/7/2018]. 
 
Lu, L. Wang, X. Ouyang, Y. Roningen, J. Myers, N. and Calfas, G. (2018) Vulnerability of Interdependent Urban 
Infrastructure Networks: Equilibrium after Failure Propagation and Cascading Impacts. Computer-
Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering, 33, 300-315. 
Mattson, LG. and Jenelius, E. (2015) Vulnerability and resilience of transport systems – A discussion of recent 
research. Transportation Research Part A – Policy and Practice, 81, 16-34. 
McColl, L. Palin, EJ. Thornton, HE. Sexton, DMH. Betts, R. and Mylne, K. (2012) Assessing the potential impact of 





McEvoy, D. Ahmed, I. and Mullett, J. (2012) The impact of the 2009 heat wave on Melbourne's critical 
infrastructure. Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability, 17(8), 783-
796. 
Met Office, (2017). Climate services [online] https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/services/climate-services [Accessed 
21/7/2018]. 
Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, (2018). National Planning Policy Framework [online] 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
728643/Revised_NPPF_2018.pdf [Accessed 30/7/2018]. 
Montesinos-Valera, J. Aragonés-Beltrán, P. and Pastor-Ferrando, JP. (2017) Selection of maintenance, renewal 
and improvement projects in rail lines using the analytic network process. Structure and Infrastructure 
Engineering, 13(11): 1476-1496. 
 
Murphy, JM. Sexton, DMH. Jenkins, GJ. Boorman, PM. Booth, BBB. Brown, CC. Clark, RT. Collins, M. Harris, GR. 
Kendon, EJ. Betts, RA. Brown, SJ. Howard, TP. Humphrey, KA. McCarthy, MP. McDonald, RE. Stephens, 
A. Wallace, C. Warren, R. Wilby, R. Wood, RA. (2009) UK Climate Projections Science Report: Climate 
change projections, Met Office Hadley Centre, Exeter [online] 
http://ukclimateprojections.metoffice.gov.uk/media.jsp?mediaid=87894&filetype=pdf [Accessed 
12/8/2018]. 
Murrant, D. Quinn, A. Chapman, L. and Heaton, C. (2017a) Water use of the UK thermal electricity generation 
fleet by 2050: Part 1 identifying the problem. Energy Policy, 108, 844-858. 
Murrant, D. Quinn, A. Chapman, L. and Heaton, C. (2017b) Water use of the UK thermal electricity generation 
fleet by 2050: Part 2 quantifying the problem. Energy Policy, 108, 859-874. 
National Audit Office, (2015). A Short Guide to Network Rail [online] https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/Network-rail-short-guide1.pdf [Accessed 20/7/2018]. 
National Audit Office, (2017). Implementing the UK’s Exit from the European Union, Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 608, Session 2017-
2019 [online] https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Implementing-the-UKs-exit-
from-the-European-Union-Department-for-BEIS.pdf [Accessed 8/8/2018]. 
National Audit Office, (2018). Implementing the UK’s Exit from the European Union, Department for Transport, 
Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 1125, Session 2017-2019 [online] 
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Implementing-the-UKs-Exit-from-the-
European-Union.pdf [Accessed 8/8/2018]. 
National Grid, (2003). Investigation Report into the Loss of Supply Incident affecting parts of South London at 
18:20 on Thursday, 28 August 2003 [online] 
http://www.geocities.jp/ps_dictionary/blackout/London28082003.pdf [Accessed 12/4/2018]. 
National Grid, (2017). Transmission network shapefiles [online] https://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/about-
grid/our-networks-and-assets/gas-and-electricity-network-routes [Accessed 6/4/2018]. 
National Infrastructure Commission, (2017). Congestion, Capacity, Carbon: Priorities for national infrastructure 
– Consultation on a National Infrastructure Assessment [online] https://www.nic.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/Congestion-Capacity-Carbon_-Priorities-for-national-infrastructure.pdf [Accessed 
15/4/2018] 







Network Rail, (2015a). Climate Change Adaptation Report 2015 [online] https://cdn.networkrail.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Climate-Change-Adaptation-Report-2015_FINAL.pdf [Accessed 30/7/2018]. 
Network Rail, (2015b). LNW Alternative Feeding Diagrams Rugby ECR. Issue 05. 
Network Rail, (2016a). Delivering a better railway for a better Britain, Network Specification 2016 London North 
Western [online] https://cdn.networkrail.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Network-Specification-
2016-London-North-Western.pdf [Accessed 5/5/2018]. 
 




Network Rail, (2016c). Route Weather Resilience and Climate Change Adaptation Plans – London North Western 
[online] https://cdn.networkrail.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/LNW-Route-WRCCA-Plan.pdf 
[Accessed 30/7/2018]. 
Network Rail, (2016d). SRS criticality update Based on 10/11 to 14/15 TRUST records. Issue 2, Draft 2. 
Network Rail, (2017a). Network Rail’s Transformation Plan [online] https://cdn.networkrail.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/Transformation-Plan-Update-Sept-2017.pdf [Accessed 10/8/2018]. 
Network Rail, (2017b). Railway Upgrade Plan 2017/18 [online] https://cdn.networkrail.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/Railway-Upgrade-Plan-Update-2017-2018.pdf [Accessed 2/4/2018]. 
 
Network Rail, (2017c). Smarter, more Efficient Electrification [online] https://cdn.networkrail.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Challenge-Statement-EP-Challenge-Statement-3-Smarter-more-Efficient-
Electrification.pdf [Accessed 25/4/2018].  




















Ofgem, (2017a). DNO Common Network Asset Indices Methodology, Health & Criticality – Version 1.1 [online] 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2017/05/dno_common_network_asset_indices_metho
dology_v1.1.pdf [Accessed 6/5/2018]. 
 
Ofgem, (2017b). Guide to the RIIO-ED1 electricity distribution price control [online] 










Ouyang, M. (2014) Review on modelling and simulation of interdependent critical infrastructure systems. 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 121, 43-60. 
Oxera, (2015). What is the contribution of rail to the UK economy? Report for the Rail Delivery Group, 
September 2015 [online] https://www.oxera.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/RDG-booklet-Final-
Sept-15.pdf.pdf [Accessed 5/7/2018]. 
O’Rourke, TD. (2007) Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience. The Bridge, p22-29, 37 (1). 
Pagani, GA. and Aiello, M. (2013) The Power Grid as a complex network: A survey. Physica A, 392, 2688-2700. 
 
Pant, R. Blainey, S. Hall, J. and Preston, J. (2014) Assessing Risks to Inform Resilience: A Criticality Assessment of 
the British Railway Network. In: International Symposium for Next Generation Infrastructure 
Conference Proceedings (eds. T Dolan and B Collins), International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA), Schloss Laxenburg, Vienna, Austria, 30 September - 1 October 2014, 117-121. 
Pant, R. Hall, J. and Blainey, S. (2016) Vulnerability assessment framework for interdependent critical 
infrastructures: case-study for Great Britain’s rail network. EJTIR, 16(1), 174-194. 
Panteli, M. Pickering, C. Wilkinson, S. Dawson, R. and Mancarella, P. (2017) Power System Resilience to 
Extreme Weather: Fragility Modeling, Probabilistic Impact Assessment, and Adaptation Measures. IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, 32 (5), 3747-3757. 
 
Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology, (2011). Future Electricity Networks, POSTNOTE, Number 372 
[online] https://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/postpn_372-future-electricity-networks.pdf 
[Accessed 10/8/2018]. 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, (2017). Cyber Security of UK Infrastructure, POSTNOTE, 
Number 554 [online] http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/POST-PN-0554/POST-
PN-0554.pdf [Accessed 20/6/2018]. 
 
Parlikad, AK. and Jafari, M. (2016) Challenges in infrastructure asset management. IFAC-PapersOnLine 49-28, 
185-190. 
 




Pollitt, M. (2005) The role of efficiency estimates in regulatory price reviews: Ofgem’s approach to 
benchmarking electricity networks. Utilities Policy, 13, 279-288. 
 
Pregnolato, M. Ford, A. Robson, C. Glenis, V. Barr, S. Dawson, R. (2016) Assessing urban strategies for reducing 
the impacts of extreme weather on infrastructure networks. R. Soc. open sci, 3, 160023. 
Quinn, AD. Ferranti, EJS. Hodgkinson, SP. Jack, ACR. Beckford, J. and Dora, JM. (2018) Adaptation Becoming 
Business as Usual: A Framework for Climate-Change-Ready Transport Infrastructure. Infrastructures, 
3(10). 
Rail Delivery Group, (2017). Guidance Note - Contingency Planning for Power Outages [online] RDG-GN037, 1 





Railway Safety and Standards Board, (2016a). Tomorrow’s Railway and Climate Change Adaptation: Final 
Report, Task 3: Metrics evaluation appendices [online] https://www.rssb.co.uk/research-
development-and-innovation/research-reports-catalogue/pb024347 [Accessed 1/6/2018]. 
Railway Safety and Standards Board, (2016b). Tomorrow's Railway and Climate Change Adaptation: Final 
Report, Task 4: Systems modelling appendices [online] https://www.rssb.co.uk/research-development-
and-innovation/research-reports-catalogue/pb024352 [Accessed 1/6/2018]. 
Railway Safety and Standards Board, (2017). Rail Technical Strategy Capability Delivery Plan [online] 
https://www.rssb.co.uk/rts/Documents/2017-01-27-rail-technical-strategy-capability-delivery-plan-
brochure.pdf [Accessed 10/8/2018]. 
Rinaldi, SM. (2004) Modeling and simulating critical infrastructures and their interdependencies. In: 
Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2004. 
Rinaldi, SM. Peerenboom JP. and Kelly, TK. (2001). Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical 
infrastructure interdependencies. Control Systems, IEEE, 21(6): 11-25. 
Rodriguez-Nunez, E. and Garcia-Palomares, JC. (2014) Measuring the vulnerability of public transport networks. 
Journal of Transport Geography, 35, 50-63. 
 
Rosato, V. Bologna, S. and Tiriticco, F. (2007) Topological properties of high-voltage electrical transmission 
networks. Electric Power Systems Research, 77, 99-105. 
Royal Academy of Engineering, (2011). Infrastructure, engineering and climate change adaptation - ensuring 
services in an uncertain future [online] www.raeng.org.uk/adaptation [Accessed 14/5/2018]. 
 
Royal Academy of Engineering, (2014). Counting the cost: the economic and social costs of electricity shortfalls 
in the UK - A report for the Council for Science and Technology [online] 
https://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/reports/counting-the-cost [Accessed 7/5/2018]. 
 
Sapkota, JB. (2018) Access to infrastructure and human well-being: evidence from rural Nepal. Development in 
Practice, 28:2, 182-194. 
Senge, PM. (1990). The Fifth Discipline: Art and Practice of the Learning Organization; New York, Doubleday. 
Severn Trent Water, (2015). Severn Trent Water’s climate change adaptation report [online] 
https://www.stwater.co.uk/content/dam/stw/about_us/documents/Full-Climate-change-adaptation-
report-2015-2020.pdf [Accessed 25/6/2018]. 
Solomon, D. (2013) Securing our economy: The case for infrastructure [online] https://www.ceca.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Securing-our-economy-The-Case-For-Infrastructure.pdf [Accessed 
28/7/2018]. 
Thacker, S. Barr, S. Pant, R. Hall, JW. And Alderson, D. (2017a) Geographic Hotspots of Critical National 
Infrastructure. Risk Analysis, 37(12), 2490-2505. 
Thacker, S. Pant, R. and Hall, JW. (2014) Characterizing the Vulnerability of Future Configurations of Great 
Britain’s Electricity Network Infrastructure to Climate-related Hazards. 2nd Int. Conf. on Vulnerability, 
Uncertainty and Risk, ASCE, Reston, VA, 648-657.  
 
Thacker, S. Pant, R. and Hall, JW. (2017b) System-of-systems formulation and disruption analysis for multi-scale 
critical national infrastructures. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 167, 30-41. 
 
The Resilience Shift, (2018). Critical Infrastructure Resilience - Understanding the landscape [online] 
http://resilienceshift.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/The-Resilience-Shift-Understanding-the-





Thornes, J. Rennie, M. Marsden, H. Chapman, L. (2012) Climate Change Risk Assessment for the Transport 
Sector [online] http://randd.defra.gov.uk/Document.aspx?Document=CCRAfortheTransportSector.pdf 
[Accessed 4/8/2014]. 
Thornes, JE. Davis, BW. (2002) Mitigating the impact of weather and climate on railway operations in the UK. 
Proceedings of the 2002 ASME/IEEE Joint Rail Conference in Washington DC, April 23-25, 2002. 
Thornes, JE. Hickman, A. Baker, C. Cai, X. and Delgado Saborit, JM. (2017) Air quality in enclosed railway 
stations. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers – Transport, 170 (TR2), 99-107. 
Thywissen, K. (2006) Components of Risk, A Comparative Glossary. UNU-EHS, SOURCE Publication Series, No. 
2/2006 [Online] http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/unu:1869/pdf4042.pdf [Accessed 13/2/2019]. 
Tran, M. Hall, J. Hickford, A. Nicholls, R. Alderson, D. Barr, S. Baruah, P. Beavan, R. Birkin, M. Blainey, S. Byers, E. 
Chaudry, M. Curtis, T. Ebrahimy, R. Eyre, N. Hiteva, R. Jenkins, N. Jones, C. Kilsby, C. Leathard, A. 
Manning, L. Otto, A. Oughton, E. Powrie, W. Preston, J. Qadrdan, M. Thoung, C. Tyler, P. Watson, J. 
Watson, G. and Zuo, C. (2014) National infrastructure assessment: Analysis of options for 
infrastructure provision in Great Britain, Interim results. Environmental Change Institute, University of 
Oxford. 
Transport for West Midlands, (2018). About Us [online] https://www.tfwm.org.uk/about-us/ [Accessed 
11/8/2018]. 
Tyler, S. and Moench, M. (2012) A framework for urban climate resilience. Climate and Development, 4 (4), 
311-326. 
UK Regulators Network, (2017). Making better use of data: identifying customers in vulnerable situations 
[online] http://www.ukrn.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Making-better-use-of-data-
identifying-customers-in-vulnerable-situations.pdf [Accessed 2/5/2018]. 
UK Regulators Network, (2018). The UK Regulators Network [online] http://www.ukrn.org.uk/ [Accessed 
2/5/2018]. 
Ukkusuri, SV. and Yushimito, WF. (2009) A methodology to assess the criticality of highway transportation 
networks. J Transp Secur, 2, 29-46. 
 
United Nations, (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015 - 70/1. 
Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, General Assembly, Seventieth 
session, Agenda items 15 and 116, A/RES/70/1 [online] 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompa
ct/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf [Accessed 20/7/2018]. 
United Nations, (2016). Report of the open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on indicators and 
terminology relating to disaster risk reduction. General Assembly, Seventy first session, Agenda item 
19c, A/71/644 [Online] https://www.preventionweb.net/files/50683_oiewgreportenglish.pdf  
[Accessed 13/2/2019]. 
Verner, D. Kim, K. and Petit, F. (2017) Incorporating Prioritization in Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience Programs. In: 10th Anniversary Homeland Defense/Security Education Summit [online] 
Arlington, VA, US. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1364653 [Accessed 15/5/2018]. 
Vespignani, A. (2010) The fragility of interdependency. Nature, News & Views, Complex Networks, p984-985, 
464. 
Voltes-Dorta, A. Rodriguez-Deniz, H. and Suau-Sanchez, P. (2017) Vulnerability of the European air transport 
network to major airport closures from the perspective of passenger delays: Ranking the most critical 






von Ferber, C. Berche, B. Holovatch, T. and Holovatch, Y. (2012) A tale of two cities - Vulnerabilities of the London 
and Paris transit network. J Transp Secur, 5 (3), 199-216. 
 
Wang, JYT. (2015) “Resilience thinking” in transport planning. Civ. Eng. Environ. Syst, 32, 180-191. 
Wang, Z. He, SY. and Leung, Y. (2018) Applying mobile phone data to travel behaviour research: A literature 
review. Travel Behaviour and Society, 11, 141-155. 
Wei, C. Minghua, H. Bin, D. Yanjun, W. and Cheng, F. (2016) Empirical analysis of airport network and critical 
airports. Chinese Journal of Aeronautics, 29 (2), 512-519. 
 
West Midlands Railway, (2018a). Train Times 20 May to 8 December 2018 Redditch – Bromsgrove – Longbridge 
– Birmingham – Sutton Coldfield – Lichfield [online] 
https://www.westmidlandsrailway.co.uk/sites/default/files/assets/download_ct/20180502/O2jija9no
o27WMB_XI3_cXaSdaxBXvp9cEnmrv-tBvc/wm01_may_2018_revised.pdf [Accessed 30/7/2018]. 
West Midlands Railway, (2018b). Up to three extra trains per hour for Bromsgrove [online] 
https://www.westmidlandsrailway.co.uk/about-us/news-desk/three-extra-trains-hour-bromsgrove 
[Accessed 10/8/2018]. 
Western Power Distribution, (2011). Adaptation to Climate Change Report [online] 
https://www.westernpower.co.uk/docs/social-responsibility/Environment/Climate-Change-
Adaptation.aspx [Accessed 22/7/2018]. 
Western Power Distribution, (2014). 2015-2023 RIIO-ED1 BUSINESS PLAN SA-08 Supplementary Annex – 
Business Performance, Efficiency and Benchmarking [online] 
https://www.westernpower.co.uk/docs/About-us/Stakeholder-information/Our-future-business-
plan/Seperate-documents/Business-Efficiency.aspx [Accessed 20/7/2018]. 
Western Power Distribution, (2015). Adaptation to Climate Change Second Round Report [online] 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
474340/climate-adrep-western-power.pdf [Accessed 2/8/2018]. 
Western Power Distribution, (2016). Shaping Subtransmission to 2030 - South West [online] 
https://www.westernpower.co.uk/docs/About-us/Our-business/Our-network/Strategic-network-
investment/Shaping-Subtransmission-to-2030-South-West-2016-v1.aspx [Accessed 5/7/2018]. 
 
Western Power Distribution, (2017). DNO Transition December 2017 Update [online] 
https://www.westernpower.co.uk/docs/About-us/Our-business/Our-network/Strategic-network-
investment/DSO-Strategy/DSO-Transition-Strategy.aspx [Accessed 11/8/2018]. 





World Economic Forum, (2013). Insight Report – Global Risks 2013 – Eighth Edition [online] 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2013.pdf [Accessed 21/7/2018]. 
World Meteorological Organisation, (2014). Implementation Plan of the Global Framework for Climate Services 
[online] http://www.wmo.int/gfcs/sites/default/files/implementation-plan//GFCS-IMPLEMENTATION-
PLAN-FINAL-14211_en.pdf [Accessed 21/7/2018]. 
World Meteorological Organisation, (2018). GFCS – Global Framework for Climate Services [online] 





Wright, D. Kelly, A. and Stuart, A. (2016) Electricity Transmission Network Output Measures Methodology 
[online] https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/99518 [Accessed 23/6/2018]. 
 
Young, DT. Chapman, L. Muller, CL. Grimmond, CSB. Cai, X. (2014) Evaluating the performance of a ‘low-cost’ 
wireless temperature sensor. Journal of Atmospheric & Oceanic Technology, 31, 938-944. 
Zimmerman, R. (2001) Social Implications of Infrastructure Network Interactions. Journal of Urban Technology, 
8:3, 97-119. 
Zimmerman, R. (2004) Decision-making and the vulnerability of interdependent critical infrastructure. In: 
Proceedings of the 2004 IEEE international conference on systems, man and cybernetics, 4059–63 
Zimmerman, R. and Restrepo, CE. (2006) The next step: quantifying infrastructure interdependencies to 
improve security. Int. J. Critical Infrastructures, 2(2/3), 215-230. 
Zuo, L. Xiahou, T. and Liu, Y. (2018) Evidential network-based failure analysis for systems suffering common 
cause failure and model parameter uncertainty. Proc IMechE Part C: J Mechanical Engineering Science, 
0 (0), 1–11. 
Zurich, (2017). Challenges of our nation’s aging infrastructure - The pressing need to maintain critical systems 
[online] https://www.zurichna.com/_/media/dbe/zna/docs/kh/infrastructure/aging-infrastructure-







APPENDIX A: MANUSCRIPT SUBMITTED TO JOURNAL 
 
[The full-text of this manuscript has been removed from the online version of the thesis 


























































































APPENDIX B: ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION NETWORK CRITICALITY BANDS 
Table of Criticality Bands allocated to substations for the South West licence area, ranked in descending order of 
disruption magnitude. 
BAND District Asset Type Voltage (Up/Down) Faults SML SML per fault 
1 Bodmin BSP 132/33 1 620.0 620.0 
1 Redruth BSP 132/33 2 674.0 337.0 
1 Redruth BSP 132/33 3 777.7 259.2 
1 Exeter Primary 33/11 2 324.1 162.1 
1 Plymouth Primary 33/11 1 117.8 117.8 
1 Barnstaple BSP 132/33 2 220.5 110.3 
1 Barnstaple BSP 132/33 2 186.0 93.0 
1 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 69.2 69.2 
1 132 kV GSP 400-275/132 1 65.0 65.0 
1 Projects BSP 132/33 1 63.0 63.0 
1 Bristol Primary 33/11 5 308.4 61.7 
1 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 60.0 60.0 
1 132 kV GSP 400-275/132 1 55.7 55.7 
1 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 55.2 55.2 
1 Redruth BSP 132/33 1 52.0 52.0 
1 Plymouth Primary 33/11 1 51.7 51.7 
1 Plymouth Primary 33/11 1 51.0 51.0 
1 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 48.0 48.0 
1 Redruth Primary 33/11 2 94.1 47.1 
1 Redruth Primary 33/11 1 46.8 46.8 
1 Exeter Primary 33/11 1 45.3 45.3 
1 Plymouth Primary 33/11 1 45.1 45.1 
1 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 44.0 44.0 
1 Weston Primary 33/11 1 40.0 40.0 
1 Bristol Primary 33/11 3 119.6 39.9 
1 Bath Primary 33/11 2 72.8 36.4 
1 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 34.7 34.7 
1 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 32.5 32.5 
1 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 32.1 32.1 
1 Projects BSP 132/33 1 31.5 31.5 
1 Taunton Primary 33/11 8 244.6 30.6 
1 Plymouth Primary 33/11 1 30.5 30.5 
1 Bristol Primary 33/11 1 28.5 28.5 
1 Plymouth Primary 33/11 3 80.7 26.9 
1 Plymouth Primary 33/11 1 25.4 25.4 
1 Bristol Primary 33/11 2 48.0 24.0 
2 Bristol Primary 33/11 2 46.9 23.5 
2 Bristol Primary 33/11 2 46.3 23.2 
2 Bristol Primary 33/11 2 44.7 22.4 
2 Weston Primary 33/11 3 64.5 21.5 
2 Plymouth Primary 33/11 2 42.8 21.4 
2 Bristol Primary 33/11 2 42.0 21.0 





2 Plymouth Primary 33/11 3 58.8 19.6 
2 Exeter Primary 33/11 3 55.8 18.6 
2 Taunton BSP 132/33 5 87.0 17.4 
2 Bristol Primary 33/11 3 50.2 16.7 
2 Plymouth Primary 33/11 2 33.5 16.7 
2 Bristol Primary 33/11 2 31.5 15.7 
2 Taunton Primary 33/11 15 232.9 15.5 
3 Bodmin BSP 132/33 3 33.8 11.3 
3 Bristol Primary 33/11 3 33.7 11.2 
3 Bristol Primary 33/11 8 82.6 10.3 
3 Taunton Primary 33/11 7 69.2 9.9 
3 Taunton BSP 132/33 4 39.6 9.9 
3 Torquay Primary 33/11 4 39.4 9.8 
3 Plymouth Primary 33/11 3 29.2 9.7 
3 Exeter Primary 33/11 3 28.6 9.5 
3 Bath Primary 33/11 5 47.0 9.4 
3 Bath BSP 132/33 4 37.2 9.3 
3 Plymouth Primary 33/11 5 46.2 9.2 
3 Plymouth Primary 33/11 2 17.8 8.9 
3 Plymouth Primary 33/11 4 35.3 8.8 
3 Bristol Primary 33/11 5 42.3 8.5 
3 Bristol Primary 33/11 4 33.8 8.5 
3 Bristol Primary 33/11 4 32.7 8.2 
3 Bodmin Primary 33/11 7 56.6 8.1 
3 Redruth Primary 33/11 30 237.4 7.9 
3 Taunton Primary 33/11 17 133.9 7.9 
3 Bath Primary 33/11 6 46.7 7.8 
3 Bath Primary 33/11 6 46.4 7.7 
3 Exeter Primary 33/11 24 182.7 7.6 
3 Plymouth Primary 33/11 7 52.4 7.5 
3 Bristol Primary 33/11 5 36.7 7.3 
3 Bristol Primary 33/11 6 43.7 7.3 
3 Bristol Primary 33/11 5 35.4 7.1 
3 Bristol Primary 33/11 5 35.0 7.0 
3 Taunton Primary 33/11 26 171.8 6.6 
3 Weston Primary 33/11 5 31.7 6.3 
3 Bristol Primary 33/11 7 44.0 6.3 
3 Weston Primary 33/11 5 31.2 6.2 
3 Exeter Primary 33/11 5 31.1 6.2 
3 Bath Primary 33/11 9 55.6 6.2 
3 Taunton Primary 33/11 14 85.3 6.1 
3 Bath Primary 33/11 6 36.3 6.1 
3 Exeter Primary 33/11 15 90.7 6.0 
3 Bristol Primary 33/11 3 17.9 6.0 
4 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 24 139.9 5.8 
4 Redruth Primary 33/11 30 162.6 5.4 
4 Bristol Primary 33/11 5 27.0 5.4 
4 Bristol Primary 33/11 3 15.7 5.2 
4 Exeter Primary 33/11 5 25.7 5.1 
4 Exeter Primary 33/11 6 30.5 5.1 
4 Bristol Primary 33/11 8 40.4 5.0 





4 Bristol BSP 132/33 1 5.0 5.0 
4 Bristol Primary 33/11 5 24.8 5.0 
4 Torquay Primary 33/11 7 34.1 4.9 
4 Exeter Primary 33/11 7 33.8 4.8 
4 Taunton BSP 132/33 1 4.8 4.8 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 15 72.0 4.8 
4 Bristol Primary 33/11 6 28.6 4.8 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 35 165.2 4.7 
4 Exeter Primary 33/11 24 111.9 4.7 
4 Weston Primary 33/11 11 49.8 4.5 
4 Bristol Primary 33/11 6 27.1 4.5 
4 Torquay Primary 33/11 9 39.5 4.4 
4 Bath Primary 33/11 19 83.3 4.4 
4 Torquay Primary 33/11 6 26.3 4.4 
4 Plymouth Primary 33/11 6 25.9 4.3 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 28 120.3 4.3 
4 Torquay Primary 33/11 21 90.2 4.3 
4 Bodmin Primary 33/11 16 68.6 4.3 
4 Exeter Primary 33/11 30 127.5 4.3 
4 Exeter Primary 33/11 14 59.0 4.2 
4 Exeter Primary 33/11 22 92.5 4.2 
4 Bath Primary 33/11 12 50.3 4.2 
4 Torquay BSP 132/33 2 8.1 4.1 
4 Exeter Primary 33/11 18 72.8 4.0 
4 Weston Primary 33/11 15 60.0 4.0 
4 Exeter Primary 33/11 10 39.6 4.0 
4 Plymouth Primary 33/11 8 31.1 3.9 
4 Bristol Primary 33/11 10 38.8 3.9 
4 Barnstaple BSP 132/33 7 27.1 3.9 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 24 90.6 3.8 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 9 33.8 3.8 
4 Exeter BSP 132/33 1 3.7 3.7 
4 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 24 88.9 3.7 
4 Torquay Primary 33/11 22 81.5 3.7 
4 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 13 47.5 3.7 
4 Bath Primary 33/11 14 49.8 3.6 
4 Bristol Primary 33/11 5 17.8 3.6 
4 Plymouth Primary 33/11 5 17.7 3.5 
4 Bristol Primary 33/11 7 24.3 3.5 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 10 34.2 3.4 
4 Bristol Primary 33/11 6 20.4 3.4 
4 Bristol Primary 33/11 7 23.7 3.4 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 28 94.3 3.4 
4 Weston Primary 33/11 19 63.8 3.4 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 11 36.8 3.3 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 15 50.1 3.3 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 31 102.5 3.3 
4 Bodmin Primary 33/11 19 62.2 3.3 
4 Bristol Primary 33/11 9 29.4 3.3 
4 Weston Primary 33/11 25 81.5 3.3 
4 Plymouth Primary 33/11 19 61.8 3.3 





4 Exeter Primary 33/11 30 95.0 3.2 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 19 59.2 3.1 
4 Redruth Primary 33/11 13 40.5 3.1 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 35 108.7 3.1 
4 Torquay Primary 33/11 9 27.7 3.1 
4 Plymouth Primary 33/11 34 104.2 3.1 
4 Bodmin Primary 33/11 25 76.3 3.1 
4 Taunton Primary 33/11 24 72.6 3.0 
4 Exeter Primary 33/11 53 159.5 3.0 
4 Bodmin Primary 33/11 1 3.0 3.0 
4 Exeter Primary 33/11 14 42.0 3.0 
4 Redruth Primary 33/11 20 59.4 3.0 
5 Bristol Primary 33/11 23 67.7 2.9 
5 Bristol Primary 33/11 7 20.6 2.9 
5 Bristol Primary 33/11 13 38.1 2.9 
5 Taunton BSP 132/33 2 5.9 2.9 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 28 81.3 2.9 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 33 95.5 2.9 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 14 40.4 2.9 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 14 40.1 2.9 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 19 54.4 2.9 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 14 40.0 2.9 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 24 67.6 2.8 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 34 95.2 2.8 
5 Bath Primary 33/11 28 77.5 2.8 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 29 79.9 2.8 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 27 73.6 2.7 
5 Bristol Primary 33/11 18 49.0 2.7 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 32 86.0 2.7 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 65 172.0 2.6 
5 Bath Primary 33/11 16 42.3 2.6 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 20 52.3 2.6 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 13 33.8 2.6 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 18 46.7 2.6 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 34 87.2 2.6 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 28 71.5 2.6 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 38 95.1 2.5 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 35 86.4 2.5 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 17 42.0 2.5 
5 Barnstaple BSP 132/33 37 90.7 2.5 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 35 85.5 2.4 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 26 63.4 2.4 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 21 51.1 2.4 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 25 60.6 2.4 
5 Weston BSP 132/33 7 16.9 2.4 
5 Bath Primary 33/11 33 79.7 2.4 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 13 31.2 2.4 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 30 70.6 2.4 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 27 63.4 2.3 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 45 103.0 2.3 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 22 50.1 2.3 





5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 44 99.3 2.3 
5 Bristol Primary 33/11 14 31.5 2.3 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 34 76.1 2.2 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 45 100.4 2.2 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 38 84.7 2.2 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 52 115.5 2.2 
5 Bristol Primary 33/11 11 24.4 2.2 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 35 77.6 2.2 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 29 63.8 2.2 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 36 79.1 2.2 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 23 50.5 2.2 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 17 37.2 2.2 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 31 67.2 2.2 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 33 70.8 2.1 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 34 72.5 2.1 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 39 82.8 2.1 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 39 82.4 2.1 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 22 46.3 2.1 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 63 132.4 2.1 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 18 37.7 2.1 
5 Exeter BSP 132/33 2 4.1 2.1 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 101 204.6 2.0 
5 Redruth BSP 132/33 3 6.0 2.0 
5 Bristol Primary 33/11 12 24.1 2.0 
5 Bodmin BSP 132/33 2 4.0 2.0 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 53 106.2 2.0 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 43 85.5 2.0 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 47 93.4 2.0 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 38 74.6 2.0 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 25 48.7 1.9 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 63 122.6 1.9 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 27 52.4 1.9 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 47 90.5 1.9 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 42 80.8 1.9 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 30 57.2 1.9 
5 Weston BSP 132/33 2 3.8 1.9 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 42 78.8 1.9 
5 Plymouth BSP 132/33 6 11.2 1.9 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 33 61.4 1.9 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 18 33.3 1.9 
5 Bath Primary 33/11 20 36.9 1.8 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 36 65.4 1.8 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 36 64.0 1.8 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 30 53.1 1.8 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 45 79.5 1.8 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 44 77.7 1.8 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 39 68.8 1.8 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 24 42.3 1.8 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 42 73.6 1.8 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 37 64.2 1.7 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 49 82.9 1.7 





5 Redruth Primary 33/11 38 63.5 1.7 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 40 64.9 1.6 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 57 91.6 1.6 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 31 49.3 1.6 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 48 76.1 1.6 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 30 46.9 1.6 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 66 102.5 1.6 
5 Bath Primary 33/11 25 38.7 1.5 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 39 60.1 1.5 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 41 62.8 1.5 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 34 52.1 1.5 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 38 57.9 1.5 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 32 48.7 1.5 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 40 60.8 1.5 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 37 56.0 1.5 
5 Bristol Primary 33/11 13 19.7 1.5 
5 Bath Primary 33/11 32 48.4 1.5 
5 Bristol Primary 33/11 21 31.4 1.5 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 35 51.5 1.5 
5 Barnstaple BSP 132/33 4 5.9 1.5 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 61 89.1 1.5 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 57 83.1 1.5 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 42 60.1 1.4 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 43 61.5 1.4 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 49 69.7 1.4 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 33 46.6 1.4 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 56 79.0 1.4 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 44 61.8 1.4 
5 Bristol Primary 33/11 22 30.8 1.4 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 37 51.8 1.4 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 48 67.1 1.4 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 30 41.1 1.4 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 53 71.2 1.3 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 45 60.2 1.3 
5 Bath Primary 33/11 44 58.1 1.3 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 40 52.2 1.3 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 65 84.7 1.3 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 35 45.6 1.3 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 55 71.0 1.3 
5 Bath Primary 33/11 31 40.0 1.3 
5 Bristol Primary 33/11 14 18.0 1.3 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 25 32.0 1.3 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 39 49.8 1.3 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 43 54.8 1.3 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 44 56.0 1.3 
5 Bath Primary 33/11 38 48.2 1.3 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 72 88.0 1.2 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 59 71.6 1.2 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 58 70.1 1.2 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 39 47.0 1.2 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 38 44.2 1.2 





5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 58 67.0 1.2 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 32 36.5 1.1 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 62 70.4 1.1 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 19 20.9 1.1 
5 Bath Primary 33/11 44 47.9 1.1 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 57 61.4 1.1 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 69 74.0 1.1 
5 Bath Primary 33/11 32 34.2 1.1 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 39 41.2 1.1 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 64 67.3 1.1 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 67 70.3 1.0 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 66 68.0 1.0 
5 Bath Primary 33/11 34 35.0 1.0 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 43 44.1 1.0 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 78 78.4 1.0 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 67 67.0 1.0 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 34 33.8 1.0 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 32 31.5 1.0 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 84 81.6 1.0 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 62 59.5 1.0 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 63 59.5 0.9 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 71 66.8 0.9 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 27 25.2 0.9 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 66 58.5 0.9 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 44 38.7 0.9 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 81 69.5 0.9 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 57 48.3 0.8 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 79 66.5 0.8 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 92 76.7 0.8 
5 Exeter Primary 33/11 56 46.5 0.8 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 95 78.2 0.8 
5 Bristol Primary 33/11 33 26.6 0.8 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 104 82.6 0.8 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 49 38.2 0.8 
5 Torquay Primary 33/11 84 63.7 0.8 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 74 54.6 0.7 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 75 54.4 0.7 
5 Bodmin Primary 33/11 64 46.2 0.7 
5 Redruth Primary 33/11 91 59.4 0.7 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 71 46.3 0.7 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 82 53.4 0.7 
5 Taunton Primary 33/11 68 44.2 0.7 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 82 51.8 0.6 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 47 29.0 0.6 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 74 45.0 0.6 
5 Plymouth Primary 33/11 90 54.4 0.6 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 93 56.0 0.6 
5 Weston Primary 33/11 84 47.6 0.6 
5 Barnstaple Primary 33/11 118 44.5 0.4 






Table of Criticality Bands allocated to substations for the West Midlands licence area, ranked in descending order 
of disruption magnitude. 
BAND District Asset Type Voltage (Up/Down) Faults SML SML per fault 
1 Tipton GSP 400-275/132 1 421.0 421.0 
1 Stoke BSP 132/33 1 263.0 263.0 
1 Gloucester Primary 33/11 1 197.0 197.0 
1 Tipton Primary 33/11 1 118.0 118.0 
1 Tipton BSP 132/33 1 97.0 97.0 
1 Stoke BSP 132/33 1 71.0 71.0 
1 Birmingham Primary 33/11 3 188.5 62.8 
1 Stoke Primary 33/11 1 54.0 54.0 
1 Gloucester BSP 132/33 5 210.0 42.0 
1 Tipton BSP 132/33 1 25.0 25.0 
1 Gloucester BSP 132/33 1 21.3 21.3 
2 Birmingham Primary 33/11 5 63.2 12.6 
2 Major Projects West GSP 400-275/132 1 12.2 12.2 
2 Birmingham Primary 33/11 9 93.8 10.4 
2 Worcester Primary 33/11 11 94.4 8.6 
2 Birmingham Primary 33/11 8 66.4 8.3 
2 Birmingham Primary 33/11 11 87.6 8.0 
3 Telford BSP 132/33 2 15.7 7.8 
3 Tipton GSP 400-275/132 1 7.4 7.4 
3 Telford BSP 132/33 4 23.8 6.0 
3 Tipton Primary 33/11 7 41.4 5.9 
3 Tipton Primary 33/11 1 5.2 5.2 
3 Birmingham Primary 33/11 20 98.6 4.9 
3 Birmingham Primary 33/11 15 73.2 4.9 
3 Birmingham Primary 33/11 15 67.1 4.5 
3 Telford Primary 33/11 8 34.8 4.4 
3 Birmingham Primary 33/11 9 39.0 4.3 
3 Birmingham Primary 33/11 15 62.0 4.1 
4 Gloucester Primary 33/11 34 128.2 3.8 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 19 66.1 3.5 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 23 77.1 3.4 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 19 62.1 3.3 
4 Worcester Primary 33/11 27 85.6 3.2 
4 Gloucester Primary 33/11 30 95.1 3.2 
4 Stoke Primary 33/11 24 71.9 3.0 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 23 68.4 3.0 
4 Stoke Primary 33/11 38 108.2 2.8 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 14 38.8 2.8 
4 Stoke Primary 33/11 41 111.9 2.7 
4 Tipton Primary 33/11 42 113.8 2.7 
4 Stoke Primary 33/11 24 64.7 2.7 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 25 66.4 2.7 
4 Telford Primary 33/11 34 87.8 2.6 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 28 72.2 2.6 
4 Stoke BSP 132/33 5 12.8 2.6 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 24 60.3 2.5 
4 Worcester Primary 33/11 35 83.6 2.4 





4 Major Projects West GSP 400-275/132 3 7.0 2.3 
4 Telford Primary 33/11 34 78.7 2.3 
4 Stoke Primary 33/11 19 43.2 2.3 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 31 68.4 2.2 
4 Stoke BSP 132/33 31 68.1 2.2 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 22 47.2 2.1 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 30 63.5 2.1 
4 Telford Primary 33/11 17 35.7 2.1 
4 Stoke Primary 33/11 20 40.9 2.0 
4 Telford Primary 33/11 23 46.8 2.0 
4 Birmingham Primary 33/11 28 56.0 2.0 
4 Stoke Primary 33/11 32 64.0 2.0 
4 Tipton Primary 33/11 17 33.9 2.0 
4 Telford Primary 33/11 30 59.4 2.0 
4 Stoke Primary 33/11 19 37.6 2.0 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 46 89.5 1.9 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 58 112.8 1.9 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 49 91.6 1.9 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 42 78.1 1.9 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 26 48.3 1.9 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 44 79.6 1.8 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 21 38.0 1.8 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 41 73.6 1.8 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 22 39.0 1.8 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 47 83.1 1.8 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 59 104.0 1.8 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 32 56.1 1.8 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 55 95.4 1.7 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 37 63.9 1.7 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 67 115.7 1.7 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 33 56.6 1.7 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 53 88.5 1.7 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 29 48.2 1.7 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 38 62.8 1.7 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 51 84.1 1.6 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 49 79.1 1.6 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 42 67.3 1.6 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 24 38.4 1.6 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 74 117.4 1.6 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 89 140.1 1.6 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 63 97.9 1.6 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 25 38.1 1.5 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 63 95.6 1.5 
5 Tipton BSP 132/33 4 6.0 1.5 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 57 85.7 1.5 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 31 45.5 1.5 
5 Birmingham Primary 33/11 32 46.9 1.5 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 64 93.0 1.5 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 65 94.0 1.4 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 57 82.4 1.4 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 45 64.9 1.4 





5 Hereford & Ludlow BSP 132/66 9 12.8 1.4 
5 Birmingham Primary 33/11 47 66.1 1.4 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 34 47.7 1.4 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 35 48.5 1.4 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 47 63.5 1.4 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 40 53.9 1.3 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 29 38.9 1.3 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 67 89.3 1.3 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 36 47.9 1.3 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 27 35.7 1.3 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 32 41.3 1.3 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 16 20.4 1.3 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 41 51.7 1.3 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 81 101.0 1.2 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 54 66.7 1.2 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 54 65.9 1.2 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 56 68.0 1.2 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 60 72.7 1.2 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 48 57.9 1.2 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 39 46.1 1.2 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 45 52.9 1.2 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 71 83.3 1.2 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 53 61.9 1.2 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 78 91.1 1.2 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 63 72.2 1.1 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 58 66.3 1.1 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 66 75.4 1.1 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 74 84.5 1.1 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 38 43.2 1.1 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 88 99.0 1.1 
5 Birmingham Primary 33/11 46 51.4 1.1 
5 Worcester BSP 132/33 37 41.3 1.1 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 73 81.4 1.1 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 68 75.5 1.1 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 46 50.6 1.1 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 56 61.0 1.1 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 109 118.7 1.1 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 91 98.5 1.1 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 68 73.4 1.1 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 49 52.6 1.1 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 56 58.7 1.0 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 35 36.4 1.0 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 44 45.6 1.0 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 68 69.7 1.0 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 63 63.8 1.0 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 42 42.5 1.0 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 30 29.6 1.0 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 87 85.2 1.0 
5 Birmingham Primary 33/11 59 57.7 1.0 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 69 67.3 1.0 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 52 50.6 1.0 





5 Telford Primary 33/11 74 71.6 1.0 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 34 32.7 1.0 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 65 62.0 1.0 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 35 33.1 0.9 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 62 58.6 0.9 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 69 65.0 0.9 
5 Birmingham Primary 33/11 74 69.5 0.9 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 46 43.1 0.9 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 45 42.1 0.9 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 83 77.5 0.9 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 64 58.2 0.9 
5 Birmingham Primary 33/11 27 24.5 0.9 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 91 82.0 0.9 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 46 41.1 0.9 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 69 59.8 0.9 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 59 50.8 0.9 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 64 55.0 0.9 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 58 48.8 0.8 
5 Birmingham Primary 33/11 94 79.1 0.8 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 66 54.9 0.8 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 83 69.0 0.8 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 60 49.7 0.8 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 66 53.4 0.8 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 70 56.5 0.8 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 70 56.4 0.8 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 64 50.7 0.8 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 80 62.0 0.8 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 56 42.9 0.8 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 81 61.7 0.8 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 61 46.2 0.8 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 59 43.1 0.7 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 65 47.5 0.7 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 65 47.2 0.7 
5 Birmingham Primary 33/11 60 43.2 0.7 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 82 58.4 0.7 
5 Telford Primary 33/11 78 55.3 0.7 
5 Birmingham Primary 33/11 78 54.5 0.7 
5 Birmingham Primary 33/11 78 54.4 0.7 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 50 34.4 0.7 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 78 52.1 0.7 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 113 75.4 0.7 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 61 40.2 0.7 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 92 60.4 0.7 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 68 44.0 0.6 
5 Stoke GSP 400-275/132 48 31.1 0.6 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 38 24.0 0.6 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 50 31.4 0.6 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 72 45.2 0.6 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 116 69.9 0.6 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 101 60.1 0.6 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 91 52.1 0.6 





5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 101 55.2 0.5 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 50 26.6 0.5 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 74 38.3 0.5 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 142 72.9 0.5 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 81 41.1 0.5 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 100 50.7 0.5 
5 Gloucester Primary 33/11 115 57.7 0.5 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 86 43.0 0.5 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 84 41.9 0.5 
5 Tipton Primary 33/11 77 38.3 0.5 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 84 41.5 0.5 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 112 53.7 0.5 
5 Hereford & Ludlow Primary 33/11 112 50.8 0.5 
5 Worcester Primary 33/11 118 50.5 0.4 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 74 28.6 0.4 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 113 39.7 0.4 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 73 23.7 0.3 
5 Stoke Primary 33/11 147 43.7 0.3 







APPENDIX C: RAILWAY NETWORK CRITICALITY BANDS 
Table of Criticality Bands allocated to locations for the Wessex route, ranked in descending order of disruption 
magnitude. 
BAND Location Incidents DM DM per Incident 
1 Strawberry Hill C.S.D. to Teddington 2 1504.6 752.3 
1 Motspur Park to Tolworth SDGS 2 945.8 472.9 
1 Nine Elms Jn to Vauxhall 5 1607.5 321.5 
1 Clapham Junction to Vauxhall 36 10512.6 292.0 
1 Fratton to Portcreek Jn 63 17983.9 285.5 
1 Clapham Junction to Wimbledon 88 23787.4 270.3 
1 New Malden 31 8103.8 261.4 
1 Andover to Romsey 4 1042 260.5 
1 Northam C.S.D. 6 1482.5 247.1 
1 Earlsfield to Wimbledon 29 7128.2 245.8 
1 Clapham Junction to London Waterloo 202 46136.7 228.4 
1 Winchester 44 9175.6 208.5 
1 Andover 2 416 208.0 
1 Eastleigh to St Denys 127 26286.3 207.0 
1 Earlsfield 23 4753.1 206.7 
1 Fawley Esso 3 567 189.0 
1 Winchester to Worting Jn 346 61683.8 178.3 
1 London Waterloo to Nine Elms Jn 15 2646.2 176.4 
1 Fratton 47 8250 175.5 
1 Basingstoke to Worting Jn 11 1861.9 169.3 
1 Southampton Eastern Docks 3 505.4 168.5 
1 Kingston 8 1341.4 167.7 
1 Bramley (Hants) 27 4483.6 166.1 
2 Eastleigh 125 20143.3 161.1 
2 Surbiton to Woking 132 21206.3 160.7 
2 Effingham Junction to Guildford 5 800.2 160.0 
2 Clapham Junction to Earlsfield 24 3813.4 158.9 
2 New Malden to Surbiton 76 12043.4 158.5 
2 Portsmouth & S'Sea D.C.S to Portsmouth & Southsea 44 6953.5 158.0 
2 St Denys 44 6932.9 157.6 
2 Surbiton to Weybridge 117 17898.9 153.0 
2 Wimbledon 89 12589.8 141.5 
2 Eastleigh to Winchester 160 22143.9 138.4 
2 Motspur Park to Wimbledon 64 8854.6 138.4 
2 Redbridge 45 6123.9 136.1 
2 Millbrook Hants..F.L.T. 9 1185.4 131.7 
2 Effingham Junction to Surbiton 2 258.4 129.2 





2 New Malden to Wimbledon 110 13469.1 122.4 
2 Wishford to Wylye Ahb 18 2197 122.1 
2 Fareham to St Denys 136 16470.5 121.1 
2 Alton to Farnham 123 14664.2 119.2 
2 
Southampton Western Docks to Southampton 
Central 2 238 119.0 
2 Brockenhurst to Redbridge 130 15385.7 118.4 
2 Vauxhall 48 5641.6 117.5 
2 Leatherhead 27 3154.6 116.8 
2 Cosham 32 3705.5 115.8 
2 Bournemouth to Brockenhurst 173 19830.6 114.6 
2 Reading Spur Jn to Wokingham 83 9219.6 111.1 
2 Ash to Guildford 40 4427.8 110.7 
2 Wokingham 44 4779 108.6 
2 London Waterloo 595 64396.4 108.2 
2 Fratton C.S.D. 9 964.5 107.2 
2 Aldershot 73 7790.5 106.7 
2 Barnes 67 7090.8 105.8 
2 Redbridge to Southampton Central 173 18280.3 105.7 
2 Cosham to Portcreek Jn 33 3447.9 104.5 
2 Basingstoke 194 19412.9 100.1 
2 Andover to Salisbury 75 7404.5 98.7 
2 Southampton Eastern Docks to St Denys 3 295 98.3 
2 Cosham to Havant 36 3437 95.5 
2 Southampton M.C.T. 25 2291 91.6 
2 Southampton Central to Southampton M.C.T. 11 1001 91.0 
2 London Waterloo to Vauxhall 115 10352.1 90.0 
2 Feltham 30 2690.4 89.7 
2 Feltham to Twickenham 86 7633 88.8 
2 Gillingham (Dorset) to Templecombe 10 885.5 88.6 
2 Maiden Newton to Yeovil Pen Mill 27 2299 85.1 
2 Cosham to Fareham 46 3873.5 84.2 
2 Fratton to Portsmouth & Southsea 64 5301.7 82.8 
2 Clapham Junction 185 15315.5 82.8 
2 Southampton Central to St Denys 222 18247.4 82.2 
3 Eastleigh East Yard 21 1674 79.7 
3 Portsmouth Harbour 103 8036.7 78.0 
3 Wool 18 1401 77.8 
3 Tolworth SDGS 5 389 77.8 
3 Surbiton 42 3259.4 77.6 
3 Nine Elms Jn 8 620.8 77.6 
3 Dorchester West to Maiden Newton 35 2710 77.4 
3 Brockenhurst 70 5403.3 77.2 
3 Staines 61 4692.6 76.9 





3 Alton 36 2729.8 75.8 
3 Guildford 109 8137.1 74.7 
3 Clandon to Effingham Junction 28 2063.2 73.7 
3 Ash Vale 33 2429.6 73.6 
3 Redbridge to Romsey 35 2566.4 73.3 
3 Worting Jn 21 1538 73.2 
3 Ash to Wokingham 107 7691.9 71.9 
3 Farnham 40 2847.9 71.2 
3 Kingston to Teddington 12 854.2 71.2 
3 Addlestone 9 617.8 68.6 
3 Epsom 69 4683.4 67.9 
3 Salisbury 79 5263.8 66.6 
3 Portcreek Jn 5 333 66.6 
3 Havant to Petersfield 135 8979.1 66.5 
3 Havant to Portcreek Jn 93 6159.3 66.2 
3 Weybridge 37 2413.6 65.2 
3 Farnborough (Main) to Woking 148 9424.8 63.7 
3 Weybridge to Woking 74 4707.4 63.6 
3 Staines to Virginia Water 126 7928.8 62.9 
3 Botley to Fareham 56 3481.1 62.2 
3 Twickenham 44 2691.2 61.2 
3 Woking 133 8091.9 60.8 
3 Fareham 59 3588.5 60.8 
3 Haslemere 71 4263 60.0 
3 Soton W Docks Shed 107 4 240 60.0 
3 Basingstoke to Bramley (Hants) 36 2148 59.7 
3 Haslemere to Petersfield 261 15521.5 59.5 
3 Branksome 19 1128.4 59.4 
3 Clapham Junction to Nine Elms Jn 123 7276.3 59.2 
3 Barnes to Putney 21 1226.2 58.4 
3 Ascot to Ash Vale 80 4645.8 58.1 
3 Chard Jn. S.B to Honiton 94 5162 54.9 
3 Honiton 13 707 54.4 
3 Yeovil Junction 16 865.5 54.1 
3 Farncombe to Haslemere 158 8542 54.1 
3 Gillingham (Dorset) to Salisbury 119 6377 53.6 
3 Aldershot to Ash Vale 44 2352.2 53.5 
3 Motspur Park 19 980.6 51.6 
3 Addlestone to Woking 16 816.6 51.0 
3 Wimbledon Park 7 352.6 50.4 
3 Templecombe 13 651 50.1 
3 Chessington South to Motspur Park 86 4292 49.9 
3 Guildford to Woking 62 3082.4 49.7 





3 Southampton Central 134 6603.9 49.3 
3 Bournemouth 101 4970 49.2 
3 Dorchester South to Weymouth 119 5849.2 49.2 
3 Epsom to Motspur Park 70 3432.8 49.0 
3 Wareham to Wool 79 3838.6 48.6 
3 Barnes to Brentford 111 5346.6 48.2 
3 Dorchester South to Wool 139 6614.8 47.6 
3 Poole 54 2565.5 47.5 
3 Basingstoke to Farnborough (Main) 170 8065.8 47.4 
3 Aldershot to Ash 28 1311 46.8 
3 Effingham Junction 28 1297.9 46.4 
3 Botley 29 1336.5 46.1 
3 Salisbury to Wishford 27 1236 45.8 
3 Feltham to Staines 76 3454.8 45.5 
3 Kingston to New Malden 37 1680 45.4 
3 Fawley Esso to Redbridge 21 952 45.3 
3 Clandon to Guildford 24 1076.4 44.9 
3 Botley to Eastleigh 50 2235.2 44.7 
3 Weymouth 50 2230.4 44.6 
3 Farncombe 22 971 44.1 
3 Fulwell to Teddington 15 655 43.7 
3 Yeovil Pen Mill 17 739 43.5 
3 Havant 117 5050.5 43.2 
3 Clapham Yard 16 687.8 43.0 
3 Chard Jn. S.B to Yeovil Junction 64 2748.5 42.9 
3 Portsmouth & Southsea 77 3189 41.4 
3 Templecombe to Yeovil Junction 61 2516.9 41.3 
3 Petersfield 33 1343 40.7 
3 Claygate to Effingham Junction 57 2306.2 40.5 
3 Bracknell to Wokingham 68 2745.4 40.4 
4 Andover to Worting Jn 41 1651 40.3 
4 Putney 14 562 40.1 
4 Hounslow 16 626.6 39.2 
4 Claygate 4 156 39.0 
4 Wareham 16 623 38.9 
4 Ash Vale to Woking 27 1045.5 38.7 
4 Poole to Wareham 61 2361.8 38.7 
4 Branksome to Poole 46 1759.9 38.3 
4 Epsom to Leatherhead 84 3212.8 38.2 
4 Brentford to Hounslow 52 1983.8 38.2 
4 Surbiton to Virginia Water 2 76 38.0 
4 Eastleigh to Romsey 46 1710.5 37.2 
4 Lymington Pier 8 286.6 35.8 





4 Farnborough (Main) 27 951 35.2 
4 Northam C.S.D. to St Denys 3 104 34.7 
4 Fulwell to Strawberry Hill 2 67 33.5 
4 Romsey 29 964.9 33.3 
4 Shepperton to Sunbury 8 263 32.9 
4 Dorchester South 34 1107.8 32.6 
4 Addlestone to Chertsey 20 648 32.4 
4 Strawberry Hill to Teddington 19 615.4 32.4 
4 Feltham to Hounslow 32 1024 32.0 
4 Gillingham (Dorset) 16 510.5 31.9 
4 Bournemouth to Branksome 52 1611.8 31.0 
4 Dorchester West to Weymouth 15 463.7 30.9 
4 Brentford 5 154 30.8 
4 Clapham Junction to Putney 74 2237.6 30.2 
4 Redbridge to Southampton M.C.T. 3 90 30.0 
4 Chessington South 10 299.2 29.9 
4 Sunbury 10 295.6 29.6 
4 Ascot 45 1304.8 29.0 
4 Hounslow to Twickenham 18 521 28.9 
4 Ascot to Virginia Water 47 1296.6 27.6 
4 Hampton Court to Surbiton 28 761.8 27.2 
4 Staines to Windsor & Eton Riverside 55 1481.8 26.9 
4 Windsor & Eton Riverside 25 668.6 26.7 
4 Aldershot to Farnham 28 738.8 26.4 
4 Hampton 13 330 25.4 
4 Strawberry Hill 34 862.8 25.4 
4 Shepperton 29 686.2 23.7 
4 Ash 19 418 22.0 
4 Strawberry Hill to Twickenham 15 329.8 22.0 
4 Virginia Water to Woking 13 276 21.2 
5 Ascot to Bracknell 24 470 19.6 
5 Dorchester West 12 232.5 19.4 
5 Effingham Junction to Leatherhead 26 457 17.6 
5 Epsom - Up Sidings 5 87.4 17.5 
5 Addlestone to Weybridge 16 278 17.4 
5 Chertsey to Virginia Water 11 182 16.5 
5 Clapham Junction to Wimbledon Park 11 179.8 16.3 
5 Fulwell to Hampton 7 112.2 16.0 
5 Brockenhurst to Lymington Pier 16 245.4 15.3 
5 Clandon 7 104.6 14.9 
5 Fulwell 24 350.2 14.6 
5 Hampton to Sunbury 14 194 13.9 
5 Chertsey 11 152 13.8 





5 Maiden Newton 10 130 13.0 
5 Shalford 6 75 12.5 
5 Guildford U.C.H.S. to Woking 2 24 12.0 
5 Claygate to Surbiton 14 160 11.4 
5 Bracknell 2 21 10.5 
5 Yeovil Junction to Yeovil Pen Mill 6 59 9.8 
5 Millbrook Hants..F.L.T. to Southampton Central 4 32 8.0 
5 Hamworthy T.C. to Poole 2 14 7.0 
5 Ash to Guildford U.C.H.S. 2 11 5.5 
5 East Putney to Wimbledon Park 2 9 4.5 
5 Fratton C.S.D. to Portsmouth & Southsea 2 8 4.0 
 
Table of Criticality Bands allocated to locations for the LNW (South) route, ranked in descending order of 
disruption magnitude. 
BAND Location Incidents DM DM per Incident 
1 Rowley Regis 4 4157 1039.3 
1 Princes R'Boro Ace 3 2446.3 815.4 
1 Weedon 5 3778 755.6 
1 Kingsbury Jn to Kingsbury SDGS 2 1285 642.5 
1 Bescot Up Engineers SDGS to Perry Barr North Jn 2 1218.5 609.3 
1 Ledburn Jn 64 27871.5 435.5 
1 Harrow & Wealdstone 24 10203.5 425.1 
1 Longbridge 28 11645.5 415.9 
1 Hanslope Jn to Weedon 133 55278.1 415.6 
1 Hanslope Jn 59 22727.8 385.2 
1 Kingsbury Jn to Park Lane Jn 6 2302 383.7 
1 Galton Jn to Wolverhampton Steel Term 9 3251.5 361.3 
1 Bescot Holding Sidings to Walsall 2 645 322.5 
1 Harrow & Wealdstone to Watford Junction 224 63578.3 283.8 
1 Ledburn Jn to Tring 76 21474.5 282.6 
1 Harrow & Wealdstone D.C. to Willesden Jn Low Level 199 55682.3 279.8 
1 Aynho Jn 10 2701.6 270.2 
1 Birmingham New Street to Galton Jn 169 43990.3 260.3 
2 Kingsbury Jn 34 8240 242.4 
2 Harrow & Wealdstone to Willesden West Londn Jn 524 126578.8 241.6 
2 Watford Junction 133 31418.3 236.2 
2 Aston 34 8014 235.7 
2 Wolverhampton 145 32823 226.4 
2 Galton Jn to Wolverhampton 199 44109 221.7 
2 Birmingham International to Coventry 162 34434.9 212.6 
2 Calvert 6 1268.8 211.5 





2 Stechford 10 2009 200.9 
2 Aston to Birmingham New Street 92 18451 200.6 
2 Barnt Green 20 3971.5 198.6 
2 Galton Jn 18 3535.5 196.4 
2 Hatton 18 3380.9 187.8 
2 Birmingham New Street to Kings Norton 126 23546.7 186.9 
2 Leamington Spa 53 9583.3 180.8 
2 Dorridge to Hatton 29 5155.6 177.8 
2 Kings Norton 29 5098.5 175.8 
2 Bordesley Jn 4 702 175.5 
2 Hanslope Jn to Northampton 80 13914.8 173.9 
2 Castle Bromwich Jaguar to Landor Street Jn 3 520 173.3 
2 Birmingham Moor Street to Tyseley 54 9193.1 170.2 
2 Birmingham New Street to Stechford 91 15302.3 168.2 
2 Bushbury Jn to Wolverhampton 72 12039 167.2 
2 Harrow & Wealdstone D.C. 44 7278 165.4 
2 Bletchley to Ledburn Jn 230 36995.7 160.9 
2 Queens Park (Dc) 47 7546.5 160.6 
2 Hanslope Jn to Milton Keynes Central 190 30232.4 159.1 
2 Queens Park (Dc) to Willesden Jn Low Level 83 13099 157.8 
2 Willesden West Londn Jn 43 6427.3 149.5 
2 Birmingham International 51 7418.8 145.5 
2 Kingsbury Jn to Landor Street Jn 191 26927 141.0 
2 Barnt Green to Redditch 13 1829 140.7 
2 Coventry 93 12875 138.4 
2 Nuneaton to Whitacre Jn 77 10655 138.4 
2 Stratford-Upon-Avon to Whitlocks End 19 2605.3 137.1 
2 Barnt Green to Longbridge 24 3233 134.7 
2 Birmingham New Street 558 74589.9 133.7 
2 Whitlocks End 2 266 133.0 
2 London Euston to Willesden West Londn Jn 272 35984.5 132.3 
2 St Albans Abbey to Watford Junction 52 6836.6 131.5 
2 Lawley Street F.L.T. 25 3280 131.2 
2 Birmingham International to Stechford 50 6506.8 130.1 
2 Four Oaks to Lichfield City 58 7433.5 128.2 
2 Birmingham Snow Hill to Rowley Regis 92 11728.4 127.5 
2 South Ruislip 15 1871.7 124.8 
3 Rugby to Weedon 176 21861.6 124.2 
3 St Albans Abbey 2 245 122.5 
3 Harrow & Wealdstone to Willesden Euroterminal 4 487 121.8 
3 Northampton to Rugby 205 24628.3 120.1 
3 Madeley Jn (Salop) 5 598 119.6 
3 Landor Street Jn 37 4365 118.0 





3 Bletchley 112 12552.1 112.1 
3 Madeley Jn (Salop) to Wolverhampton 99 10749 108.6 
3 Willesden Jn Low Level 45 4840 107.6 
3 Tring 64 6834.8 106.8 
3 Birmingham Moor Street to Birmingham Snow Hill 6 635 105.8 
3 Nuneaton 97 10127 104.4 
3 Stourbridge Junction 37 3808.2 102.9 
3 Four Oaks 13 1330 102.3 
3 Harrow & Wealdstone D.C. to Watford Junction 5 511 102.2 
3 London Euston to Queens Park (Dc) 29 2945 101.6 
3 Gerrards Cross to High Wycombe 81 8137.2 100.5 
3 Hatton to Leamington Spa 49 4803.4 98.0 
3 Birmingham New Street to Landor Street Jn 62 5919 95.5 
3 Lichfield City 14 1330 95.0 
3 Mitre Bridge Jn 42 3977.3 94.7 
3 Perry Barr North Jn to Walsall 188 17773 94.5 
3 Rugby 133 12567.1 94.5 
3 Bushbury Jn 24 2261 94.2 
3 Coventry to Rugby 168 15786.9 94.0 
3 Camden C.S.D. to London Euston 2 187.8 93.9 
3 Dorridge 28 2618.5 93.5 
3 Tyseley 18 1679.5 93.3 
3 Nuneaton to Rugby 260 24130.5 92.8 
3 Madeley Jn (Salop) to Wellington (Shropshire) 24 2219.5 92.5 
3 Banbury to Leamington Spa 126 11391.7 90.4 
3 Milton Keynes Central 89 7880.4 88.5 
3 Aston to Four Oaks 67 5812 86.7 
3 Aston to Perry Barr North Jn 43 3721 86.5 
3 Wembley Eur Frt Ops Cntre to Willesden West Londn Jn 4 341 85.3 
3 Tyseley to Whitlocks End 16 1363.5 85.2 
3 Park Lane Jn 5 419 83.8 
3 Gerrards Cross to South Ruislip 81 6655 82.2 
3 Park Lane Jn to Walsall 73 5973.5 81.8 
3 London Euston 146 11933.4 81.7 
3 Bescot Down Side to Walsall 11 886 80.5 
3 London Marylebone 95 7607.1 80.1 
3 Coventry to Leamington Spa 59 4649 78.8 
3 Bletchley C.S. 9 702.8 78.1 
3 Bescot Down Side to Perry Barr North Jn 5 377 75.4 
3 Portobello Jn (West Mids) 6 449 74.8 
3 Northampton 138 10183.2 73.8 
3 Bletchley to Milton Keynes Central 179 12872.9 71.9 
3 Camden C.S.D. 2 141 70.5 





3 Bordesley Jn to Tyseley 19 1332 70.1 
3 Birmingham Moor Street 49 3417.9 69.8 
3 Aynho Jn to Banbury 86 5801 67.5 
3 Birmingham New Street to Bordesley Jn 65 4328.5 66.6 
3 Perry Barr North Jn 23 1492.5 64.9 
3 Tyseley L.M.D. 4 256 64.0 
3 Landor Street Jn to Whitacre Jn 120 7596 63.3 
4 Stonebridge Park Depot to Willesden Jn Low Level 3 182 60.7 
4 Bordesley Jn to Landor Street Jn 15 892 59.5 
4 Stonebridge Park Depot 5 296 59.2 
4 Bescot Down Side 13 759 58.4 
4 Dorridge to Tyseley 86 5015.3 58.3 
4 Banbury 126 7336.3 58.2 
4 Rowley Regis to Stourbridge Junction 39 2270.5 58.2 
4 Lichfield Trent Valley Hl 25 1428 57.1 
4 Dorridge to Stratford-Upon-Avon 4 222 55.5 
4 Wembley Eur Frt Ops Cntre 16 885 55.3 
4 Landor Street Jn to Hams Hall Reception Line 2 109 54.5 
4 Hednesford 20 1073.5 53.7 
4 Bletchley C.S. to Milton Keynes Central 10 534 53.4 
4 Aynho Jn to Heyford 24 1258 52.4 
4 Aynho Jn to Bicester North 38 1925.8 50.7 
4 Bordesley Jn to Kings Norton 30 1445 48.2 
4 Hednesford to Rugeley Town 35 1685 48.1 
4 Castle Bromwich Jaguar 2 94 47.0 
4 Kidderminster to Stourbridge Junction 56 2631 47.0 
4 Hednesford to Walsall 135 6216 46.0 
4 Landor Street Jn to Park Lane Jn 13 593 45.6 
4 Walsall 39 1744 44.7 
4 Gerrards Cross 36 1605.5 44.6 
4 Kidderminster 52 2308.8 44.4 
4 Bescot Up Engineers SDGS 8 346 43.3 
4 Watford Junction Dc 20 848.6 42.4 
4 Birmingham Snow Hill 38 1609.1 42.3 
4 Galton Jn to Perry Barr North Jn 6 254 42.3 
4 Aylesbury 46 1892.6 41.1 
4 Bordesley Jn to Tyseley L.M.D. 10 400.5 40.1 
4 Aston to Stechford 7 280 40.0 
4 Whitacre Jn 7 274 39.1 
4 Perry Barr North Jn to Portobello Jn (West Mids) 36 1393 38.7 
4 Birmingham New Street to Perry Barr North Jn 32 1211 37.8 
4 Walsall Freight Terminal to Walsall 2 68 34.0 
4 Soho L.M.D. 2 68 34.0 





4 Hatton to Stratford-Upon-Avon 15 500.5 33.4 
4 Bescot Up Engineers SDGS to Walsall 3 94 31.3 
5 Rugeley Town 14 432 30.9 
5 Wellington (Shropshire) 17 514 30.2 
5 Kingsbury Jn to Lawley Street F.L.T. 3 87 29.0 
5 Harrow & Wealdstone to Wembley Eur Frt Ops Cntre 8 228 28.5 
5 Amersham to Aylesbury 34 938 27.6 
5 High Wycombe 18 487.7 27.1 
5 Portobello Jn (West Mids) to Walsall 17 447 26.3 
5 Amersham 2 50 25.0 
5 Lawley Street F.L.T. to Whitacre Jn 22 515 23.4 
5 Perry Barr North Jn to Soho L.M.D. 8 179 22.4 
5 Kingsbury Jn to Whitacre Jn 8 176 22.0 
5 Northampton Castle Yard 2 44 22.0 
5 Park Lane Jn to Whitacre Jn 6 129 21.5 
5 Galton Jn to Rowley Regis 19 396 20.8 
5 Willesden Brent Sidings 4 74 18.5 
5 Stratford-Upon-Avon 9 165 18.3 
5 Redditch 8 146 18.3 
5 Northampton Emd to Northampton 3 52 17.3 
5 Harrow & Wealdstone D.C. to Watford Junction Dc 54 904 16.7 
5 Round Oak to Stourbridge Junction 11 184 16.7 
5 Bicester North 21 337 16.0 
5 Mitre Bridge Jn to Willesden West Londn Jn 13 206 15.8 
5 Bushbury Jn to Portobello Jn (West Mids) 13 201 15.5 
5 Portobello Jn (West Mids) to Wolverhampton 9 134 14.9 
5 Lichfield City to Lichfield Trent Valley Hl 16 225 14.1 
5 Landor Street Jn to Lawley Street F.L.T. 3 41 13.7 
5 Wembley Lmd 5 64 12.8 
5 Aston to Galton Jn 7 85 12.1 
5 Bedworth Murco SDGS to Nuneaton 2 22 11.0 
5 Bushbury Jn to Madeley Jn (Salop) 5 49 9.8 
5 Birmingham Moor Street to Tyseley L.M.D. 2 8 4.0 









APPENDIX D: EXAMPLES OF NETWORK DIAGRAMS 
 
Example of WPD network diagram (REDACTED). 
[This image has been removed from the online version of the thesis due to copyright 






Example of NR traction feeder diagram (REDACTED). 
[This image has been removed from the online version of the thesis due to copyright 
and confidentiality restrictions] 
